Goldman Fears Lincoln’s Derivatives Language

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To the extent that strains in European sovereign debt and short-term money markets cause broader risk deleveraging, U.S. financials are not immune from falling asset prices. At the same time, while regulatory risk is (hopefully) reaching a peak, it does create the specter of an overhang for some time. In particular, our Washington analyst does not expect the Lincoln proposal to make it into the final bill, but should this occur, it would be very negative for investment banks and potentially exchanges, as volumes would suffer.

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“I mean there’s no partisan fight here, it’s just: let’s get the language right. And the language which is in the Senate bill is wrong. It’s just plain wrong. It’s going to cause significant contraction in the credit markets, and it’s going to make the derivative markets less stable less sound and push a lot of business and competition — business which we want in America — overseas.”

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Our normalized EPS estimates adjusted for potential regulatory impact implies that large banks can still generate a return on tangible common equity of 21% which is equivalent to a ROE of 13%. This compares to an average ROE for the banking industry of 15% during the 15 years preceding the crisis (1992-2006) and 11% during the 70 years preceding the crisis (1937-2006). While our implied ROE is higher than the average of the past 70 years it is lower than the past 15 years which we think is attainable. We believe that the benefits of increased scale and efficiency stemming from industry consolidation will partly offset the costs of added regulation, implying that the industry can generate a return higher than the average of the past 70 years but not as high as the past 15 years.