I admit I overlooked this case, because it was initially reported as a suicide. But it’s no longer so clear that that’s the case.  now looks like that may not have been the case. Guantanamo spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Brook DeWalt told According to journalist Naomi Wolf, “the status of the investigation into Mr al-Hanashi’s death … is now a Naval criminal investigation – meaning that he is no longer considered a suicide but a victim of a murder or a negligent homicide.”

Guantanamo spokesman Lt. Cmdr Brook DeWalt, however, who I spoke to after initially writing this post, denies that interpretation. According to DeWalt, “any death is investigated by NCIS [Naval Criminal Investigative Service] on navy bases. Whether it be natural causes, whether it be suicide, criminal, across the board.”

Wolf’s “news” has just gotten a little fuzzier. What is clear, though, is that five months after al-Hanashi’s death, we still don’t know what happened to him.

In all the discussion of where the administration is going to try Guantanamo detainees, the news about Hanashi has been buried.  It’s In fact, both the Bush and Obama administrations have been extremely tight-lipped about the deaths of detainees in U.S. custody. Although the government reports when a Guantanamo detainee dies, As I’ve pointed out before, at some point the military stopped reporting the deaths of its prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan. I’ve repeatedly asked why, and I’ve asked the Pentagon to define its current policy for reporting deaths of detainees in U.S. custody overseas.

I’ve never received any explanation. I’ll keep trying.

This post has been updated for clarification, based on DeWalt’s statement that Wolf misinterpreted his remarks.

The federal judge who helped draft Justice Department memos on torture has set up a legal defense fund to pay the costs of defending against possible disciplinary or impeachment proceedings. Jay Bybee, a U.S. Court of Appeals judge in Las Vegas, quietly set up the fund last July following widespread news reports that he and a former deputy, John Yoo, were the focus of a long-running investigation by the Justice Department’s internal ethics unit, the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), over their role in crafting the memos.

Attorney General Holder said yesterday he expected the Justice Department would finally release a version of the OPR report by the end of the month. Judge Bybee is evidently prepared for the rather nettlesome case of his former employer considering him unfit to practice law: Isikoff reports that he’s got Liz Cheney’s advocacy group, Keep America Safe, on his side.

One interesting question arises. Bybee’s former deputy John Yoo helped him craft the torture memos in 2002. Yoo faces similar criticism and legal difficulty, and is reportedly implicated in the OPR report alongside his old boss. But Yoo’s personal legal expenses are, risably, covered by the American taxpayer. Will Bybee similarly stick us with the bill?

“The report is completed,” said Holder. “It is in its last stages of review now.” Holder said it was delayed “because of the amount of time we gave to the lawyers who were the subject of the report to respond. And then people in OPR had to respond to their responses.” Holder said that in this final stage, “a career prosecutor has to review the report. We expect that process should be done by the end of the month. At that point the report should be issued.”

So it’s significant that today they’ve released a report calling on the United States to follow its legal obligation to prosecute the leaders in the U.S. government responsible for the “torture, cruel and inhuman treatment” of detainees during its own “war on terror.”

“Investigations and prosecutions should focus on the engineers of official policies that were the basis of illegal abuses, to send a clear signal that the absolute prohibition of torture and the ban on cruel and inhuman treatment will be respected by the United States,” the report said, adding that if the U.S. government fails to initiate prosecutions, then other countries will take up the cause. Italy, for example, recently convicted 23 Americans for their involvement in “extraordinary renditions.”

“Failing to hold accountable the architects and overseers of a policy of abuse undermines the U.S. justice system and the fundamental idea that law provides a check on power,” Alex Boraine, acting president of ICTJ, said in a statement today. “As we have seen in countless examples around the world, abuse of power by allowing torture and cruel treatment can tear down what the law and democracy have built.”

While there’s support among many Democrats for some sort of accountability, whether through criminal prosecutions or an independent truth commission, Republicans vehemently resist any suggestion that the Bush administration even did anything wrong.

Since Attorney General Eric Holder announced on Friday that the Justice Department would try the alleged 9/11 co-conspirators in a U.S. federal court in New York, some Republicans have denounced the move as an illegitimate attempt to put the Bush administration, rather than the terrorists, on trial.

“The government is going to try to put Khalid Sheik Mohammed on trial. Defense lawyers will try and put the government on trial,” former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani told Fox News.

Tom Ridge, head of the Department of Homeland Security during the Bush administration, added that any effort to use the 9/11 trial to “delve into a fishing expedition” to go after Bush officials is “wrong and unconscionable.”

Meanwhile, in The Wall Street Journal today, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo — a potential target of any future criminal prosecution of Bush officials — attacked the decision to try the 9/11 detainees in federal court as a dangerous mistake. “The treatment of the 9/11 attacks as a criminal matter rather than as an act of war will cripple American efforts to fight terrorism,” Yoo wrote. “It is in effect a declaration that this nation is no longer at war.”

Attorney General Eric Holder (WDCpix)

On October 30, the Justice Department for the first time applied its new “state secrets” policy to a case charging the government with breaking the law. Open government advocates hoping for a significant change in the government’s stance toward secrecy in national security cases were sorely disappointed. Attorney General Eric Holder said that in the case of Shubert v. Obama — a class action filed in 2007 claiming that the National Security Agency has an ongoing dragnet surveillance program spying on the telephone and e-mail communications of ordinary Americans — the government would do the same thing it’s done repeatedly in the past: it would move to dismiss the case, because even to respond to the charges would endanger national security by revealing sensitive “state secrets.”

The state secrets privilege allows the government to ask a court to dismiss a case filed against it by claiming that merely allowing the case to move forward in court would reveal government secrets and jeopardize national security. It’s frequently used by the Justice Department in cases alleging warrantless wiretapping, “extraordinary rendition” and abuse of detainees by U.S. officials has angered open-government advocates, who claim that the Bush administration, and now President Obama, is using the evidentiary privilege to conceal government wrongdoing.

Image by: Matt Mahurin

“We are not invoking this privilege to conceal government misconduct or avoid embarrassment, nor are we invoking it to preserve executive power,” Holder insisted, adding that “we have given the court the information it needs to conduct its own independent assessment of our claim by filing a classified submission outlining the underlying facts and providing a detailed record upon which it can rely.”

Because that information is filed with the court under seal, however, it’s impossible to know whether the government’s reasons are legitimate. That decision will be made by Judge Vaughn Walker, the federal judge in the Northern District of California who’s presiding over this and several other pending cases that the government also claims involve “state secrets.”

But lawyers and advocates for government transparency were dismayed that the Obama administration would even assert the privilege in the Shubert case after promising to severely restrict its use.

“What they’re saying is, ‘because of state secrets, we can’t tell you what the program is,’” said Ilann Maazel, a lawyer representing Virginia Shubert and the three other Brooklyn residents named in the the case who claim the government has been wiretapping them without a warrant. “There’s no limit to the state secrets privilege in their view. There’s no law they cannot violate that implicates national security in their view. Their view is, ‘just trust us.’ ”

Maazel is hardly the only one disappointed with how the Obama administration has used the privilege so far.

“The DOJ continues to embrace the very same “state secrets” theories of the Bush administration—which Democrats generally and Barack Obama specifically once vehemently condemned—and is doing so in order literally to shield the President from judicial review or accountability when he is accused of breaking the law,” wrote Salon blogger and constitutional lawyer Glenn Greenwald after the Justice Department moved to dismiss the Shubert case.

Daniel Metcalfe, a former Justice Department official and now Executive Director of the Collaboration on Government Secrecy at American University’s Washington College of Law, also thinks the new administration’s record on the issue overall has been disappointing.

“On the state secrets privilege as well as other transparency issues, the Obama administration has an easy act to follow, in that the Bush administration was so extremely secretive across the board,” he said. “But from early on, specifically as of February 9 when the Obama administration began following the Bush administration’s state secrets position in the case of Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,” a lawsuit challenging the government for its role in torture and extraordinary rendition, “open government advocates have been quite alarmed,” said Metcalfe. Although he acknowledged that it takes time for a new administration to develop its own policies, “the Obama administration’s eventual state secrets policy issuance of September 23 has done very little to assuage these growing concerns.”

The Collaboration on Government Secrecy gives President Obama a “D” on its secrecy/transparency scorecard for his use of the state secrets privilege so far. Metcalfe added that the Justice Department still has not completed a promised review of the cases where the government has invoked the state secrets privilege to dismiss them. The new state secrets policy announced in September did not mention that review.

The problem isn’t only that Holder wants to ues the privilege once again to dismiss a case that challenges government conduct. As Steven Aftergood, director of the Project on Government Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists has pointed out in his blog, the government may not even be following all aspects of its new policy.

Part of that policy, announced in September after months of delay, attempts to respond to the concern that the state secrets policy can be used to conceal government lawbreaking. The new policy requires more thorough review by senior Justice Department officials, including the Attorney General himself. But it also says that if the Attorney General believes the case “raises credible allegations of government wrongdoing,” he’s supposed to refer those allegations to an Inspector General for further investigation.

Shubert v. Obama claims the government is engaged in a broad surveillance “dragnet” that monitors ordinary Americans’ phone and internet communications without a warrant and without any suspicion that the targets have done anything wrong. It would all sound very sci-fi — and therefore, perhaps, not credible — if there weren’t strong evidence to back it up. That evidence was first introduced in the case of Jewel v. NSA, brought by the Electronic Frontier Foundation last year. In that case, a former AT&T telecommunications technician named Mark Klein submitted a sworn declaration describing how AT&T routed copies of Internet traffic to a secret room in San Francisco controlled by the NSA. Only employees cleared by the NSA were allowed to enter the room. The government has likewise moved to dismiss that case on state secrets grounds. The matter is still pending in the same federal district court in California where the Shubert case is filed.

After Klein’s testimony became public, another whistleblower came forward, this time a former NSA Intelligence Analyst. In January, Russell Tice told Keith Olbermann on MSNBC that “the NSA had access to all Americans’ communications – faxes, phone calls, computer communications. They monitored all communications.”

But is that enough evidence to require the Attorney General to refer the claims to an Inspector General for investigation, as the new policy requires? It’s impossible to know, because the new policy doesn’t say how the AG should decide which claims are “credible.”

Asked whether the Justice Department referred the matter to an inspector general, spokesperson Tracy Schmaler told TWI that she “can’t comment specifically” on that question, adding: “just to be clear, there is no automatic referral in the policy.”

As for whether guidelines or regulations govern the credibility determination, Schmaler said she couldn’t go beyond the statement made by the Attorney General when he announced his application of the state secrets privilege to the Shubert case.

Ultimately, critics say the problem with even the new state secrets policy is that it leaves too much discretion to the executive to decide what information is so sensitive that it cannot be disclosed even to a judge behind closed doors – and what constitutes a credible allegation against the executive branch that’s worth investigating. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides various ways that the government can produce information to a court and have it still remain secret, but allow a legal challenge to government conduct to proceed.

The Obama administration’s use of the state secrets privilege to try to dismiss the Shubert case “demonstrates that we can’t count on the executive to rein itself in when it comes to the state secrets privilege,” said Kevin Bankston, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation working on the Jewel case.

Although the debate over the privilege sounds technical, what’s at stake isn’t just courtroom procedure. It’s whether the government can get away with engaging in illegal conduct simply by claiming that the evidence is too sensitive to reveal.

“There is not a single person in the United States government who has disavowed the dragnet program, who has said that it’s stopped,” said Maazel, referring to the claims in the Shubert case. Although the government has said that warrantless wiretapping under the Terrorist Surveillance Program has stopped, the Obama administration has not said that warrantless wiretapping isn’t ongoing under some other program. “We have every reason to believe that the copping and splitting in San Francisco is continuing,” said Maazel, referring to the way the government allegedly duplicates messages for monitoring purposes.

Experts note that the state secrets privilege actually encourages illegal conduct in national security matters, since the government knows it can be invoked as a shield. “The basic nature of the state secrets privilege always has been that it can remove a disincentive that the government ordinarily would have against engaging in highly questionable, if not outright wrongful, conduct,” said Metcalfe.

Regardless of how Judge Walker rules in these cases (they’ve all be transferred to his court), the issue isn’t going away. Democrats in Congress have introduced legislation that would keep courts from dismissing cases based solely on the government’s assertion that the case would reveal state secrets. Last week the House Judiciary Committee approved the bill introduced by Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), after Nadler called the government’s use of the privilege “the greatest threat to liberty at present.”

President Obama, for his part, has avoided taking any position on it. In fact, when a House Judiciary subcommittee in June held a hearing on the proposed legislation, the Justice Department did not even send a witness to testify about its use, saying only that the policy was still under review.

A justice department attorney is expected to appear at a conference next week on the subject being held at Washington College of Law at American University, and will surely be asked about the administration’s views. Metcalfe, who’s convening the conference, hopes the department will also be prepared to report the results of the litigation review that Holder said the department was undertaking in February. That review could lead the government to change its position on asserting the privilege in some pending cases.

Ultimately, if Congress doesn’t pass legislation on the state secrets privilege, the matter could end up in the Supreme Court, which first recognized this controversial executive privilege back in 1953. The court dismissed that case, brought by widows of civilians killed in a military plane crash, because the government claimed it would reveal military secrets. But when the accident report was finally declassified in 2000, rather than military secrets, it revealed gross military negligence that would have been damning evidence against the government in the case. (The case settled in 1953 for $170,000.)

“The Supreme Court hasn’t heard a state secrets case since 1953,” said Maazel. “There’s no question they will have one sooner rather than later.”

The Italian court convicted in absentia a CIA station chief and 22 other agents for abducting a Muslim cleric and sending him to Egypt, where he was tortured. Similarly, a British court recently ruled that a former detainee and torture victim has the right to obtain documents to prove he was mistreated — despite U.S. objections.

In contrast, in a recent case here in the United States, involving the abduction and extraordinary rendition of Canadian citizen Maher Arar to Syria by U.S. authorities, a federal appeals court ruled that Arar — who turned out to be innocent — has no right to redress.

Arar, as we now know, was arrested based on faulty intelligence at John F. Kennedy airport in New York, denied access to a lawyer, and shipped off to Syria for interrogation under torture. Both the Syrian and Canadian governments have since confirmed that Arar had done nothing wrong, and Arar sued U.S. officials for his unlawful treatment. Yet the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York recently ruled that the courts should not interfere in cases involving national security and foreign affairs — that’s for the executive and legislative branches alone.

As The Times notes today in an editorial, the ruling was an abdication of the role of the federal judiciary, which, after all, is the branch of government charged with upholding the rights granted in the U.S. Constitution.  Surely the right to be free from groundless abduction, rendition and torture is among them. As The Times’ editorial board puts it: “The ruling distorts precedent and the Constitutional separation of powers to deny justice to Mr. Arar and give officials a pass for egregious misconduct.”

What The Times neglects to mention is that another case, filed just yesterday on behalf of a U.S. citizen, raises precisely the same issues — and could meet the same fate. This time, however, as I explained yesterday, the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen, born and raised in New Jersey, abducted by U.S. authorities and held in three different African prisons where, he says, he was tortured and threatened by FBI agents, among others. He was eventually returned home without charge.

The judges who decided the Arar case earlier this month didn’t uniformly agree that he ought not be allowed to make his case in court. In fact, the 7-4 opinion spawned four dissenting opinions that are among the most eloquent statements on the role of the judiciary in upholding the U.S. Constitution that I’ve ever read.

As Judge Barrington Parker wrote, the court’s decision “risks a government that can interpret the law to suits its own ends, without scrutiny.” Parker cited a memo from former Deputy Assistant Attorneys General John Yoo and Robert Delahunty in the Bush Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel advising the top lawyer at the Pentagon in 2002 that the President enjoys “complete discretion” in conducting operations overseas, and that the Constitution’s Bill of Rights — such as the Fifth Amendment right to due process and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” — do not apply to overseas interrogations.

In February, Feinstein began a probe into the CIA’s detention and interrogation practices, and not a lot has leaked out since then. Feinstein said in April that the committee had finished a review into the cases of two al-Qaeda detainees subject to enhanced interrogation, and indicated in a letter to President Obama that month that her study would last “six to eight months.” Which would mean it should be wrapping up now-ish.

But it’s going to continue until “sometime early next year,” according to Feinstein spokesman Phil LaVelle. Dealing as the review does with highly classified information, LaVelle declined to provide many specifics, or to elaborate on the reasons for the delay. But he said that “additional staff have been hired and are working full-time” on the review — he wouldn’t provide a specific number — who are “moving through the cases of the detainees,” a task that involves reviewing “millions of documents.” LaVelle added that the review is “not related to DOJ investigation,” although that doesn’t evidently foreclose the prospect of Durham reviewing the Feinstein panel for potential prosecutorial action.

Will the public be able to see the results of the committee’s inquiry? It hasn’t held any public hearings this year. “There will be a final report,” LaVelle said, and “the committee will made a determination on what declassified information can be released.”

Asked for a comment on Feinstein’s panel and the CIA’s role in it, CIA spokesman George Little said only, ” We continue to cooperate with the investigation.”

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

Twenty-four-year-old Amir Meshal, the son of Muslim immigrants from Egypt, was a lifelong resident of New Jersey when, after living briefly in Cairo with extended family members, in 2006 he decided to go to Somalia to study Islam and experience living under Islamic law. The country appeared to have stabilized and a new Islamic government was on good terms with the United States.

But Somalia wasn’t as stable as Meshal had thought, and as violence erupted there again in January 2007, Meshal fled, along with many Somali civilians. He was arrested in a joint U.S.-Kenyan-Ethiopian operation along the border of Kenya.

Image by: Matt Mahurin

Those claims are the subject of a new lawsuit being filed Tuesday by the American Civil Liberties Union in Washington. Although it’s not the first lawsuit against U.S. officials seeking damages for torture and other mistreatment abroad, Meshal is only the second U.S. citizen to sue for U.S.-sponsored torture. That and a few other distinctive facts in this case may give him some advantages over those that have been dismissed.

“This is a U.S. citizen who was caught in hostilities abroad, and instead of helping him return, U.S. officials abused him and mistreated him and never charged him with a crime,” said Nusrat Choudhury, one of the lead lawyers from the ACLU representing Meshal. “Should they be allowed to do that without helping a U.S. citizen get home, and instead, denying him access to lawyers?”

That’s the question that will face judges in this case. In the past, the government has managed to convince courts to dismiss torture victims’ cases by saying that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity, or that the case would reveal state secrets, or that courts should not imply a right to sue government officials for constitutional violations when the case involves national security and foreign policy. But will courts be so willing to dismiss a case brought by a U.S. citizen, born to U.S. citizen parents, allegedly tortured directly by U.S. officials, and who has never even been charged with doing anything wrong?

American University Law Professor Stephen Vladeck, an expert on constitutional and national security law, says that although doctrinally the cases are not very different, the fact that Meshal is a U.S. citizen “practically, could make a difference to judges,” he said. “It would just highlight how wrong those other decisions are,” he said.

One of those decisions is Rasul v. Rumsfeld, decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals last year. In that case, the court dismissed the claims of four British men who’d been detained and allegedly abused at Guantanamo Bay because, the court reasoned, the federal officials were entitled to “qualified immunity” because it was not clear that Guantanamo detainees had rights under the U.S. Constitution at the time of their alleged abuse.

In that case, though, which is still on appeal (the Supreme Court remanded it back to the D.C. Circuit for reconsideration in light of intervening Supreme Court precedents), the court’s reasoning was based in part on the fact that the plaintiffs were all “aliens” — none were lawful U.S. citizens or residents.

Meshal’s U.S. citizenship may make his case more difficult to dismiss. “Mr. Meshal alleges there needs to be discovery in this case to determine whether what those officers did was objectively reasonable,” said Choudury, his lawyer. “Should an FBI officer think it’s objectively reasonable to threaten a U.S. citizen to send him to place where he will be tortured?”

Interestingly, recently released documents produced in the ACLU’s Freedom of Information Act case against the government have revealed memos written by FBI interrogation specialists in 2002 and sent to Defense Department officials specifically explaining that threatening a detainee with torture, death or disappearance is a violation of the U.S. Constitution and the anti-torture law. That could weaken the government’s argument that FBI officials reasonably thought it was legal to threaten Meshal in 2007.

The most recent case decided that presents similar facts is the case of Maher Arar, dismissed this month for the second time by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Arar, a Canadian citizen, was arrested by U.S. authorities while he was changing planes at JFK airport in New York in 2002. Arar was held briefly in the states, denied access to a lawyer, then rendered to Syria where he was held in a grave-like cell and interrogated under torture, he says, for almost a year. He was finally released without charge; Syrian authorities acknowledged that they had no evidence against him.

Arar sued the U.S. government for complicity in his treatment abroad. The court last week ruled that he has no right to sue under the U.S. Constitution in this case because the claims would “have the natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security of the nation.” As for his claims under the Torture Victims Protection Act, enacted to protect victims of torture in other countries, Arar could not claim compensation from U.S. authorities because it was the Syrians who tortured him, even if U.S. officials knew that he was likely to be tortured when they sent him to Syria, the court ruled.

In addition to the fact that Meshal is a U.S. citizen, his case may stand a better chance because he is suing the actual FBI officials who he claims conducted his interrogation and threatened him with torture, forced disappearance and execution to coerce him into confessing to associations with al-Qaeda that he says he does not have.

“It was a Kenyan jail, but he is alleging that U.S. officials were complicit with those officials in keeping him detained in secret,” said Choudhury. “During interrogations, U.S. government officials threatened to send him to Israel, where they would make him disappear.”

Meshal’s constitutional claims may also fare better because there appears to be nowhere else to bring them — an important factor courts consider. The government claimed that Arar, as a Canadian, could have objected to his rendition before U.S. immigration authorities. (Arar’s lawyers disputed that.)

In this case, there appears to be no alternative means for redress. Meshal has declined to speak to reporters about his ordeal, but according to his legal complaint, while he was in Kenya, Meshal repeatedly asked to speak to a lawyer, to his father, and to the international Committee of the Red Cross; his requests were denied. He was allowed to speak once to a U.S. consular official in Kenya who said he would help Meshal.

Before the consular official could do anything, though, Meshal was handcuffed, hooded and flown to Somalia, where he feared he would be killed, he says. Meshal was deposited in an excruciatingly hot 25-foot-square cave, without windows or toilets. When guards opened the door of the cell, Meshal “noticed that enormous cockroaches were clustered in the corners of the cell and large black millipedes were all over the walls,” the legal complaint charges. Meshal says he was left there, handcuffed in the dark, for two days.

He was then moved to a storage tent where he was given one meal a day of biscuits, marmalade and water. He was left there for about four days until he was transferred to Ethiopia for further interrogation.

The government could still argue that the “state secrets privilege” should doom the case. In many cases charging government wrongdoing in the national security arena, the Justice Department has argued that allowing a lawsuit to go forward would reveal sensitive state secrets and endanger national security. The government’s frequent invocation of the state secrets privilege has become something of a political embarrassment, however. In February, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) introduced a bill, which now has nine co-sponsors, that would severely limit the government’s ability to dismiss cases on that ground. Shortly after, Attorney General Eric Holder in September announced a new policy on state secrets, pledging to use the privilege more sparingly and according to strict new rules. However, he has continued to assert it in situations where advocates say the case should move forward, with the judge simply reviewing any sensitive evidence behind closed doors.

“It seems unlikely the government wouldn’t invoke state secrets again,” said David Luban, a law professor at Georgetown University and expert on legal ethics and international law. In this case, Luban said, the government would likely claim that allowing the cases to move forward would expose sensitive information about the United States’ relationships or agreements with the other countries that Meshal was rendered to. And “if the action is being shut off because of state secrets,” he said, “I don’t think you can get around that.”

“The government can raise that in the course of litigation,” Choudhury agreed. “But that’s not a reason for this case not to go forward.” The government would still have to convince a court that national security would be put at risk simply by responding to requests about the FBI’s treatment of one individual and its role in his rendition and alleged torture. Some courts have been skeptical about that argument, although in the case of German citizen Khaled Al-Masri, a lawsuit filed by a rendition victim against U.S. authorities, a federal judge in Virginia did dismiss the case on state secrets grounds.

And the court could still decide to dismiss the case based on its broader national security implications, as it did in Arar. “What’s been so disturbing is how judges have bent backwards to say this is a new kind of claim,” said Vladeck. In the Arar case, for example, the court cast his claim for compensation for extraordinary rendition as a new kind of constitutional claim that would require the court essentially to create a new right to sue. The court then could easily decline to create that new right, citing the “special factors” involved — in particular, the potential impact on national security and foreign policy. “What’s so distressing about Arar was that the Second Circuit endorsed such a limitless view of special factors,” said Vladeck. “If Arar’s rendition case can’t prevail, then I’m pressed to see what kind of case can win.”

Still, one case has survived dismissal so far. That’s the case of Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen deemed an “enemy combatant”, who is now suing John Yoo, the former lawyer at the Justice Department who justified torture and Padilla says personally helped to devise his illegal treatment. Although the Obama administration, representing Yoo, tried to have the case dismissed, a federal court in California refused, in part because there was no other way for a U.S. citizen to hold U.S. officials accountable.

Padilla was also the only U.S. citizen to have sued a U.S. official for torture. Until now. Choudhury hopes, at least, that Meshal’s U.S. citizenship might also make some difference. But the outcome is hard to predict. Judges and courts are sharply divided on when a victim of abusive federal government policies should have a right to bring their claims to court.

When the full Second Circuit court ruled in Arar’s case last week, the decision included four powerful dissents.

“The majority would immunize official misconduct by invoking the separation of powers and the executive’s responsibility for foreign affairs and national security,” wrote Judge Barrington Parker, in one of them. “Its approach distorts the system of checks and balances essential to the rule of law, and it trivilializes the judiciary’s role in these arenas,” he continued. The executive’s powers in foreign policy and national security “are not limitless” and their “bounds in both wartime and peacetime are fixed by the same Constitution,” he wrote. The court’s refusal to allow Arar a remedy, he continued, “immunizes official conduct directly at odds with the express will of Congress and the most basic guarantees of liberty contained in the Constitution. By doing so, the majority risks a government that can interpret the law to suits its own ends, without scrutiny.”

The BAU, explained elsewhere in documents released on Friday, is “comprised of Supervisory Special Agents with an average of 18 years of experience in criminal and counterintelligence investigations.”

The memo lays out clearly and simply what the interrogation experts at the FBI knew about interrogations of terror suspects, what would or would not work on them, and what sort of conduct was illegal. And it reads much like the sorts of arguments we’re now hearing from the America Civil Liberties Union and other civil and human rights organizations arguing that senior defense department officials and lawyers who approved abusive techniques ought to be criminally investigated.

“Central to the gathering of reliable, admissible evidence is the manner in which it is obtained,” the authors write to the General. “Interrogation techniques used by the DHS [Defense Human Intelligence Services, part of DoD] are designed specifically for short term use in combat environments where the immediate retrieval of tactical intelligence is critical. Many of DHS’s methods are considered coercive by Federal Law Enforcement and [Uniform Code of Military Justice] standards. Not only this, but reports from those knowledgeable about the use of these coercive techniques are highly skeptical as to their effectiveness and reliability.”

Most of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay had already been interviewed repeatedly overseas by the DHS, so the FBI recommended a different approach be taken at Guantanamo.

The FBI favors the use of less coercive techniques — ones carefully designed for long-term use in which rapport-building skills are carefully combined with a purposeful and incremental manipulation of a detainee’s environment and perceptions.

The BAU staff explain:

FBI/CITF agents are well trained, highly experienced and very successful in overcoming suspect resistance in order to obtain valuable information in complex criminal cases, including the investigations of terrorist bombings in East Africa and the USS Cole, etc. FBI/CRT interview strategies are most effective when tailored specifically to suit a suspect’s  or detainee’s needs or vulnerabilities. Contrary to popular belief, these vulnerabilities are more likely to reveal themselves through the employment of individually designed and sustained interview strategies rather than through the haphazard use of prescriptive, time-driven approaches. The FBI/CITF strongly believes that the continued use of diametrically opposed interrogation strategies in GTMO will  only weaken our efforts to obtain valuable information.

The memo goes on to list the interrogation techniques being used, and then to list which ones are “not permitted by the U.S. Constitution.” Those include: the use of stress positions for more than four hours; hooding; 20-hour interrogation segments; stripping a detainee of all clothing; and exploiting individual phobias, such as fear of dogs, to induce stress. They also include the use of scenarios designed to convince a detainee that death or severe pain is imminent for him or his family; waterboarding (here called “use of wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of drowning”); and exposure to cold weather or water.

All of those techniques, we now know, continued to be used by the Defense Department.

The FBI also warned that the use of such techniques would make any evidence derived inadmissible in federal court and if admissible in a military commission, likely to be given “little or no weight.”

The FBI drafters of the memo further explained that most of those techniques, particularly the last four, would also violate the U.S. anti-torture statute. It recommended that they not be used.

We know that the Pentagon and CIA went ahead and used them anyway. Instead of relying on their top experts in the FBI, they relied on a plan developed by a couple of private psychologists with no experience whatsoever in interrogating terror suspects and who cribbed much of their plan from a study of Chinese Communist techniques used to obtain false confessions from American prisoners during the Korean war. Senior U.S. officials then sought legal opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel that would tell them that these techniques, contrary to the FBI’s opinions, were not illegal. Conveniently, those opinions did cast the techniques described in a completely different light.

The most recently released memos have not gotten much attention, as torture fatigue sets in and the Bush torture program becomes old news. But the FBI memo is important because it adds to the growing body of evidence that senior defense department and CIA officials deliberately ignored the opinions of the best trained and most experienced people in the government about interrogations that abusive interrogations would not work and were not legal. Add that to the rest of the evidence that senior Bush administration officials did not act in good faith in relying on the Office of Legal Counsel memos that justified the techniques the Defense Department and CIA were using, and this latest declassified memo adds weight to the argument that something fishy was going on at the highest ranks of government that demands further investigation.

This latest memo also sheds light on why some in the Defense Department and some Republicans are now so eager to try Guantanamo detainees in military commissions rather than in Article III federal courts. They know that the evidence extracted from the prisoners under the “enhanced” methods Cheney is still defending doesn’t stand a chance in front of an independent U.S. federal court judge.

These latest documents provide a glimpse of the early struggles between the FBI and the Pentagon over just how to conduct the “war on terror” and how to interrogate and treat that war’s detainees. Sadly, they reveal that the FBI knew perfectly well — and repeatedly warned Defense Department officials, as well as Justice Department lawyers — that the abusive interrogation techniques being used on detainees at Guantanamo Bay were likely to be ineffective and make subsequent prosecutions impossible.

As one memo says, while the interrogation techniques based on tactics used in the U.S. Army Search, Escape, Resistance and Evasion (SERE) training “may be effective in eliciting tactical intelligence in a battlefield context, the reliability of information obtained using such tactics is highly questionable, not to mention potentially legally inadmissible in court.”

That memo was written in May 2003.  The “enhanced” interrogation techniques, such as stress positions and prolonged sleep deprivation, were still being used and justified in memos as late as July 2007. The memo raises several important questions. Did the Office of Legal Counsel lawyers drafting those later memos for the CIA not know about the FBI’s earlier objections? Or did they just dismiss them out of hand? Were they told to ignore those earlier conclusions?

Then there’s the fact that senior officials from the Criminal Investigative Task Force, including the chief psychologist with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service “repeatedly argued for implementation of a rapport-based approach” and “lamented the fact that many DHS [Defense Human Intelligence Services] interrogators seem to believe that the only way to elicit information from uncooperative detainees is to use aggressive techniques on them.”

“Despite objections raised by the [Behavioral Analysis Unit of the FBI], the DHS initiated an aggressive interrogation plan for #63,” who elsewhere in the document is identified as Mohammed al-Qatani. “This plan incorporated a confusing array of physical and psychological stressors which were designed, presumably, to elicit #63’s cooperation. Needless to say, this plan was eventually abandoned when the DHS realized it was not working and when #63 had to be hospitalized briefly.”

Officials from the Criminal Investigative Task Force and the Behavioral Analysis Unit drafted a letter “reiterating the strengths of the FBI/CITF approach” and providing “a detailed historical record of the development of interagency policies regarding aggressive interrogation techniques in GTMO.” The letter also argued that they were a bad idea.

Not only did the officials not succeed in convincing DHS to abandon the techniques, but the document described how the military and DHS inaccurately portrayed to the Pentagon that the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit approved of and helped design the very techniques that the BAU warned would backfire.

Although we knew before that the FBI had disagreed with the so-called “enhanced” interrogation techniques and refused to participate in them, this latest release of previously classified information reveals the extent to which FBI officials made both the legal and practical case to senior Pentagon and Justice Department officials for why the usual rules on interrogations should be followed.

That they were so blatantly ignored suggests more than just bad judgment. It suggests a deliberate indifference to the facts and the law, which cries out for a more thorough investigation.

09 Memos