The federal judge who helped draft Justice Department memos on torture has set up a legal defense fund to pay the costs of defending against possible disciplinary or impeachment proceedings. Jay Bybee, a U.S. Court of Appeals judge in Las Vegas, quietly set up the fund last July following widespread news reports that he and a former deputy, John Yoo, were the focus of a long-running investigation by the Justice Department’s internal ethics unit, the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), over their role in crafting the memos.

Attorney General Holder said yesterday he expected the Justice Department would finally release a version of the OPR report by the end of the month. Judge Bybee is evidently prepared for the rather nettlesome case of his former employer considering him unfit to practice law: Isikoff reports that he’s got Liz Cheney’s advocacy group, Keep America Safe, on his side.

One interesting question arises. Bybee’s former deputy John Yoo helped him craft the torture memos in 2002. Yoo faces similar criticism and legal difficulty, and is reportedly implicated in the OPR report alongside his old boss. But Yoo’s personal legal expenses are, risably, covered by the American taxpayer. Will Bybee similarly stick us with the bill?

“The report is completed,” said Holder. “It is in its last stages of review now.” Holder said it was delayed “because of the amount of time we gave to the lawyers who were the subject of the report to respond. And then people in OPR had to respond to their responses.” Holder said that in this final stage, “a career prosecutor has to review the report. We expect that process should be done by the end of the month. At that point the report should be issued.”

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

Twenty-four-year-old Amir Meshal, the son of Muslim immigrants from Egypt, was a lifelong resident of New Jersey when, after living briefly in Cairo with extended family members, in 2006 he decided to go to Somalia to study Islam and experience living under Islamic law. The country appeared to have stabilized and a new Islamic government was on good terms with the United States.

But Somalia wasn’t as stable as Meshal had thought, and as violence erupted there again in January 2007, Meshal fled, along with many Somali civilians. He was arrested in a joint U.S.-Kenyan-Ethiopian operation along the border of Kenya.

Image by: Matt Mahurin

Those claims are the subject of a new lawsuit being filed Tuesday by the American Civil Liberties Union in Washington. Although it’s not the first lawsuit against U.S. officials seeking damages for torture and other mistreatment abroad, Meshal is only the second U.S. citizen to sue for U.S.-sponsored torture. That and a few other distinctive facts in this case may give him some advantages over those that have been dismissed.

“This is a U.S. citizen who was caught in hostilities abroad, and instead of helping him return, U.S. officials abused him and mistreated him and never charged him with a crime,” said Nusrat Choudhury, one of the lead lawyers from the ACLU representing Meshal. “Should they be allowed to do that without helping a U.S. citizen get home, and instead, denying him access to lawyers?”

That’s the question that will face judges in this case. In the past, the government has managed to convince courts to dismiss torture victims’ cases by saying that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity, or that the case would reveal state secrets, or that courts should not imply a right to sue government officials for constitutional violations when the case involves national security and foreign policy. But will courts be so willing to dismiss a case brought by a U.S. citizen, born to U.S. citizen parents, allegedly tortured directly by U.S. officials, and who has never even been charged with doing anything wrong?

American University Law Professor Stephen Vladeck, an expert on constitutional and national security law, says that although doctrinally the cases are not very different, the fact that Meshal is a U.S. citizen “practically, could make a difference to judges,” he said. “It would just highlight how wrong those other decisions are,” he said.

One of those decisions is Rasul v. Rumsfeld, decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals last year. In that case, the court dismissed the claims of four British men who’d been detained and allegedly abused at Guantanamo Bay because, the court reasoned, the federal officials were entitled to “qualified immunity” because it was not clear that Guantanamo detainees had rights under the U.S. Constitution at the time of their alleged abuse.

In that case, though, which is still on appeal (the Supreme Court remanded it back to the D.C. Circuit for reconsideration in light of intervening Supreme Court precedents), the court’s reasoning was based in part on the fact that the plaintiffs were all “aliens” — none were lawful U.S. citizens or residents.

Meshal’s U.S. citizenship may make his case more difficult to dismiss. “Mr. Meshal alleges there needs to be discovery in this case to determine whether what those officers did was objectively reasonable,” said Choudury, his lawyer. “Should an FBI officer think it’s objectively reasonable to threaten a U.S. citizen to send him to place where he will be tortured?”

Interestingly, recently released documents produced in the ACLU’s Freedom of Information Act case against the government have revealed memos written by FBI interrogation specialists in 2002 and sent to Defense Department officials specifically explaining that threatening a detainee with torture, death or disappearance is a violation of the U.S. Constitution and the anti-torture law. That could weaken the government’s argument that FBI officials reasonably thought it was legal to threaten Meshal in 2007.

The most recent case decided that presents similar facts is the case of Maher Arar, dismissed this month for the second time by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Arar, a Canadian citizen, was arrested by U.S. authorities while he was changing planes at JFK airport in New York in 2002. Arar was held briefly in the states, denied access to a lawyer, then rendered to Syria where he was held in a grave-like cell and interrogated under torture, he says, for almost a year. He was finally released without charge; Syrian authorities acknowledged that they had no evidence against him.

Arar sued the U.S. government for complicity in his treatment abroad. The court last week ruled that he has no right to sue under the U.S. Constitution in this case because the claims would “have the natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security of the nation.” As for his claims under the Torture Victims Protection Act, enacted to protect victims of torture in other countries, Arar could not claim compensation from U.S. authorities because it was the Syrians who tortured him, even if U.S. officials knew that he was likely to be tortured when they sent him to Syria, the court ruled.

In addition to the fact that Meshal is a U.S. citizen, his case may stand a better chance because he is suing the actual FBI officials who he claims conducted his interrogation and threatened him with torture, forced disappearance and execution to coerce him into confessing to associations with al-Qaeda that he says he does not have.

“It was a Kenyan jail, but he is alleging that U.S. officials were complicit with those officials in keeping him detained in secret,” said Choudhury. “During interrogations, U.S. government officials threatened to send him to Israel, where they would make him disappear.”

Meshal’s constitutional claims may also fare better because there appears to be nowhere else to bring them — an important factor courts consider. The government claimed that Arar, as a Canadian, could have objected to his rendition before U.S. immigration authorities. (Arar’s lawyers disputed that.)

In this case, there appears to be no alternative means for redress. Meshal has declined to speak to reporters about his ordeal, but according to his legal complaint, while he was in Kenya, Meshal repeatedly asked to speak to a lawyer, to his father, and to the international Committee of the Red Cross; his requests were denied. He was allowed to speak once to a U.S. consular official in Kenya who said he would help Meshal.

Before the consular official could do anything, though, Meshal was handcuffed, hooded and flown to Somalia, where he feared he would be killed, he says. Meshal was deposited in an excruciatingly hot 25-foot-square cave, without windows or toilets. When guards opened the door of the cell, Meshal “noticed that enormous cockroaches were clustered in the corners of the cell and large black millipedes were all over the walls,” the legal complaint charges. Meshal says he was left there, handcuffed in the dark, for two days.

He was then moved to a storage tent where he was given one meal a day of biscuits, marmalade and water. He was left there for about four days until he was transferred to Ethiopia for further interrogation.

The government could still argue that the “state secrets privilege” should doom the case. In many cases charging government wrongdoing in the national security arena, the Justice Department has argued that allowing a lawsuit to go forward would reveal sensitive state secrets and endanger national security. The government’s frequent invocation of the state secrets privilege has become something of a political embarrassment, however. In February, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) introduced a bill, which now has nine co-sponsors, that would severely limit the government’s ability to dismiss cases on that ground. Shortly after, Attorney General Eric Holder in September announced a new policy on state secrets, pledging to use the privilege more sparingly and according to strict new rules. However, he has continued to assert it in situations where advocates say the case should move forward, with the judge simply reviewing any sensitive evidence behind closed doors.

“It seems unlikely the government wouldn’t invoke state secrets again,” said David Luban, a law professor at Georgetown University and expert on legal ethics and international law. In this case, Luban said, the government would likely claim that allowing the cases to move forward would expose sensitive information about the United States’ relationships or agreements with the other countries that Meshal was rendered to. And “if the action is being shut off because of state secrets,” he said, “I don’t think you can get around that.”

“The government can raise that in the course of litigation,” Choudhury agreed. “But that’s not a reason for this case not to go forward.” The government would still have to convince a court that national security would be put at risk simply by responding to requests about the FBI’s treatment of one individual and its role in his rendition and alleged torture. Some courts have been skeptical about that argument, although in the case of German citizen Khaled Al-Masri, a lawsuit filed by a rendition victim against U.S. authorities, a federal judge in Virginia did dismiss the case on state secrets grounds.

And the court could still decide to dismiss the case based on its broader national security implications, as it did in Arar. “What’s been so disturbing is how judges have bent backwards to say this is a new kind of claim,” said Vladeck. In the Arar case, for example, the court cast his claim for compensation for extraordinary rendition as a new kind of constitutional claim that would require the court essentially to create a new right to sue. The court then could easily decline to create that new right, citing the “special factors” involved — in particular, the potential impact on national security and foreign policy. “What’s so distressing about Arar was that the Second Circuit endorsed such a limitless view of special factors,” said Vladeck. “If Arar’s rendition case can’t prevail, then I’m pressed to see what kind of case can win.”

Still, one case has survived dismissal so far. That’s the case of Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen deemed an “enemy combatant”, who is now suing John Yoo, the former lawyer at the Justice Department who justified torture and Padilla says personally helped to devise his illegal treatment. Although the Obama administration, representing Yoo, tried to have the case dismissed, a federal court in California refused, in part because there was no other way for a U.S. citizen to hold U.S. officials accountable.

Padilla was also the only U.S. citizen to have sued a U.S. official for torture. Until now. Choudhury hopes, at least, that Meshal’s U.S. citizenship might also make some difference. But the outcome is hard to predict. Judges and courts are sharply divided on when a victim of abusive federal government policies should have a right to bring their claims to court.

When the full Second Circuit court ruled in Arar’s case last week, the decision included four powerful dissents.

“The majority would immunize official misconduct by invoking the separation of powers and the executive’s responsibility for foreign affairs and national security,” wrote Judge Barrington Parker, in one of them. “Its approach distorts the system of checks and balances essential to the rule of law, and it trivilializes the judiciary’s role in these arenas,” he continued. The executive’s powers in foreign policy and national security “are not limitless” and their “bounds in both wartime and peacetime are fixed by the same Constitution,” he wrote. The court’s refusal to allow Arar a remedy, he continued, “immunizes official conduct directly at odds with the express will of Congress and the most basic guarantees of liberty contained in the Constitution. By doing so, the majority risks a government that can interpret the law to suits its own ends, without scrutiny.”

Salim Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's alleged driver, was held in Cuba at Guantanamo Bay prison camp like these detainees. (Department of Defense photo by Petty Officer 1st class Shane T. McCoy, U.S. Navy)

New documents obtained by TWI related to the case of Mohammed Jawad, an adolescent tortured by Afghan police and then abused again by U.S. interrogators, suggest that not only certain CIA interrogations, but interrogations by the Department of Defense demand a broader investigation as well.

Last month, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that he would investigate only CIA interrogations that appeared to have violated the agency’s rules and guidance from the Department of Justice. The Jawad case, however, reveals that U.S. military interrogations also violated well-established laws and appear to have violated the Justice Department’s legal guidelines as well. The newly obtained documents also reveal that the Department of Defense repeatedly failed to follow up on complaints by Jawad’s lawyers that its officers were breaking the law.

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

Jawad, who was about 12 years old when he was captured and accused of throwing a hand grenade at U.S. soldiers, endured “cruel and inhuman” treatment and possibly “torture” while in U.S. custody, a U.S. military commission judge ruled last year, determining that his supposed “confessions” to the crime were therefore unreliable. A federal district court judge later similarly refused to admit the confessions in ruling on Jawad’s habeas corpus petition, and announced that without Jawad’s statements, the government’s case was “riddled with holes.” She eventually granted Jawad’s petition, and Jawad was released on Aug. 24 after nearly seven years in captivity, most at the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay.

Despite the court’s rulings that Jawad was mistreated in U.S. custody, however, no one has ever been punished or otherwise held accountable. His lawyers say that despite repeated requests, the Defense Department never investigated whether its officers had violated the law. Jawad’s lead military lawyer, Air Force Maj. David Frakt, has released to TWI some of the details of how and why he asked the Defense Department to investigate, and how his repeated complaints about Jawad’s treatment went ignored.

Jawad now plans to sue the United States for his mistreatment, which included such extreme sleep deprivation that it appears to have violated even the rules governing interrogation tactics issued by the Bush Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, which issued the now-infamous “torture memos.”  A military judge in Jawad’s case excluded his “confessions” in part on the grounds that he endured 14 days straight of sleep deprivation (by means of what came to be known as the “frequent flyer” program), which may well have amounted to torture. Justice Department memos approved up to 96 hours of sleep deprivation, although some make reference to 180 hours, which would be 11 days. But 14 days exceeds the guidelines of all of the legal memos regarding interrogations that have been revealed so far.

According to Judge Stephen Henley, the U.S. Army colonel who ruled on Jawad’s military commission case, Jawad was “moved from cell to cell 112 times from 7 May 2004 to 20 May 2004, on average of about once every three hours.” Jawad was shackled but not interrogated; “the scheme was calculated to profoundly disrupt his mental senses.”

The alleged purpose of the “frequent flyer” program, Judge Henley wrote, was “to create a feeling of hopelessness and despair in the detainee and set the stage for successful interrogations.” But by the time Jawad was subjected to it, he “was of no intelligence value to any government agency,” Judge Henley ruled. “The infliction of the ‘frequent flyer’ technique upon the Accused thus had no legitimate interrogation purpose.” (Significantly, interrogation experts say sleep deprivation doesn’t produce useful information even if the subject does know something.)

When Frakt, Jawad’s appointed military defense lawyer, learned about how the frequent flyer program was used on Jawad, he became so concerned that, as a military officer, he felt obliged to report to his superiors what he believed was evidence of a war crime. So on May 29, 2008, Frakt sent a memo to the chief defense counsel at the Office of Military Commissions.

“I am reporting a suspected LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict] violation that I have uncovered in the course of my duties as a defense counsel assigned to the Office of Military Commissions Defense,” Frakt wrote. Frakt wrote that after an exhaustive review of the facts and relevant law, he believed Jawad had been tortured — in violation of the Geneva Conventions, U.S. and international law, and Defense Department regulations. “Accordingly, I believe I have an affirmative obligation to report the incident to my chain of command,” he wrote. Frakt cited several provisions, all of which require reporting of suspected war crimes to a supervisor.

Records provided by the government in the course of the case before the military commission reveal that from May 7, 2004 until May 20, 2004, Jawad, a teenager at the time, was subjected to the program.

“During this 14 day period, Mr. Jawad was moved from cell to cell 112 times, an average of every 2 hours 50 minutes,” Frankt wrote in the memo. “There were eight extra moves of very short duration between the hours of midnight and 0200 to ensure maximum disruption of sleep.”

After sending that memo, Frakt expected to receive a response. At least, eventually. But he received nothing.

So on Oct. 7, 2008, he followed up with an e-mail to the Commander in charge at the U.S. Southern Command post, Joint Task Force for Guantanamo Bay, or SouthCom-JTFGTMO. He cc’d four lawyers in the Pentagon’s Office of General Counsel.

In his email, Frakt wrote:

On 29 May, I filed this LOAC violation memo with the Chief Defense Counsel, COL David. He forwarded the memo to your office on or about 1 June. Presumably your office forwarded it to SOUTHCOM. I have never received any information about the investigation.

The military judge in the Jawad case recently found that Jawad was subjected to the frequent flyer program, and that it constituted “abusive conduct and cruel and inhuman treatment.” (see attached ruling) He found it unnecessary to decide whether the conduct rose to the level of torture but did find that the action was intended to seriously disrupt the mental senses, which is one of the elements of psychological torture. He recommended disciplinary action for this “flagrant misbehavior”. [Confidential testimony from Guantanamo officer indicated] that the program was standard operating procedure, was carried out on many detainees as part of the camp “incentives program” and was personally approved by Col Nelson Cannon (now Maj Gen) and Brig Gen Jay Hood (now Maj Gen). Please provide me with an update on the status of the mandatory LOAC violation investigation or direct me to the appropriate officials who can respond to this inquiry. If you need any further supporting documentation to assist you in the investigation, please let me know. Thank you very much.

Frakt received no response. In January of this year, he sent another e-mail to the same Commander and a Captain at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, and the same set of lawyers in the Pentagon’s General Counsel office.

It read, in part:

It has now been over seven months since this report was filed. I have never received any update on the status of the mandatory LOAC violation investigation. In the interim, the Military Commission has determined that the violation did, in fact, occur and that “under the circumstances, subjecting [Mr. Jawad] to the ‘frequent flyer’ program from May 7-20, 2004 constitutes abusive conduct and cruel and inhuman treatment.” In other words, Mr. Jawad was abused, in clear violation of the Geneva Conventions. The commission has specifically recommended that “those responsible should face appropriate disciplinary action.” (See attached Ruling D-008)

Upon receipt of a LOAC violation report, a formal investigation is mandatory and should be done by the most expeditious means available. However, it does not appear that the DoD Directive was followed because I have never been contacted by anyone regarding my report. Please confirm whether JTF-GTMO or SOUTHCOM investigated this incident, and provide me with an update on the status of this investigation or direct me to the appropriate authority at USSOUTHCOM who can answer this query. If I do not receive a satisfactory explanation, I intend to pursue this matter with the appropriate Inspector General offices. Thank you very much for your prompt attention.

V/R

David J. R. Frakt, Major, USAFR

To this day, says Frakt, he has not hear back from the Defense Department as to whether anyone investigated the abuse and potential war crimes violation.

The Defense Department and US-SOUTHCOM-JTFGTMO did not respond to TWI’s request for comment. TWI has other outstanding requests for comment from the the Defense Department, including an explanation of why the department stopped reporting the deaths of detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a statement of the current policy of reporting those deaths. Despite at least half a dozen requests, TWI has never received an answer.

Still, according to the recently released July 2007 memo from the Office of Legal Counsel, the technique was determined not to cause “serious physical pain or suffering” and not to violate the War Crimes Act. The War Crimes Act prohibits torture and “cruel and inhuman treatment.”

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

A comparison of the inspector general report with legal memos released from the Office of Legal Counsel within the Justice Department, however, reveals that lawyers were so uncertain about how and whether sleep deprivation could be used legally that their advice to the CIA ranged from restricting its use to 48 continuous hours, to allowing it for 180 hours or more. And although the 2007 legal memo specifically mentions that the CIA said it might use the technique for 180 hours, the lawyers restricted their analysis, in footnote 7, to only the legality of its use for up to 96 hours. Meanwhile, the inspector general report discusses the contemplated use of sleep deprivation on Abu Zubaydah for up to 11 days at a time — or 264 hours straight.

None of the former interrogators, physicians, lawyers or government officials could explain to TWI exactly why the CIA and Justice Department lawyers changed the rules so sharply and frequently. A call to Jack Goldsmith, the Harvard Law Professor and director of the Office of Legal Counsel from 2003 to 2004 was not returned.

“How they go from 48 to 100 plus hours is anybody’s guess,” said Jack Cloonan, a former FBI special agent who worked in the Osama Bin Laden unit from 1996 to 2002. “I think that they were making the rules up as they went along,” he said, adding that “they outsourced a lot of this,” referring to the role, recently revealed by The New York Times, of Jim Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, two businessmen-psychologists who developed the interrogation procedures for the CIA but had no interrogation experience themselves.

But the experts on sleep deprivation all appear to agree – and the literature on the subject is remarkably consistent – that sleep deprivation is physically and mentally harmful, and largely ineffective at producing useful information. Still, it’s tempting for government officials desperate to get detainees to talk.

“It will elicit information, that’s true,” said Cloonan. “People will talk. But in point of fact the substance is what separates what works and what doesn’t. Did they provide actionable intelligence, and could you verify what was being told?” asks Cloonan. “There’s a big diff between compliance — giving information to stop what they’re being subjected to — and real cooperation, where they’re giving useful information.”

Scientists, physicians and interrogators all say that because sleep deprivation causes extreme confusion and even psychosis, it’s impossible to know if what the detainee is telling interrogators is true or not.

“Sleep deprivation has been extensively studied,” said Dr. Steven Miles, professor of medicine at the University of Minnesota Medical School and faculty member of its Center for Bioethics, as well as the author of the book, “Oath Betrayed: America’s Torture Doctors.” “It will cause people to speak. It does not produce reliable intelligence. It impairs the ability to concentrate in a way that allows the interrogatee to assemble coherent narratives. So it’s counterproductive in terms of information solicitation.”

A December 2006 report from the Intelligence Science Board of the National Defense Intelligence College says that sleep deprivation is associated with, among other things, “increased suggestibility,” adding: “On this last point it is worth noting that suggestibility increases specifically under conditions simulating an interrogation. At least one study has found that “the effect on suggestibility of one or two night’s sleep loss is comparable to the difference in suggestibility between true and false confessors.”

That’s such a basic fact for interrogators that in the book, “Introduction to Forensic Psychology,” by Curt and Anne Bartol, the glossary lists “Coerced-compliant false confessions” as “Admissions of guilt most likely to occur after prolonged and intense interrogation experiences, especially in situations where sleep deprivation is a feature. The suspect, in desperation to avoid further discomfort, admits to the crime even knowing that he or she is innocent.”

As Tom Parker, a former British Intelligence agent, now Amnesty International’s Policy Director for Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human Rights explained: “Sleep deprivation was never designed as an interview tool. It was used by the KGB and its precursors as a way to break people down to give false confessions. These techniques are not about getting people to tell the truth, they’re about breaking people down to kill their spirit.”

The justification for the technique originated with the idea of learned helplessness, based on studies conducted decades ago on dogs.

“They took dogs, tied them in a cage and shocked them,” explained Miles. “They showed that the dogs would act to resist or escape, unless the dogs learned there was nothing they could do to resist. Then they would just lie there and take it.”

The theory, explained Miles, is that “when used with other techniques it will induce dependence on the interrogator, which will cause the person to comply.” But all the research done on this from around the world reveals that “this technique simply does not gather intelligence.”

Sleep deprivation is always part of a package: as described in CIA inspector general report, prisoners were shackled, semi-starved, put in diapers and forced to stand that way. Their hands were cuffed along the wall close to their chins, according to Department of Justice memos. If they nodded off and stopped standing, the chains would pull at their wrists, waking them up.

Andrea Northwood, director of client services at the Center for Victims of Torture in Minneapolis, recently told The Associated Press that her organization considers 96 hours of sleep deprivation to be torture.

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who was tortured in Vietnam, has also said that prolonged sleep deprivation is torture, and recently denied the claim in the CIA inspector general report that he was among several members of Congress who approved its use.

Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister from 1977-83, tortured by the KGB as a young man, famously described sleep deprivation in his book, White Nights:

“In the head of the interrogated prisoner, a haze begins to form. His spirit is wearied to death, his legs are unsteady, and he has one sole desire: to sleep… Anyone who has experienced this desire knows that not even hunger and thirst are comparable with it,” he wrote. “I came across prisoners who signed what they were ordered to sign, only to get what the interrogator promised them” — time to sleep.

Although the technique was prohibited by President Obama, some worry it could be revived in the future because it at least gets people to talk, and it’s generally perceived as less offensive than waterboarding, head-slamming or forced nudity. “Sleep deprivation may be seen as a tempting technique to restore,” wrote reporter Greg Miller in the Los Angeles Times recently.

In justifying the use of sleep deprivation in a 2005 memo, Justice Department lawyers argued that it was okay for CIA interrogators to keep terror suspects awake for seven and a half days straight — because “even very extended sleep deprivation does not cause physical pain.” They relied for that claim on the work of university researchers who found that people who were deprived of sleep for just one night had an increased sensitivity to certain types of pain. Justice Department memos dated May 10, 2005 cited this study to support the conclusion that severe sleep deprivation of up to 180 consecutive hours might cause some increased pain but not “severe physical pain” — even when used together with slaps, stress positions, water dousing and “walling” — slamming a detainee’s head repeatedly against a flexible wall.

“Because sleep deprivation appears to cause at most only relatively moderate decreases in pain tolerance, the use of these techniques in combination with extended sleep deprivation would not be expected to cause severe physical pain,” wrote Steven Bradbury, a principal deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel, who signed the memos. (Bradbury has since left the department and works at a private law firm in Washington. He did not return calls for comment.)

But those same academic researchers have since called the Justice Department’s use of their work “nonsense.” “To claim that 180 hours [of sleep deprivation] is safe in these respects, is nonsense.” Dr. James Horne, with the Loughborough University Sleep Research Centre, told the blog Obsidian Wings. “Prolonged stress with sleep deprivation will lead to a physiological exhaustion of the body’s defense mechanisms, physical collapse, and with the potential for various ensuing illnesses.”

In their studies, the doctors explained, the subjects were well-fed and could play video games and watch television. Detainees under interrogation, on the other hand, were often semi-starved and chained into place, not even allowed to go to the bathroom.

“In a manner, it’s like giving a drug to a patient: if you administer it in small doses for therapeutic reasons, it helps them. If you give it in huge volumes, it becomes toxic — and can even kill them,” another of the researchers cited, Dr. S. Hakki Onen, sleep specialist and geriatrician, told Time Magazine.

Although the Justice Department lawyers wrote that “extended sleep deprivation cannot be expected to cause ’severe mental pain or suffering,’” the doctors vigorously disagree.

After several days, “the mental pain would be all too evident, and arguably worse than physical pain,” Dr. Horne said to Obsidian Wings.

Notably, a combination of techniques similar to those used by the CIA has been ruled unlawful by the European Court of Human Rights. In the case Ireland v. U.K., the court held that a combination of sleep deprivation, hooding, wall-standing, continuous white noise, sleep deprivation and “the bread and water diet” violated international humanitarian law.

What’s odd, say former interrogators, is that the military knew this and for the most part, resisted using these techniques. The CIA, however, relying on inexperienced contractors who developed its interrogation strategies based on the military’s Survival Evasion Resistance Escape (SERE) training, seems to have completely ignored common knowledge.

“The point is you realize when you’re going through that [SERE] training, they tell you this isn’t about trying to get useful intelligence out of you, it’s about getting propoganda,” said Matthew Alexander, a 14-year veteran of the air force and leader of an elite interrogations team in Iraq and author of “How to Break a Terrorist.” (Matthew Alexander, seen here on The Daily Show, uses a pseudonym.) Sleep deprivation may be used for no longer than 48 hours in SERE training, according to the inspector general report. “They’re just trying to break down your will.”

“I think people misinterpreted that,” Alexander added. “Mitchell and Jessen, the psychologists, they took that learned helplessness theory, but they’d never done an interrogation. They were so off base.”

Moreover, in Footnote 34, the IG reports that “According to the General Counsel, the period was reduced to 48 hours in December 2003.”

But the Dec. 30, 2004 memo, also released on Monday, this one from the CIA to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel concerning the treatment of high-value detainees at CIA “black sites” says on page 13 that “sleep deprivation may continue to the 70 to 120 hour range, or possibly beyond for the hardest resisters, but in no case exceed the 180-hour time limit.”

So it appears that at some point after the IG report was completed, the CIA increased the permissible number of hours of sleep deprivation from 48, in December 2003, to 180, in 2004.  That’s 132 hours more of sleep deprivation than the CIA’s general counsel had allowed.

And we know that it stayed at that much higher level for years afterwards, because the May 10, 2005 memo from the Office of Legal Counsel that we’ve previously reported on also approved 180 hours of sleep deprivation. (Remember, this can be accompanied by food deprivation, nakedness, diapering, extreme hot and cold and shackling into stress positions.)

So why the change? How was only 48 hours of sleep deprivation legal in December 2003, but more than three times as long was legal just a year later? Who was changing the rules, and why?

We know that at some point, Jack Goldsmith, hired to head the head of the Office of Legal Counsel in October 2003, withdrew some of the earlier memos authorizing extreme interrogation practices because he worried the memos were “legally flawed.” But then, Goldsmith resigned in June 2004.

Did his resignation open the way for the Justice Department to boost the permissible duration of the sleep deprivation technique back up to 180 hours?

I’ve put in a call to Goldsmith about this, and will report back if I hear anything.

–

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“At the end of investigating is the time when you decide who to prosecute. You don’t decide who to prosecute before you investigate.”

That is the normal course of how investigations work. And that’s why Attorney General Eric Holder announced that he was opening a “preliminary review” into certain cases of extreme detainee abuse; notwithstanding the conventional wisdom based on plenty of cheap political analyses to the contrary, Holder didn’t say that the investigation would be limited to looking only at the actions of specific individuals.

As I’ve argued before, that investigation, if done properly, could eventually lead to investigating the actions of individuals higher up the chain of command. “When you’re talking about high-level officials,” says Abdo, “it’s important to investigate whether the attorneys were providing high level legal advice, or providing legal cover to the decisions made by high level officials.”

Interestingly, as Abdo and others point out, the CIA inspector general report released on Monday did not mention anything about high level officials. Or at least the parts of the report that were not blacked out didn’t talk about the role of the White House or other senior officials. Yet we know from previously released documents that the White House and senior officials were closely involved in the decisionmaking about interrogations.

“You would think it would be in the report because the report discusses the origin of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation technique program,” says Abdo. “And that’s relevant to whether the CIA thought it needed these techniques, or whether they were handed to them by high level officials.”

Lawyer and blogger Scott Horton made a similar point when he appeared with me on MSNBC’s Live with Carlos Watson yesterday. And he laid out the case against Cheney that may be hidden behind that black magic marker in his blog at Harper’s:

All trails lead to the Vice President’s office. At several points, redactions begin just when the discussion is headed toward the supervision or direction of the program and context suggests that some figure far up the Washington food chain is intervening. Moreover, as Jane Mayer recounts in Dark Side, Helgerson’s report was shut down when he was summoned, twice, to meet with Dick Cheney, who insisted that the report be stopped. Cheney had good reason to be concerned. This report shows that the vice president intervened directly in the process and ensured that the program was implemented. The OPR report likewise shows Cheney’s office commissioning the torture memos and carefully supervising the process. It is increasingly clear that torture was Dick Cheney’s special project and that he was personally and deeply involved in it. And the CIA report has some amazing nuggets that show Cheney’s hand. In 2003, after Jay Bybee departed OLC, Cheney struggled to have John Yoo installed as his successor, but ultimately John Ashcroft’s candidate, Jack Goldsmith, prevailed. Goldsmith quickly backtracked on the torture authorizations that Yoo and Bybee gave. The result? The CIA stopped taking its cue from OLC and instead turned to the White House for guidance. It is remarkably vague on the particulars, and blackouts emerge just as passages seem to be getting interesting. But there’s little doubt that Dick Cheney and his staff were pushing the process from behind the scenes.

What a surprise that Cheney is now the most vocal critic of Holder’s decision to appoint a prosecutor to conduct a “preliminary review.”

Abdo said the ACLU is still deciding whether to challenge the government’s redactions of the inspector general report. If it does, the judge would review what’s been blacked out and decide if it was properly classified, or if it was simply redacted to protect the government from embarrassment or conceal evidence of criminal conduct.

The Washington Post notes today in a story setting out Cheney’s arguments that an Aug. 31, 2006 memo from Steven Bradbury, then-acting assistant attorney general in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, said his legal conclusions relied in part on assurances from CIA general counsel John Rizzo that “interrogations conducted pursuant to the program have led to specific, actionable intelligence about terrorist threats to the United States and its interests.”

Rizzo may well have said that, but even if it were true, that doesn’t make the techniques used legal. And it certainly doesn’t bolster Cheney’s argument now that an investigation is not warranted.

A look at those legal memos of 2006 and 2007 released on Monday reveal that the government’s lawyers went out of their way to twist and turn and manipulate the applicable law to approve the techniques that they were already using, notwithstanding the fact that by 2006, the law had changed. Congress had specifically outlawed abusive interrogations, and the Supreme Court had ruled, contrary to the Bush administration’s claims, that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to “war on terror” detainees.

So much for former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’s idea that the Geneva Conventions were a “quaint” relic of the past.

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the court ruled that the basic protections apply to all prisoners, even in an unconventional international conflict such as the one against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And Congress, which by that time had grown concerned about reports of abuse and deaths of detainees in U.S. custody, in 2005 passed The Detainee Treatment Act, or DTA, prohibiting the “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” of detainees and providing for “uniform standards” for interrogation.

Oddly, however, the arguments of the Justice Department’s lawyers justifying the techniques in existence remained essentially the same.

Take the July 20, 2007 OLC opinion on interrogation techniques, released for the first time on Monday. The memo defines techniques like prolonged sleep deprivation for up to 96 straight hours (or 180 hours in a 30-day period) while forced to stand, shackled, in diapers (and eventually in one’s own feces); which can be used in combination with restriction to a 1,000-calorie-a-day diet (half the normal minimum) and “corrective techniques” such as the “facial hold,” “facial slap,” and “abdominal slap”; as not violating Congress’s ban on “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” and not violating Common Article 3’s requirement that prisoners be treated “humanely.”

How does it do that? Largely by saying that to violate the laws, the techniques must cause “serious” mental or physical harm, and the lawyers just didn’t think that the sort of mental or physical pain involved here was “serious” enough. That’s because, just as the lawyers defined “waterboarding” in the past to not cause serious harm because the harm was not prolonged for years — or at least it wasn’t when used on soldiers undergoing SERE training — this sort of prolonged-standing, half-starved sleep deprivation in diapers wasn’t going to cause “prolonged” or “severe” harm either. I don’t know how you prove that, but the lawyers seem to have just decided it.

“It’s an attempt to analyze the interrogation techniques under a different sets of norms,” American Civil Liberties Union national security project lawyer Alex Abdo explained to me yesterday. “But it’s surprising how little the analysis in this memo changed from the past memos, notwithstanding the passage of the DTA and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan.”

“At the end of the day, it seems fairly commonsensical that you can’t beat up someone for information, and yet this memo contemplates that,” Abdo says. “It’s dodging bullets fired at the CIA by Congress and the Supreme Court.”

Cheney thinks this and other memos dodged those bullets effectively, and the investigation should end there. But for those who find it cavalier the way the Justice Department decided that obviously painful, physically destructive and likely terrifying interrogation techniques were not “serious” enough to fall under the prohibitions against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, then who ordered those techniques to be used, how they were used and why they were approved might merit further inquiry.

This seems more likely to be raised in defense of the CIA interrogators than against the lawyers. An investigation of the relationship between the OLC and the executive might turn up criminal wrongdoing, but bad legal work isn’t prosecutable on its own.

Of course bad legal work isn’t prosecutable.  And of course CIA interrogators will say they’re not guilty because they were just following vaguely worded guidelines — which sounds an awful lot like “just following orders.” My point is that a prosecutor can’t simply stop his investigation of the over-the-top CIA interrogations there. Not because shoddy lawyering is a crime, but because it’s very likely that the Justice Department lawyers knew better.They knew that the CIA’s instructions were vague but approved them anyway, possibly because they were told by senior Bush officials not to constrain the interrogators. And if the lawyers knew that was likely to lead interrogators to cross the line from “enhanced interrogation” to torture, then the lawyers could themselves be liable for participating in a criminal conspiracy.

All of which is to say that any real investigation of how and why some CIA interrogators broke the law by torturing and even killing detainees in their custody must look at the orders they received — and at who signed off on them.

Here’s CCR’s statement:

Responsibility for the torture program cannot be laid at the feet of a few low-level operatives. Some agents in the field  may have gone further than the limits so ghoulishly laid out by the lawyers who twisted the law to create legal cover for the program, but it is the lawyers and the officials who oversaw and approved the program who must be investigated.

The Attorney General must appoint an independent special prosecutor with a full mandate to investigate those responsible for torture and war crimes, especially the high ranking officials who designed, justified and orchestrated the torture program. We call on the Obama administration not to tie a prosecutor’s hands but to let the investigation go as far up the chain of command as the facts lead. We must send a clear message to the rest of the world, to future officials, and to the victims of torture that justice will be served and that the rule of law has been restored.