Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (AP Photo)

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki opened the door for the first time Thursday to the prospect of a U.S. military presence in Iraq after the December 2011 deadline for troop withdrawal set by last year’s bilateral accord — something President Obama appeared to rule out during a joint appearance on Tuesday.

Speaking to an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, Maliki said the accord, known as the Status of Forces Agreement, would “end” the American military presence in his country in 2011, but “nevertheless, if Iraqi forces required further training and further support, we shall examine this at that time based on the needs of Iraq,” he said through translation in response to a question from The Washington Independent. “I am sure that the will, the prospects and the desire for such cooperation is found among both parties.”

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

Maliki continued, “The nature of that relationship — the functions and the amount of [U.S.] forces — will then be discussed and reexamined based on the needs” of Iraq.

The Iraqi prime minister’s allowance for a post-2011 U.S. troop presence comes despite his increasingly nationalist tone to a domestic audience in advance of parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for January. He resisted the advice of Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, to keep a U.S. combat presence in volatile areas like Mosul after June 30, the date set by the Status of Forces Agreement for their evacuation from Iraqi cities and towns. Instead, when they departed, Maliki declared a national holiday. He called the withdrawal a “great victory” for Iraq, language reminiscent of his oft-stated declarations of victory over Iraq’s various insurgent groups. In his remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Maliki moderated that remark, saying the U.S. “withdrawal from the cities is a victory, not a failure for either the Iraqis or the Americans.”

In a joint appearance with Maliki at the White House on Tuesday, President Obama gave no indication that he envisioned a place for U.S. troops in Iraq after 2011, instead pledging to “fulfill our commitment to remove all American troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.”  Using language that signaled an end to the U.S. troop presence in Iraq, Obama said the departure of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities was an “unmistakable signal” that his administration will “keep our commitments with the sovereign Iraqi government.” There are currently about 130,000 U.S. troops in the country.

Senior administration officials have denied any intent to keep U.S. forces in Iraq past that period as well. “It would require a new agreement, a new negotiation — almost certainly an Iraqi initiative — to provide for some presence beyond the end of 2011,” Defense Secretary Robert Gates told reporters in February after Obama announced a schedule for staggered U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement. “So in the absence of that agreement, in the absence of any negotiation for such an agreement, it is in keeping with the SOFA that, to say definitively, that we will be out at the end of 2011.”

But some former officials and analysts close to the administration have envisioned small non-combat residual U.S. forces remaining in Iraq past the 2011 deadline to advise Iraqi security forces, echoing the notes Maliki struck on Wednesday. Doug Ollivant, who left the National Security Council as an Iraq director last month, told TWI that the U.S. military will retain ties with its Iraqi counterparts after combat forces depart similar to the “ties we have to many other countries in the region,” which are often for officer training, coordination and advice. (While some countries in the region, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, host U.S. military bases, Obama reiterated Wednesday that “we seek no bases in Iraq.”)

And in a paper for the Center for a New American Security, a think tank with close ties to the Obama Pentagon and State Department, John Nagl, the think tank’s president, wrote last month that developing Iraqi security capacity for air and naval operations “always required some level of American support beyond the SOFA deadline, but now the United States may need to provide continued air and naval protection for an extended period beyond 2011″ owing to the global economic crisis. Both Ollivant and Nagl have longstanding relationships with Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of all U.S. forces in the Middle East and South Asia.

While antipathy for the U.S. military presence remains a popular Iraqi sentiment — the streets of Baghdad resembled a “carnival” when U.S. troops withdrew, according to reporters on the ground — some Iraqi legislators and security officials have questioned whether the Status of Forces Agreement provides a sufficient amount of time for Iraqi forces to take control of the still-violent country. Qassim Daoud, a Shiite parliamentarian and former national security adviser to Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, has said the accord should be renegotiated to allow U.S. troops to stay until 2020 or 2025. Last year, Iraq’s defense minister, Abdul Qadir al-Obaidi, suggested in a press conference that the less-mature elements of the Iraqi security forces, like the Air Force, might require American assistance after 2011.

Most of Maliki’s remarks to the U.S. Institute of Peace described a post-2011 U.S.-Iraqi relationship in non-military terms. In keeping with a companion according known as the Strategic Framework Agreement, which spells out terms for a U.S.-Iraqi alliance after 2011, Maliki said he sought a relationship on “all levels — political, economic, educational, cultural.” He extended his thanks to “the international community and all the countries that have cooperated and helped Iraq,” saying Iraq would enjoy a “solid relationship with a great and strong country like the United States.”

A Gallup poll released last week found that 58 percent of Americans consider the U.S. invasion of Iraq to be a mistake.

Prime Minister Maliki  answered Spencer Ackerman’s question at a press meeting held Thursday, not Wednesday as we originally reported. We regret the error.

” …But we have taken it as far as Americans can.  In my opinion, anything we do now may do more harm than good in delaying the inevitable and reinforcing [Iraqis], at times, crippling malaise. The only enduring role for Americans is to provide the safety net to prevent complete collapse, chaos, and civil war; three things that I do not believe will happen in any event.”

Additionally, the Defense Department just emailed this out to reporters:

“The United States is committed to full, transparent, and continued implementation of the security agreement in a spirit of partnership with the sovereign nation of Iraq. Iraqi security forces continue to take the lead in the security and stability of Iraq,” said Gen. Ray Odierno, commanding general, Multi-National Force Iraq. U.S. forces outside urban areas will continue to conduct operations by, with, and through, ISF, focusing on securing Iraqi borders and areas outside the cities. “In order to meet our obligations under the security agreement, some U.S. forces will remain in cities to train, advise, and coordinate with Iraqi security forces, as well as support civil capacity efforts led by the U.S. Mission-Iraq, government of Iraq (GoI) and the United Nations. All U.S. forces retain full authority and ability to protect themselves, Iraqi security forces, and the Iraqi public,” said Odierno.

I had my doubts about Odierno’s commitment to implementing the Status of Forces Agreement. He proved me wrong.

But not if you’re an Iraqi. Just read the outpouring that The Washington Post reports for the end of a major U.S. presence in the cities and the towns:

“Out, America out!” a group of sweat-drenched young men chanted Monday at a Baghdad park as the sun was setting. They jumped up and down to the deafening beat of drums and the wail of horns.

It’s a “carnival” in Baghdad, according to The Post’s Ernesto Londono, filled with Iraqi troops grinning as they take their lives into their own hands and graffiti writers further south demanding, “Pull your troops from our Basra, we are its sons and want its sovereignty.” Don’t tell them today is just another day.

Building on the political opportunity afforded by today’s national celebration, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared victory, reports The New York Times:

“The national united government succeeded in putting down the sectarian war that was threatening the unity and the sovereignty of Iraq.”

Adds reporter Alissa Rubin, “He made no mention of the American military’s involvement in fighting here for the last six years.” If you were Maliki, would you? Rubin also notes that the government turned American reporters away from the Green Zone — the former U.S. enclave now under Iraqi control — in an apparent gesture “to signal that the Iraqi authorities were in charge.”

What will that entail? “A lot of it will be trying to deal with the al-Qaeda presence, particularly in Ninewa Province,” said Joseph McMillan, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, on a bloggers’ conference call this morning. McMillan declined to get more specific, but said to expect “the tracking of insurgent activities, particularly on the borders” as a hallmark of U.S. troops’ new wilderness-focused combat mission.

Under what circumstances can U.S. forces operate in the cities after Wednesday? That’s “essentially a call by the Iraqi government,” McMillan continued. “If they tell us they need help, then Gen. Odierno and his staff will sit down with the Iraqi military and security leadership [to determine] what missions are appropriate,” and how to execute them in a supporting role. He added that even though about 120 bases operated by U.S. forces in urban areas have been handed over to Iraqi leadership, there hasn’t been much base construction for facilities out in the sticks. “My understanding is they’re doing minor work, the standard engineering thing” to accommodate an increased volume of U.S. forces in the facilities, but “we’re not in the mode of building new bases around the countryside.”

McMillan rejected the idea that the pullout from Iraqi cities represented a return to a pre-surge combat posture, when U.S. troops were criticized for “commuting to the fight” from big bases on the outskirts of Iraqi cities. From 2003 to now, “U.S. forces operated with the freedom to go into anywhere” deemed appropriate by their commanders, he said, and didn’t provide the responsibility for urban security to their Iraqi counterparts. “This is a fundamental change of the rules of the road. We are now handing off the urban security mission to Iraqi security forces.”

And that’s the mark of a sensible policymaker. For the United States., victory is a category error in a war like Iraq. The goal is to mitigate the fundamental errors of invasion and occupation by leaving the country in the hands of a reasonably capable Iraqi government. If there is a victory to be had, it’s to be had by that government, when it finds a way to either defeat, co-opt or marginalize the rejectionists challenging its authority.

Or maybe another way. According to The New York Times, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is portraying the June 30 departure of U.S. combat troops from Iraqi towns and cities as a “great victory,” ahead of the forthcoming national elections. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, contended to Maliki that the prime minister should allow a limited U.S. combat presence in violent northern cities like Mosul. Maliki rejected the argument. His efforts are designed to cast himself as the man who ended the occupation of Iraq, in line with his years-long strategy of consolidating power within his office.

“We will not ask them to intervene in combat operations related to maintaining public order,” he said in an interview with Le Monde published last week. “It is finished.”

Sure, as of next week, 130,000 U.S. troops will still be in Iraq as an insurance policy, training and equipping the Iraqi security forces for missions like emergency medical evacuation, and with their helicopters flying in the skies for if things get gnarly. But that’s less important than the political dynamic that Maliki’s strategy reinforces, which is that there’s a dividend to be reaped by the leader who evicts the United States from Iraq. And while that may hurt American feelings, it gets the U.S. everything its interests require: out of Iraq, while a reliable-enough U.S. ally increases his hold on power. As a mitigation strategy, it works fairly well. Unsurprisingly, U.S. military leaders embrace it. Here’s military spokesman Stephen Lanza, a one-star general:

“Symbolically,” General Lanza said of the withdrawing American forces ahead of Tuesday, “this is what we want for the Iraqis as a sovereign nation.”

He’s “fairly optimistic” about the future of Iraq. “The price has been high and will continue to be high,” Sumaida’ie said, “but a) the outcome matters, to us and to you and the region, and b) the alternative is too awful to contemplate.” He means a failed state. He’s not so concerned about “how much attention” the Obama administration gives to Iraq but “the quality of attention” it gives. Very diplomatic. He praises America’s ability to learn from its mistakes in Iraq.

Structurally, Iraq has “issues that cannot be easily wished away.” You think? So “for this reason Americans should continue to be engaged. They have learned at every level … from writers and journalists to leaders and military officers.” The United States is “wiser” in Iraq now, knows Iraq more than in 2003, which seems like faint praise. “Now it’s time to shift from the SOFA, the Status of Forces Agreement, to the Strategic Framework Agreement,” the U.S.-Iraq document that establishes a long-term post-occupation relationship.

American influence is not dwindling. “Maybe military,” he says. But “Iraqis are now used to dealing with Americans.” Iraqi police and soldiers are dressed more like Americans than the Saddam era. “McDonald’s has not opened up yet,” Sumaida’ie said, to laughs. “It’s the soft power that now should be exercised, rather than the hard power,” he continues. “But there is a reluctance … America should be much more forceful, much more engaged.”

Managing the disengagement of U.S. troops “will be extremely important. We have to get that right, though we got the engagement wrong.” Clearly he’s not convinced that the Obama administration has already gotten it right. “Maybe I’m putting more weight than most people do, but it’s crucial … There are issues that can only be resolved with the help of our American friends.”

I’m reminded of Hamid Karzai’s 2003 congressional testimony pleading for the United States not to neglect Afghanistan as it invaded Iraq.

The cabinet suggested that the referendum could be delayed until January, but the parliament speaker, Ayad al-Summarie, an opponent of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, appears to be leaning in the direction of holding it by July 30.

Welcome to Christopher Hill’s first massive challenge as Iraq ambassador. He can continue to press behind the scenes for the Maliki government and the parliament to block or delay the referendum, contending that a premature U.S. departure is a gamble that Iraq can’t afford. But if he does that, the inevitable charges about American intentions for permanent occupation will intensify in an election year, risking not only the passage of the referendum but a more anti-American parliament as well. If he doesn’t press Maliki and the parliament, the referendum could pass. Would that be the end of the world? No, but it could make the actual withdrawal more chaotic. What’s striking is that for months, administration officials I’ve spoken with about Iraq have been convinced the referendum wasn’t going to happen.

On a kind-of-related note, Musings On Iraq has a good post noting that the Iraqis asked the British to keep 100 sailors and 5 ships in Basra after the “final” British pull-out date of May 31. Is this what’s going to happen for U.S. troops, as John Nagl kind-of-sort-of-maybe suggests in his new Iraq paper? If the referendum passes and U.S. troops have to leave Iraq in 2010, expect the Obama administration, ironically, to negotiate a more robust advisory presence than it would if the referendum fails, out of an attempt to mitigate the consequences of what it’ll view as an accelerated withdrawal schedule.

Nagl’s paper, which can be downloaded here and will apparently be formally released on Thursday, is about U.S. involvement in Iraq after the occupation ends. I’ll have more to say about this later — on Thursday I’ll be at CNAS’s annual conference, where hopefully I can chat with Nagl about the paper — but on first glance a few things stand out. Nagl accepts the “clear Iraqi desire to reduce America’s role in their country” and predicates his paper on how to secure American interests in Iraq — such as “regional stability and security, counterterrorism, and the advancement of democratic governance,” he writes, and he might have mentioned oil — without a costly and unpopular troop presence. Most of his mechanisms are diplomatic and economic, and he advocates a sustained advisory presence from civilian elements of the U.S. government in order to bolster Iraq’s still-fragile institutions.

On the security side, Nagl urges “rethinking the emphasis on security-force assistance,” by which he means a U.S. military partnership with the Iraqi security forces that’s primarily a matter of educating an officer corps at U.S. military and police schools, rather than continuing to build them up in the field. The (seeming) exception, though, is this blink-and-you’ll-miss-it reference:

The economic downturn has hindered the Iraqis’ current efforts to fully modernize their forces and develop supporting capabilities, making continued U.S. assistance even more crucial. This is particularly true in more technical arenas such as the development of the air and naval forces necessary to defend Iraq’s territory and Persian Gulf oil infrastructure. Developing such capabilities always required some level of American support beyond the SOFA deadline, but now the United States may need to provide continued air and naval protection for an extended period beyond 2011.

I’m not sure what exactly Nagl’s envisioning here. Would this be an offshore presence post-withdrawal, whereby U.S. Air Force and Naval assets overfly Iraqi airspace as necessary and maintain access to the Persian Gulf? Or does he mean something that would take place inside the country, with U.S. planes maintaining bases in Iraq and ships patrolling its waterways? If he means the latter, I’m not sure how he reconciles that with his recognition earlier in the paper that the “Iraqi government takes [troop withdrawal] deadlines seriously and shows no intent to modify them.”

Additionally, the paper doesn’t give any cost estimates for Nagl’s proposals. This isn’t meant as a backdoor criticism of the merits of his proposals. But Nagl recognizes early in the paper that there’s a “lack of U.S. public support for resource-intensive nation-building projects” that impose “serious constraints on the U.S. commitment to Iraq, particularly in a time of economic distress.” His advisory-centric agenda hardly seems to amount to “resource-intensive nation-building projects,” but it’ll still impose some costs on the budget. It’s hard to debate whether his proposals are worth the costs if it’s not clear what the costs are.

I’ll try and get some clarity on these questions at Thursday’s CNAS conference.

The official said Maliki warned that releasing the photos would lead to more violence that could delay the scheduled U.S. withdrawal from cities by June 30 and that Iraqis wouldn’t make a distinction between old and new photos. The public outrage and increase in violence could lead Iraqis to demand a referendum on the security agreement and refuse to permit U.S. forces to stay until the end of 2011.

Maliki said, “Baghdad will burn” if the photos are released, said a second U.S. military official.

The prospect of losing a popular referendum — slated to be held, if it occurs at all (it’s unclear), by July 30 — that would compel U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq ahead of the Status of Forces Agreement’s December 2011 timeframe was also referenced in statements from Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, and Gen. David Petraeus, commander of U.S. troops in the Middle East and South Asia, to the Second Circuit Circuit Court of Appeals last week. Petraeus told the court that releasing the photographs would mean “pressure will mount on the Prime Minister to allow for a national referendum on the Security Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement.” Odierno assessed, “The release of the photos may incite the Iraqi public and cause the referendum to be defeated.” He added that “senior Iraqi officials” — he didn’t mention Maliki by name — believe that releasing the images would benefit Iraqi rejectionists, who would argue against reconciliation “with a Government that has aligned itself with a country that committed this abuse.” (The full statements, in PDF format, are here.)

The budget squeeze is also heightening concerns about the Shiite-led Iraqi government’s ability to continue paying U.S.-formed — and formerly U.S.-funded — Sunni paramilitary groups that are now working under its supervision. The government promised to shift 20 percent of the 94,000 men in those groups to security jobs, but because of the hiring freeze, fewer than 5,000 of them have made the transition.

In recent months, many Sunni guards have walked away from their checkpoints after working unpaid for months. U.S. officials fear that the dissolution of the groups could refuel the insurgency, widen the sectarian divide and destabilize the government.

Beyond the reconciliation issue, Londono reports that the Iraqis may face problems with preparedness to face external threats, as money dries up to supply the country’s tiny air force, navy and border guard. To go far out in the realm of speculation, watch to see if that becomes a pretext for the Iraqi military to request revisions to the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement holding a total U.S. troop departure by the end of 2011. Senior Iraqi military commanders have often said that they want the United States to leave when they’re able to take control. We can argue whether Iraq isn’t already seeing foreign-sponsored aggression against it, but the implicit premise in London’s reporting is that Iraq won’t be prepared for a major conventional conflict with one of its neighbors. How likely is that, though?