The peace-building think tank wants to explore the lessons of SMS-based relief campaigns for victims of the Haiti earthquake and Pakistani military push against Taliban insurgents for the Afghanistan conflict. Both were heavily promoted by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and both appeared to have some ameliorative impact, though precisely how much is unclear. Richard Holbrooke, the administration special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is going to give the keynote at the panel, and in attendance will be his two key communications aides, Vikram Singh and Ashley Bommer.

The panel doesn’t appear to think texting is a substitute for a political or economic or development strategy. But here’s what it’s looking at:

• Improving governance –  rule of law and anti-corruption
• Countering extremism – media development and counter-insurgency
• Delivery of essential services – education, health, agricultural development, commerce

Text Taliban geospatial coordinates to ISAF headquarters.

A team of 100 authors and researchers at the U.S. Institute of Peace, led by Beth Cole, has published a civilian’s manual, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, in the hope of getting civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations and international partners to coalesce around a “strategic concept” for operations in non-traditional conflict zones like Iraq or Afghanistan. The manual, published today, came after Amb. John Herbst, head of stabilization and reconstruction efforts for the State Department, observed two years ago that there wasn’t a unified civilian doctrinal publication for the sorts of complex operations that the U.S. was finding itself involved in fighting. Cole’s effort is the answer. “This is rocket science,” she said.

The document itself — which I’ve obtained in print; it should be available later today on USIP’s website and perhaps the State Department’s blog — identifies five common “end states” for what Cole said “planners, practitioners and decisionmakers” should envision for stabilization and reconstruction efforts: a safe, secure environment; the rule of law; social well-being; a stable government; and a sustainable economy. From there, senior policymakers can conceive of how to produce them and what resources are necessary. The manual isn’t intended for civilian government advisers out in, say, Afghanistan’s Helmand Province — it’s about “why” and not “how,” Cole says.

Herbst was the first recipient of the brand-new manual — he got a copy two weeks ago and is responsible for disseminating it throughout the U.S. government and building a constituency for its concepts within the Obama administration. But Cole has a heavy-hitter partner in Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, the head of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth and the driving force behind FM 3-07. Sitting next to Cole this morning at a small briefing on the manual for reporters, Caldwell explained that the overarching purpose behind his stability operations field manual was to effect a “change in our culture, a change in our mindset,” and that the “civilian side doesn’t have a system set up” to achieve the same result. Until now.

“There is a schedule… in the hands of the two ministries [Iraqi ministries of Defense and Interior] to cover the training and equipment program, which is definitely [farther] than 2011, despite the fact that Iraq and the U.S. are committed to implement the SOFA and complete withdrawal at 2011.” Eissawi suggested that the [Iraqi security forces] would not be fully prepared to handle external threats until 2018.

“I think this should be the decision of the next Iraqi government to reevaluate the status of the security forces,” Eissawi continued. “I think it is possible for Iraq or the U.S. to restudy their situation again, to decide at that time whether to [participate] in another phase of agreement or not.” However, Eissawi assured, “for the time being in Baghdad,” the assumption is that the SOFA will be carried out and withdrawal will be complete at the end of 2011.

He prefers the term “transnational violent extremists” to “terrorists” — as in, Afghanistan can’t again become a haven for transnational violent extremists. Petraeus opens with the challenges in Afghanistan, where there “is nothing easy,”  and they’re well known: a deterioration of security; rampant corruption; poor governance.” And then:

“Afghanistan is not Iraq,” Petraeus says, reminding that “every case is unique” in counterinsurgency. (What about the so-called Sons of Afghanistan program, which is basically a template lifted from Iraq? He doesn’t say.)

He quotes Gen. David McKiernan’s much-cited “tyrannies of topography, distance and weather” to distinguish the two countries, and adds that the “human terrain” is much different, in terms of illiteracy rates, tribal ties and natural resources. Basic services — electricity and water, in particular — lag well behind Iraq, which itself is not exactly service-heavy. Petraeus might have added that Afghanistan basically lacks infrastructure as well.

“Achieving progress, needless to say, will take time,” Petraeus adds, requiring a “sustained” commitment. Progress in security needs to go hand-in-hand with development of infrastructure, the rule of law and governance capabilities, including the provision of credible elections. (All this is basic counterinsurgency stuff.) More Afghan security forces are necessary, but so are “greater civilian contributions” and greater international assistance.

“It’s not possible to solve the problems internal to Afghanistan without addressing the challenges” to Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan, and especially in Pakistan’s northwest frontier province, which Petraeus cites as more dangerous to Pakistan than India. (Diplomatic!) “The central Asian states must also be part of the strategy for Afghanistan,” he contends. That might be an interesting component to Petraeus’ south-Asia review. There are also congruent interests with “Iran, although there are also conflicting interests,” and with a smile, Petraeus quickly changes the subject away from that controversy.

“Partners, not occupiers,” was how Petraeus summed up the basic relationship between the United States, NATO and Afghanistan. It’s as much a goal as a description of the situation America faces in Afghanistan. In the end, a “sustained commitment” from the United States to the entire region has the greatest chance of producing success and stability, from the perspective of U.S. interests. Not a word about talks with the Taliban this time around, though.

Accordingly, the event will offer a glimpse of how likely Obama appointees view the challenges ahead: speakers include Wendy Sherman, often mentioned as a possible State Department troubleshooter in east Asia; Daniel Kurtzer, a possible Israel/Palestine policy czar; Anne-Marie Slaughter, who may become the State Department’s chief of policy planning; noted counterinsurgency expert Janine Davidson, who’s part of President-elect Barack Obama’s Pentagon transition team; as well as two military officers you may have heard of: Gen. David Petraeus and Adm. Michael Mullen.

Rice’s imminent speech won’t be the only one offering a defense of the Bush administration’s record. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is in the lineup, as is outgoing Pentagon Undersecretary for Policy Eric Edelman and proliferation official Bob Joseph (he of the Sixteen Words). Naturally, I will be riveted. Dispatches will come throughout the day.

Update: Never mind! Rice, it was just announced, is in New York working with the U.N. Security Council on a Gaza ceasefire. However, I just saw former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry walk in, so there you go.