I would like to convey our most sincere condolences to the friends and families of each of those that have fallen in Afghanistan. Our thoughts and prayers are with them and their families. They are heroes and their valiant sacrifices are not in vain, and they will each be remembered for their distinguished service and valor in this fight for a noble cause.

I excerpted Jawad’s statement because it’s four paragraphs long. By contrast, in his speech today to the U.S. Institute of Peace, here’s the closest Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came to recognizing the fact that over 4,300 U.S. troops have died in Iraq:

He extended his thanks to “the international community and all the countries that have cooperated and helped Iraq,” saying Iraq would enjoy a “solid relationship with a great and strong country like the United States.”

The U.S. invaded Iraq in an unprovoked preemptive war, and the chaos that followed makes it very understandable — if painful to American ears — why an Iraqi head of state who called it a “great victory” when U.S. troops withdrew from his towns and cities wouldn’t extend much praise to U.S. forces. Obama said Maliki intends to lay a wreath at Arlington National Ceremony honoring fallen U.S. troops, which is a meaningful and respectful gesture. Still, the two statements underscore the difference in perceptions of U.S. partnership between Afghans and Iraqis.

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No, he said, adding that Kabul “doesn’t know exactly how Washington operates. … They ask, ‘Is this legal, to buy influence?’ Yes, everybody’s doing it!” Jawad told me that he doesn’t even have enough money to properly entertain embassy guests. “People like you,” he said. “If you are interested, I can give you a book on Afghanistan, but nothing else.”

Deja vu! Jawad generously gave me Bijan Omrani and Matthew Leeming’s “Afghanistan: A Companion And Guide” ahead of my trip there last year.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the memo, which Jawad wrote ahead of the second round of U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral talks in early May, is the surprising assessment that Afghanistan doesn’t have sufficient juice in Washington after seven years of war and an administration that came into office vowing a new focus on the beleaguered country.

Now take a look at this statement, released this morning by Afghan Ambassador Said Jawad. Notice that the Afghan government is portraying itself as a key contributor of the strategy:

“We are very grateful to President Barack Obama and his administration for the efforts that have gone into producing this new strategy for victory in Afghanistan,” said Ambassador Jawad. “The new strategy is significant because it is comprehensive and incorporated the input and insights of diverse voices.” [...]

“During the visit of our senior delegation, we were able to share a number of issues of importance to the Afghan government, including expanding the Afghan security forces, enhancing the capacity of our state institutions, increasing and more effectively using development assistance, and looking at the terrorist threat in a regional context,” said Ambassador Jawad. “This new strategy took our perspectives into consideration.”

Also interesting: the next round of formal discussions with the Obama administration and the Afghan government about the future course of Afghanistan strategy will come in May.

Finally, on the circle-squaring front, check out the way Jawad’s statement slyly inserts “democracy,” a word that Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta emphasized in his public talks in Washington and that the Obama speech spoke of only in the context of Pakistan.

“We are happy to see the new U.S. strategy touch upon the many inter-related issues that will be key to success in Afghanistan,” said Ambassador Jawad. “Security, development, democracy and regional cooperation are all vital elements of a victorious campaign for Afghanistan’s future.”

When a man came to police headquarters recently to complain that his motorcycle had been stolen, the police refused to act without a bribe.

“Fine,” he said, according to soldiers who witnessed the encounter. “I’m going to the Taliban. At least they’ll take me seriously.”

Wow, does that seem like deja vu to me. And it’s a good illustration of why U.S. counterterrorism goals won’t succeed without population-centric counterinsurgency. If a guy who gets his motorcycle stolen feels more comfortable reporting the theft to the Taliban, he’s unlikely to assist Jawad’s government or NATO with intelligence about where the Taliban is, or what its liaisons with the locals down south look like, or any of the other necessary supporting components that could dislodge the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies as a threat to the Kabul government. It starts with the motorcycle, basically. If the criminals in your neighborhood did a better job keeping the streets safe and providing something approximating justice, why would you ever help the police catch them?

Also interesting in that piece: negotiations with the insurgency aren’t seen as relevant in southern Afghanistan:

What the new strategy does not seek to do, however, is to borrow a page from the U.S. playbook in Iraq by creating tribal militias to fend off the Taliban. Commanders here said that approach could create even more warlords and new intratribal feuds. And the commanders see little benefit from negotiations with the Taliban right now, despite Obama’s support for such an overture.

Military officials regard the Taliban, composed largely of ethnic Pashtuns, as both too strong and too fragmented in the south to pursue an effective deal, although they remain open to the possibility in the east, where some tribal leaders who have supported the insurgency could be persuaded to switch sides.

“Mullah Omar has given the green light to talks,” said one of the mediators, Abdullah Anas, a former friend of Osama bin Laden who used to fight in Afghanistan but now lives in London.

A source negotiating for the Afghan Government confirmed: “It’s extremely sensitive but we have been in contact both with Mullah Omar’s direct representatives and commanders from the front line.”…

“A big, big step has happened,” Mr Anas said yesterday. “For the first time, there is a language of … peace on both sides.”

While stranger things have happened, representatives from the Afghan government told reporters in Washington a few weeks ago that they don’t seek reconciliation with Omar and his al-Qaeda-aligned Quetta Shura Taliban council. Instead they seek defeat. Assuming that line is the true government line, Omar would have to swear allegiance to the post-Taliban constitution before the government would think about dealing with him instead of arresting him. Which they might not even consider at all, since they said his crew was guilty of terrible crimes. (As they are.)

But who knows. Positions change, especially if there might be a reasonable prospect to end the war. Still, that’s doubtful. The Taliban are in possibly the best position they’ve been in since they were driven out of Kabul in 2001. Why would they seek peace now, particularly a peace on the Kabul government’s terms?

“Taliban are in a strong position now but that doesn’t mean they can control the state,” [Anas] said. “They are well aware that it’s a different situation to 1996 when they swept to power because Afghans saw them as bringing peace.”

Again, consider that unverified until further reporting emerges.

More interesting is Jawad’s perspective on negotiating with the Taliban-led insurgency. Speaking to a point Josh Foust has taken me to task for overlooking, Jawad reminds that talks with “individual Taliban commanders has been going on for the past six years” and says about 600 insurgents have agreed to stop fighting, with some “even occupy[ing] public offices in government and parliament.” Mirroring the reconciliation framework that I reported the Afghan government is adopting, Jawad uses Gen. David McKiernan’s “capital-T Taliban” phraseology to describe those whom the Afghan government considers irreconcilable:

This faction is affiliated with Al Qaeda and the regional and international terrorist networks. Contrary to Iraq, the history of Al Qaeda and the Haqqani and Hekmatyar networks are deeply rooted in the three decades of fighting together against the Soviet Union and cemented by inter-marriages.  This group of Taliban is irreconcilable and will not rest until their main objectives of eliminating the West and its allies are met. They must be defeated or eliminated by force. We mustn’t forget that in 2001, there were talks with the Taliban for it to deliver Osama bin Laden, but that yielded no success. Furthermore, since 2004, talks with similar groups in Waziristan, Pakistan and FATA have led to regroupings, extended control and brutalities against the Pakistani people.

The other mid-level commanders are potentially reconcilable and the foot soldiers need a jobs program to cleave them from the insurgency. Jawad thinks there’s really no hope in talking with them unless fighting continues:

Negotiation and reconciliation with the Taliban will succeed only if we talk to them from the position of strength and with a clear and strong stand on human rights, women’s rights and the Afghan Constitution.  These are principles on which there cannot be concession or compromise. Unfortunately, some of the current “defeatist” and “reductionist” media statements and policy recommendations in the U.S. and European capitals feed the Taliban propaganda, which is mainly based on questioning the U.S. and NATO’s staying power. NATO and U.S. forces are saying that we are not winning in Afghanistan, implying that the Taliban are not losing. If they are not losing, why should they talk to us?

But they’re not losing. Saying that does something more important than “feed[ing] the Taliban propaganda” — it reflects the truth about the current strategic situation. If the insurgency wasn’t registering big successes, there would be no need to negotiate. Jawad risks marginalizing himself if he’s telling the Obama administration to stop speaking clearly about the severity of the situation in Afghanistan.

For the Afghans: Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak, Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar, Ambassador to the United States Said Jawad, and U.N. Ambasssador Zahir Tanin. I think intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh might have been there, but I’m not sure.

For the Obama administration: National security adviser Jim Jones; Former CIA official Bruce Reidel, chairman of the strategy review; Special Envoy to Af-Pak Richard Holbrooke and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, the co-chairs of the review; and representives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary Bob Gates and Vice President Biden.

What did the Afghans tell the Americans? More on that later.

They’ll have a full itinerary. Tomorrow, they’ll meet with the visiting Pakistani minister for foreign affairs, Shah Mahmoud Qureshi, as well as select members of congress. Wednesday they have a lunch briefing with the White House Af-Pak strategy review session and dinner alongside a visiting Pakistani delegation at the State Department. Thursday it’s back to State for a bilateral meeting with Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton and a joint State Department meeting with the Pakistani delegation, as well as a parley with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Friday it’s breakfast fun with the press. There will also be media appearances throughout, like a Thursday morning press conference with Wardak hosted by the Center for a New American Security.

My understanding is that in addition to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, the ministers will meet with Reps. Nita Lowey (D-N.Y.), Kay Granger (R-Texas), Silvestre Reyes (D-Tex.), Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), Pete Hoekstra (R-Mich.) and John McHugh (D-N.Y.).

An official at the Afghanistan embassy is happy that the Afghan officials are informing the strategy review, and comments that the Karzai government looks “forward to forging ahead with a new coordinated and comprehensive regional strategy to overcome the joint challenges that Afghanistan and Pakistan face.”

I’ll have more on this later, but in the meantime, check out Laura Rozen’s analysis of the trip.