President Obama, addressing military families on Sunday at an Independence Day celebration, faces growing opposition to the Afghan war from within his own party. (epa/ZUMApress.com)

The war in Afghanistan has produced divisions among Democrats in Congress from the start, but a series of votes on Thursday night revealed a rising tide of Democratic discontentment that could alter the trajectory of the Obama administration’s approach to the conflict.

[Security1] A measure to fund the administration’s 30,000-troop surge with $33 billion narrowly passed late Thursday, by a 215-210 margin. But the inclusion of domestic spending projects in the overall package appeared to boost its support among some Democrats, while a number of votes on amendments signaled a growing desire for an exit strategy.

“The close vote shows the rising disagreements over war policy,” said Darrell M. West, director of governance studies at the Brookings Institution. “The war has never been popular among Democratic activists and now lawmakers are starting to express their own doubts.”

An amendment calling for a flexible withdrawal timetable — sponsored by Reps. David Obey (D-Wis.), Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) and Walter Jones (R-N.C.) — failed to pass the House, but it won 162 votes, including those of 153 Democrats, three-fifths of the Democratic caucus.

McGovern hailed it as an “important milestone” in a statement released Friday. “This vote should send a signal to the Administration that Congress is increasingly troubled by risking the lives of our troops and borrowing hundreds of billions of dollars for ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan while we are facing a dire economic situation here at home,” he said. “I will continue to work to build bi-partisan support for a meaningful exit strategy from this war.”

An amendment introduced Thursday by Rep. Barbara Lee (D-Calif.) proposed to restrict future war funding to troop redeployment and protecting soldiers presently in combat. It received 100 votes, including those of 93 Democrats. A third amendment to slash war funding entirely from the bill won the votes of 25 congressmen, including 22 Democrats, while an additional 22 Democrats chose not to oppose it and voted “present.”

“Obviously, a lot of people are understandably anxious. The sustainability of this war is in some doubt,” said Michael O’Hanlon, a foreign policy expert at Brookings.

Antiwar sympathies seemed notably stronger than during a previous effort in the House to implement a withdrawal timetable, a motion in March by Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) that failed 365-65. Prior attempts have likewise been overwhelmingly defeated.

Speaking out most forcefully for limits to the war were the 23 members of the “Out of Afghanistan Caucus,” established by Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) on May 18.

“It’s a fool’s errand,” said Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.), one of the members, during a press conference Thursday. “Every dollar we spend in Afghanistan, every life we waste there, is a waste. … What makes us think, what arrogance gives us the right to assume that we can succeed where the Moguls, the British, the Soviets, failed?”

Also on Thursday, Reps. Alan Grayson (D-Fla.), John Conyers (D-Mich.), Raul Grijalva (D-Ariz.) and Mike Honda (D-Calif.) took aim at President Obama for depicting the measure as urgent.

“It is disingenuous to say this is an ‘emergency’ supplemental,” they said in a joint statement. “The only emergency,” they said, is that “we are putting America further into debt” by “funding the longest war in history.” They added: “Last year, President Obama pledged to stop these off-budget gimmicks to hide the cost of war.”

West of Brookings noted that it’s historically unusual for presidents to face challenges over war policy from within their own party.

“Generally, members of your own party support your foreign policy,” he said. “It’s typical that you have to worry more about the opposition party than your own, and the fact that Democrats are expressing reservations should send a warning sign to the Obama administration.”

This deepening fissure could turn into a headache for the president and Democratic leaders.

“There’s been a schism in the Democratic Party over all wars since Vietnam. What matters is the intensity of it,” said Eric Alterman, of the liberal Center for American Progress. “[The antiwar coalition is] going to make it more difficult for [Obama] to continue the war, and they’re going to be a faction that has to be negotiated with.”

“But they’re not going to cut him off at the knees, they’re not to going to humiliate him, and they’re not going to destroy his presidency over it,” Alterman continued. “It’s not going to be the kind of thing that tears the party apart, as this issue has done in the past, because people have learned those lessons.”

O’Hanlon, a self-described Democrat and proponent of the Afghanistan occupation, cautioned that stripping funding now would cause Democrats to get “pilloried by Republicans” for “being weak on defense.” “It would be not only strategically unwise but politically suicidal,” he said.

And while skeptical Democrats could play an important role in determining the eventual outcome of the war, they may not wield much influence over the administration’s short-term strategy.

“This group has influence in the broader sense because obviously it has put a stake in the ground, and if things continue to go badly in Afghanistan, its influence will grow,” O’Hanlon said. “At some point it may be able to push the United States out of this conflict, but for now it’s not going to have any direct impact on strategy.”

Recent weeks and months have enhanced negative perceptions of the war, due to escalating violence, the ousting of Gen. Stanley McChrystal and charges of corruption by the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Polls suggest Americans are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the war.

The Obama administration hasn’t flinched in its commitment to the effort, and has even begun to back away from its promise to begin winding America’s involvement in the war next July. “That absolutely has not been decided,” said Defense Secretary Robert Gates on June 20 on Fox News, nothing that withdrawal will be “conditions-based.” Obama said on June 28 that there’s “a lot of obsession” about the withdrawal date, which irritated some Democrats who perceived it as a snub.

It’s unclear whether Democrats will accept the president’s decision to extend it beyond then, if he chooses to.

“I think a year from now all bets are off if we haven’t seen major progress,” O’Hanlon said. “It’s possible to imagine a revolt within the party in a year.”

And that’s the mark of a sensible policymaker. For the United States., victory is a category error in a war like Iraq. The goal is to mitigate the fundamental errors of invasion and occupation by leaving the country in the hands of a reasonably capable Iraqi government. If there is a victory to be had, it’s to be had by that government, when it finds a way to either defeat, co-opt or marginalize the rejectionists challenging its authority.

Or maybe another way. According to The New York Times, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is portraying the June 30 departure of U.S. combat troops from Iraqi towns and cities as a “great victory,” ahead of the forthcoming national elections. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, contended to Maliki that the prime minister should allow a limited U.S. combat presence in violent northern cities like Mosul. Maliki rejected the argument. His efforts are designed to cast himself as the man who ended the occupation of Iraq, in line with his years-long strategy of consolidating power within his office.

“We will not ask them to intervene in combat operations related to maintaining public order,” he said in an interview with Le Monde published last week. “It is finished.”

Sure, as of next week, 130,000 U.S. troops will still be in Iraq as an insurance policy, training and equipping the Iraqi security forces for missions like emergency medical evacuation, and with their helicopters flying in the skies for if things get gnarly. But that’s less important than the political dynamic that Maliki’s strategy reinforces, which is that there’s a dividend to be reaped by the leader who evicts the United States from Iraq. And while that may hurt American feelings, it gets the U.S. everything its interests require: out of Iraq, while a reliable-enough U.S. ally increases his hold on power. As a mitigation strategy, it works fairly well. Unsurprisingly, U.S. military leaders embrace it. Here’s military spokesman Stephen Lanza, a one-star general:

“Symbolically,” General Lanza said of the withdrawing American forces ahead of Tuesday, “this is what we want for the Iraqis as a sovereign nation.”

“These dates cannot be extended, and this is consistent with the transfer and handover of responsibility to Iraqi security forces,” Dabbagh said in a statement.

Iraqi government statements are occasionally walked back, so let’s wait and see if this one is. But the fact that Dabbagh put out a statement shooting down Gen. Raymond Odierno’s trial balloon indicates that Maliki thinks that extending the deadlines would provoke more chaos than allowing U.S. forces more time to conduct combat operations would suppress.

As Eric notes, the poll doesn’t (so far) break down why the 29 percent opposed the plan — too slow a withdrawal? Too rapid? Against the prospect of any withdrawal at all? Against anything that That One proposes? — and it’ll be instructive to see the basis for the opposition. But on some level, it may be more valuable to see why people support withdrawal. Are people simply sick of Iraq and would support any plan to get out, or is there something about the Obama plan that commands a broad constituency?

“President Obama’s plan establishes a reasonable timetable for redeployment of most of our forces from Iraq by August 2010 as promised by President Obama during his campaign.  However, I had expected that the size of the residual force would have been lower than 35-50,000 troops given the limited missions remaining after the brigade combat teams are removed.”

The question, I suppose, is whether antiwar figures think 16 months — from August 2010 to December 2011, when the Status of Forces Agreement turns the occupation of Iraq into a pumpkin — is too long to keep a force of that size for training/advisory/”limited counterterrorism” missions in Iraq.

Presumably, the force wouldn’t even stay at that size for 16 months, since a force sized at several divisions is unlikely to pack all its equipment up and go home in a single day. Three more years in Iraq is indeed a hedged bet, but think about it this way: As a candidate, Obama used to talk about a “residual force” past his old 16-month combat-troop withdrawal plan. The Status of Forces Agreement places a hard deadline on that comparatively open-ended proposal. It’s odd to be surprised by this after Obama spent two years talking about leaving 30,000 troops in Iraq indefinitely.

Mr. McCain said during the private White House meeting that he thought the withdrawal plan was thoughtful and well prepared, according to several people who were in the room. His spokeswoman, Brooke Buchanan, confirmed by e-mail on Thursday night that Mr. McCain is “supportive of the plan.”

The Iraq debate is over.

The United States plans to withdraw most of its troops from Iraq by August 2010, 19 months after President Barack Obama’s inauguration, according to administration officials. The withdrawal plan would fulfill one of Obama’s central campaign pledges, albeit a little more slowly than he promised. He said he would withdraw troops within 16 months, roughly one brigade a month from the time of his inauguration. …

The 19-month strategy is a compromise between commanders and advisers who are worried that security gains could backslide in Iraq and those who think the bulk of U.S. combat work is long since done.

Why, 19 months instead of 16??? What a craven sellout!!1!! A SLAP IN THE FACE to his antiwar base! A three-month-long slap in the face!

OK, seriously, I’ve confirmed the story independently, and this is extremely well played. Portraying a three-month delay in pulling combat forces out as a “compromise” with those who wanted a slower withdrawal is a great way to nullify bureaucratic opposition to withdrawal. The “23-months” option was mooted, considered, and rejected, and it’s very hard to see see how 90 extra days of combat could be substantively problematic to even hardcore antiwar forces. Last year, withdrawing combat forces from Iraq on a fixed timetable was “reckless.” This year it’s the “compromise” policy of the U.S. government. Everyone gets something — thereby neutralizing rejectionism — and those who want to end the war get the lion’s share. Ironically, it’s wise counterinsurgency strategy.

Now let’s see if conservatives try and portray 90 days as an abandonment of a campaign promise and proof that Obama is just like George W. Bush.

U.S. Army soldiers at Forward Operating Base Warrior, Iraq (army.mil)

It was supposed to lock in an indefinite U.S. occupation.

Last year, after the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Iraq considered the U.N. Security Council mandate for the U.S. occupation an affront to Iraqi sovereignty, the Bush administration signed a “Declaration of Principles” with Maliki for the future of the U.S.-Iraq relationship. It underscored the prospective terms for an agreement on an indefinite U.S. presence. American and Iraqi negotiators have now spent months working on this accord.

But the latest — and possibly final — text of that agreement reveals that the Iraqi government has undermined practically every effort made by the Bush White House to lock in the occupation as an enduring feature of U.S. foreign policy.

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

Instead of entrenching the occupation, a draft of the accord, dated Oct. 13 and currently being circulated by members of the U.S. House of Representatives, insists on a 2011 pullout date, with Washington “recogniz[ing] the Iraqi government’s sovereign right” to demand an earlier withdrawal. “Dec. 31, 2011 looks like the real deadline,” said Ilan Goldenberg, policy director of the National Security Network, a liberal policy organization.

Iraqi negotiators are exhausted, said Rend al-Rahim, the Iraqi ambassador to the U.S. from 2003 to 2004. “There’s a sense of crisis, ongoing crisis associated with this SOFA,” al-Rahim said in a phone interview from Baghdad, using the acronym for a Status of Forces Agreement — the formal term for a garrisoning accord. “All Iraqi officials I’ve talked to are worn out by this, not only because of negotiators on the Iraqi side [feeling frustrated with the U.S.], but also by internal Iraqi negotiations. You cannot underestimate the complications to the SOFA created by internal Iraqi political dynamics.”

As currently written, the accord hardly makes the occupation permanent. Instead, it could make it easier for a hypothetical President Barack Obama to withdraw from Iraq — and make it more difficult for a hypothetical President John McCain to remain indefinitely.

Rather than establish an open-ended presence, Article 25 of the Oct. 13 draft states, “the U.S. forces shall withdraw from Iraqi territories no later than Dec. 31, 2011.” U.S. combat forces must also pull back “from all cities, towns and villages” long before that — “no later than June 30, 2009.”

More than that, the text states that the Iraqis reserve “the sovereign right to request a withdrawal of U.S. forces at any time.” Between now and 2011, all military activities performed by U.S. troops must be coordinated through “a joint committee of military operations,” giving the Iraqis a potential veto over U.S. actions in Iraq.

The draft accord places other restrictions on the U.S. freedom of movement. Article 12 states Iraq will have “primary legal jurisdiction” over U.S. personnel “in the case of major and intentional crimes” that take place off U.S. bases or while “troops are off duty.” Iraq also has “primary legal jurisdiction” over “contractors with the U.S. and their employees” — something Iraqis insisted on after contractors employed by the Blackwater private security firm were accused of killing 17 Iraqi civilians in September, 2007.

A Black Hawk helicopter lands in Baghdad (army.mil)

Far from establishing permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq, Article 5 specifies that all U.S.-used installations or facilities “will be returned to the Iraqi authorities after this agreement expires.”

How the Bush administration got to this point is instructive. In the spring and summer, a team of negotiators led by Amb. Ryan Crocker — and backed at the White House by a National Security Council staffer named Brett McGurk — pushed far-reaching terms on the Iraqis. Washington pressed for exemptions from Iraqi law applying not only to U.S. troops, as is traditional, but to U.S. contractors for private corporations at work in Iraq.

It also sought a free hand when conducting military operations — without having to consult Iraqis — and the ability to arrest Iraqis as it saw fit. Reportedly, Washington even claimed the right to control Iraqi airspace for all aircraft flying below 29,000 feet. “It is a terrible breach of our sovereignty,” one Iraqi politician told Patrick Cockburn of The Independent of London.

Surprising to both the administration and many outside observers, the Iraqis began to push back. Figures outside the government, especially radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, demanded that Maliki refuse any open-ended occupation. Maliki responded by taking the dramatic step of endorsing Obama’s plan to withdraw combat troops by 2010, even mentioning the candidate’s plan in an interview with the German news magazine Der Spiegel.

“As late as July, you had the prime minister saying the draft was totally unacceptable,” said Rahim. “That’s not the sense now. It’s no longer an unacceptable agreement — it’s a workable one. That doesn’t mean it’s going to be signed, because of political problems — domestic Iraqi problems.”

Looking to salvage as much from the deal as it could, the Bush administration — which had spent five years arguing that a timetable for withdrawal amounted to a dishonorable defeat — agreed in the draft to so-called “time horizons” for removing troops. The acceptance would “take the heat off [Maliki] a little bit, to rebrand the thing and counter the narrative that he’s negotiating for a permanent military presence in Iraq,” one negotiator told Karen DeYoung of The Washington Post in July.

The Bush administration also ended up locking itself into a process that created more difficulties. On Dec. 31, the legal mandate for the occupation set by the United Nations will expire, effectively acting as a deadline for Washington to reach a deal with Iraq.

The Iraqis’ continued belief that the text doesn’t adequately protect Iraqi sovereignty has caused nervousness among senior officials that time is running out. “There is great potential for losses of significant consequence” if the U.S. military loses the legal authority to operate in Iraq, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said this week.

Similarly, Defense Sec. Robert Gates effectively announced that Washington will not significantly renegotiate the draft accord. “There is great reluctance to engage further in the drafting process,” Gates said. “I don’t think you slam the door shut, but I would say it’s pretty far closed.”

Yet a wide-ranging group of Iraqis remain dissatisfied with many aspects of the deal, if for different reasons. Some would prefer that the text include a provision allowing a continuing review of security conditions before withdrawal. Others are concerned about the Article 22 provision, that when the deal goes into force “all detainees in U.S. custody shall be released.”

Still others fear that an Article 28 provision does not obligate the U.S. to defend Iraq from external aggression while its troops operate on Iraqi soil. Rahim said these concerns were “not fundamental,” but added, “This is all happening in a climate where there are elections in the U.S. and provincial elections very soon in Iraq. And undoubtedly those two factors complicate the situation.”

Some analysts in the U.S. remain concerned as well. “Increasingly I see a danger that a new administration could face an overwhelming set of priorities — on the economic and domestic fronts as well as national security — that such an agreement with in Iraq could set into motion a certain path of dependency in the policy — creating facts on the ground in a sense,” said Brian Katulis, a fellow at the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank, in an email. “Just like the appointments of Gens. Ray Odierno and David Petraeus could serve to constrain fundamental changes on Iraq policy, an agreement — if (and it is very big if) it is achieved — could set into motion a series of commitments that might be more difficult for a new administration to break just as it is getting its team in place and setting its priorities.”

But the agreement appears to be a bigger constraint for a new administration that wishes to stay in Iraq, not one that wishes to leave. “According to this draft only the Iraqis can ask for an extension of American forces remaining in Iraq,” said Goldenberg of the National Security Network. “And that is a request that, as far as I can tell, would be politically impossible for them to make. So, yeah, Dec. 31, 2011, looks like the real deadline.”

Neither the Obama campaign nor the McCain campaign responded to requests for comment. In an interview with CNN on Wednesday, McCain misrepresented what the accord states. “You know it’s condition-based, and that’s the big fight was all about,” he lectured Wolf Blitzer, who accurately stated that the accord calls for hard dates for withdrawal.

Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, expressed concern about legal protections for U.S. troops in Iraq, but, in a statement issued Friday, said that he would reserve judgment until the text is finalized.

Levin, however, praised the agreement for setting a date to withdraw from Iraq. “The proposed agreement with Iraq includes strict deadlines for the pullback of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities and towns by next summer; and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011,” he said in the statement. “Clearly, now, the administration is willing to accept such deadlines, despite the president’s past insistence that similar congressionally-proposed goals for the withdrawal of U.S. forces would be ‘setting a date for failure.’”

Blitzer: The Bush administration seems to be close to what is called a “status of forces” agreement with the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. It calls, in the draft agreement at least, for the complete withdrawal of combat forces from villages and cities by July 30 of 2009, and out of the country by December 30, 2011. If you’re elected president, would you, as commander-in-chief, honor this agreement if, in fact, it’s formalized?

McCain: With respect Wolf, and you know better, my friend. You know better. It’s condition-based. It’s conditions-based, and Ryan Crocker, our ambassador to Baghdad, said, “If you want to know what victory looks like, look at this agreement.”

You know better than that, Wolf. You know it’s condition-based, and that’s what the big fight was all about.

Actually, my friends, it’s McCain who should know better. I’ll have much more on this in a piece tomorrow morning, but if you read Article 25 of the Oct. 13 text — as I blogged yesterday — you’ll see it says that “The U.S. forces shall withdraw from Iraqi territories no later than December 31st, 2011″ and goes on to say “U.S. combat forces will withdraw from all cities, towns, and villages as soon as the Iraqi forces take over the full security responsibilities in them. The U.S. withdrawal from these areas shall take place no later than June 30th, 2009.”

The only possible claim to truth McCain has here is in subsection 4, which allows for a “review” for “one side asking the other to extend or reduce the time periods mentioned.” But changing the dates requires “both sides’ approval,” which is going to be difficult to obtain and easy for one side to obstruct. What the agreement definitely does not call for is “conditions” to determine the pace of withdrawal.

Sorry, my friend, but your position on the war is in tatters.