Congress has held two hearings already on the cases of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, which introduced a new “credibility” requirement in pleading standards that civil rights advocates and some Democratic lawmakers complain leaves the fate of discrimination victims to the prejudices of a particular judge assigned to the case. Now, instead of simply having to state clearly what the claims are, plaintiffs have to convince the judge that those claims are credible at the outset, before even having had an opportunity to collect evidence to support them.

While that pleases some conservatives who view most civil rights lawsuits with skepticism, civil rights experts say it rewards employers and others who discriminate but have learned to cover their tracks.

As the Times puts it today: “The practical impact in, say, an employment discrimination case is to disadvantage the wronged employee, who is unlikely to have access at the outset to the records needed to prove wrongful conduct.”

The Times cites John Payton, president of the NAACP legal defense fund, who recently testified that some of the landmark cases of the civil rights era might never have survived the Supreme Court’s new standard. In his written testimony submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee earlier this month, Payton cites specific examples of potentially meritorious cases that didn’t survive the new standard because the plaintiffs couldn’t convince a skeptical judge that employment, voting or housing discrimination is “credible.”

As Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), a former U.S. Attorney, put it at that Senate hearing, “In my experience, misconduct is inherently implausible” because we generally expect people to act decently, fairly and lawfully.

Nadler’s legislation acknowledges the fact that sometimes, they don’t live up to that standard.

“NOT EVEN ONE JUSTICE APPROVED SOTOMAYER IN RICCI CASE,” blares the headline of a statement from Wendy Long, counsel to the Judicial Confirmation Network, on the Supreme Court’s decision.

“Frank Ricci finally got his day in court, despite the judging of Sonia Sotomayor, which all nine Justices of U.S. Supreme Court have now confirmed was in error,” she writes.

Huh?  Today’s ruling, as I noted before, was 5-4. Five justices voted to require the city to present more evidence — what the Supreme Court calls “a strong basis in evidence” — that if the city had not thrown out the results of a promotional exam that had a disparate impact on minorities, then it would have been legally liable to any racial minorities denied promotions who sued under the civil rights law.

Setting aside, for a moment, whether that evidentiary burden makes sense, there’s no question that only five of the nine justices supported it. The other four were just fine with the law the way it was, and believed that the city had presented sufficient evidence to satisfy its decision.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the four justices in dissent, questioned the court’s “newly announced strong-basis-in-evidence” standard and recites in painstaking detail the evidence supporting the city’s decision. She went on to note that since the majority is announcing “a new legal rule,” then it should remand the case to allow the lower courts to apply it, since they didn’t have notice before that that’s what the rule was. “[T]he ordinary course is to remand and allow the lower courts to apply the rule in the first instance,” she wrote, chastising the majority for not following that usual course and instead deciding against the city of New Haven.

Within hours after the decision, conservatives had turned this notion that the majority should have remanded the case if it was going to decide a new legal rule into the idea that the four dissenting justices had repudiated Sotomayor and the reasoning of the Second Circuit panel on which she sat.

“This was a unanimous decision that the 2nd circuit was incorrect,” said Gail Heriot, a professor at the University of San Diego School of Law on a conference call organized by the Federalist Society this morning. “Nobody agreed with Sotomayor. Nobody.”

As Long continues in her release:

“Usually, poor performance in any profession is not rewarded with the highest job offer in the entire profession.

“What Judge Sotomayor did in Ricci was the equivalent of a pilot error resulting in a bad plane crash. And now the pilot is being offered to fly Air Force One.

Well, that’s not how Justice Ginsburg and her co-dissenters see it, as they made clear in this passage:

Applying what I view as the proper standard to the record thus far made, I would hold that New Haven had ample cause to believe its selection process was flawed and not justified by business necessity. Judged by that standard, petitioners have not shown that New Haven’s failure to certify the exam results violated Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision.

UPDATE: Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas) has weighed in with his view of today’s Supreme Court decision in the Ricci case, and — suprise! — he reads the 5-4 decision as a 9-0 against Sotomayor, just like Wendy Long and the Federalist Society lawyers do:

Today’s decision is a victory for evenhanded application of the law. Saying the earlier decision was “antithetical to the notion of a workplace where individuals are guaranteed equal opportunity regardless of race,” the Supreme Court saw the case for what it is: a “race-based decision” that violates federal law. And while the Justices divided on the outcome, all nine Justices were critical of the trial court opinion that Judge Sotomayor endorsed. [Emphasis added.]

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As Aaron noted earlier, the Supreme Court this morning decided that the city of New Haven violated the federal civil rights law when it denied white firefighters promotions based in part on their race. That the city was only acting to avoid a lawsuit under the same civil rights law shouldn’t matter, the court ruled in a 5-4 decision.

“Fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer’s reliance on race to the detriment of individuals who passed the examinations and qualified for promotions,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in the majority opinion, joined by the usual block of conservative justices — Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, David Souter and John Paul Stevens. Ginsburg wrote that while the white firefighters “understandably attract this court’s sympathy,” they had “no vested right to promotion. Nor have other persons received promotions in preference to them.”

People for the American Way, which supports the Sotomayor nomination, released a statement this morning in anticipation of today’s ruling, saying that the ruling, whatever it would be, “does not reflect upon Sotomayor’s jurisprudence.”

Sotomayor and her panel colleagues were bound by longstanding precedent and federal law. They applied the law without regard to their personal views and unanimously affirmed the district court ruling. To do anything but would have been judicial activism.

The Federalist Society has scheduled a conference call with reporters for later this morning, at which point they’re sure to put their own spin on the decision.

Given how close the ruling was, though, it will be hard to say that Sotomayor’s decision in the lower court was either right or wrong, as a legal matter. In fact, Sotomayor was in the majority of her own court in deciding to affirm the district court’s finding that New Haven did not intentionally discriminate against the white firefighters when it tossed out the results of a promotional exam that had a disparate impact on black and Hispanic applicants. That disparate impact could have been the basis for a lawsuit against the city. Whether race was also a factor, in addition to avoiding a lawsuit, is an issue that was never directly addressed or briefed in the lower court, which, as I’ve explained before, is one reason that the full Second Circuit voted against re-hearing the case.

Whether the Supreme Court majority today made new law by deciding the way it did will be the subject of contention for weeks to come.

Greenwald writes:

Without a trace of sympathy or even interest in the plight of the plaintiff, Sotomayor methodically recounted the evidence of discrimination and, in as coldly and legalistic a manner as possible, concluded that the Norville ‘produced insufficient evidence at trial to show that the hospital’ discriminated against her.

The Norville case, Greenwald continues, “was one where she acted exactly contrary to the Rove-led disparagement of her jurisprudence — the accusation that she disregards objective legal considerations in favor of emotions and sympathy for what Charles Krauthammer euphemistically described as ‘certain ethnicities.’ ”

My own reading of the case is that she not only didn’t let her sympathies get in the way, but she may have gone too far in ignoring human “emotions and sympathy” to rule based on hyper-technicalities. By “emotions and sympathy,” I don’t mean bias; I mean the fact that discrimination cases are inherently about whether a supervisor made an employment decision based on an emotional, rather than an objective, assessment of an employee. And that requires a judge to let herself empathize at least a little with the situation the case presents.

In the case of Wendy Norville, a 56-year-old black nurse who suffered a spinal injury while working at the Staten Island hospital where she’d been employed for 13 years, the question of whether the hospital refused to reasonably accommodate her disability because of her race, her age, or her disability itself is hardly clear. Yet Judge Sotomayor, writing for a three-judge panel on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed the dismissal of her race and age claims on extremely technical, legalistic grounds that would seem to me to have been more appropriate for a jury. (Granted, as a lawyer I worked briefly on employment discrimination cases, so I might be considered biased. But as a former law clerk to a  federal appeals court judge, I saw many of these cases and I doubt I would have recommended coming down the way Sotomayor did on this one.)

Take, for example, Sotomayor’s discussion of Norville’s race discrimination claim, which was based “on her allegation that the hospital refused to accommodate her disability despite having made job accommodations for two disabled white nurses,” as Sotomayor described it.

That’s normally enough to create a prima facie case of discrimination that the hospital would then have to rebut. But here, Sotomayor decided against Norville’s claim failed because Norville failed to show that she was “similarly situated” to the two white nurses. One had terminal cancer and due to the treatment often had to leave work early. The other had a herniated disc — as did Norville — but was promoted to Head Nurse around the time of her injury.

That wasn’t good enough to get her claims to the jury, wrote Sotomayor, because Norville did not provide “evidence regarding the specific degree to which either of these nurses was disabled, the type of work they did prior to becoming disabled, or the ways in which they were limited in performing their jobs. Norville thus has failed to demonstrate that they were ‘subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation’ or that they ‘engaged in conduct similar to [hers].’”

Although I don’t have the full trial record before me, that reasoning seems to place a much greater burden on Norville than she should have had to bear before trial. The fact that the hospital accommodated two other white nurses who had serious disabilities — as Norville did, but was not accommodated — at least seems to create a real question as to whether the reason for the hospital’s action was due to Norville’s race. And it’s the jury’s job to provide the answer.

Sotomayor used similar reasoning to dismiss Norville’s claim of age discrimination, based on the fact that a 38-year old nurse was hired for a position that the hospital could have offered her as a reasonable accommodation for her disability (which, it’s worth emphasizing, was due to an injury sustained on the job).  Even though the hospital gave contradictory reasons for choosing the younger nurse over Norville, and Sotomayor concluded that Norville presented sufficient evidence that she was qualified for the job and that the hospital’s reasoning might be pretextual, strangely, that wasn’t enough to create a question of fact about whether the real reason was age discrimination.  Sotomayor seems to require some direct evidence that the reason for the hospital’s decision was Norville’s age — although given that employers rarely state their discriminatory reasons for their actions, showing pretext is usually sufficient to get the case to the jury to decide what was the real motive.

In fact, it was then-Judge (now Justice) Samuel Alito who, as the lone dissenter in the Third Circuit sex discrimination case of Sheridan v. DuPont, insisted that there ought to be some more direct evidence of the kind of discrimination alleged — an issue that caused considerable controversy during his Supreme Court confirmation hearing.

I know this seems like a long and excessively detailed analysis of one judicial opinion, but I do think it says something about Sonia Sotomayor, which  Greenwald alludes to but many others seem to be overlooking:  Sotomayor’s hyper-technical reading of the law may not always be such a good thing. In Norville’s case, for example, did Sotomayor miss the forest for the trees?

The fact that the jury ultimately awarded Norville $1.6 million for her disability discrimination claim alone — which Sotomayor allowed to go forward based on yet another technical (and correct) reading of the law — suggests that she might have.

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