Iran has formally asked for changes to an International Atomic Energy Agency proposal to ship nuclear fuel out of Iran for reprocessing abroad.

The response represents a setback in attempts by the international community to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. Just last week, negotiators from the U.S., France and Russia left the table with Iranian counterparts in Vienna optimistic that they had hammered out a deal acceptable to all parties, including Iran.

“Fortunately, the conditions for international nuclear cooperation have been met,” Mr. Ahmadinejad said. “We are currently moving in the right direction and we have no fear of legal cooperation, under which all of Iran’s national rights will be preserved, and we will continue our work.”

An Iranian hardline newspaper has indicated that the regime wants two changes to the offer, which, as it stands, would send about 75 percent of Iran’s low-enriched uranium to Russia and France for processing into a state basically unsuitable for nuclear weapons. Experts believe that would add a year to the time it would take Iran to build a bomb. But Iran, according to the paper, will ask to stagger the shipments of uranium and for immediate weapons-unsuitable uranium shipments into Iran to power a medical-research reactor. The Times says that those changes may “undermine the deal.” We’ll have an idea tomorrow about whether that’s a gambit; what the Iranians will say; and how the United States and its allies will respond.

Iran may agree to send only a bit of its LEU stockpile out at a time, maintaining the bulk of it on Iranian soil (where in theory it could be further enriched to weapons grade). French officials have made clear in the past few days that they will only sign on to the deal if it involves all 1200 kg LEU suggested at Geneva.

Talks may go on until Wednesday.

I think it’s pretty safe to predict that this is going to be an extraordinarily difficult process. I doubt that it’s going to be measured in terms of one meeting, although we’ll see how the Iranians approach the meeting tomorrow.

That’s a way of saying that the talks will establish either that there’s a basis for further diplomatic engagement — predicated on Iranian disclosure — or that the Iranians are not interested in disclosure and the P5+1 will consider more punitive measures like sanctions. So, what specifically does Iran have to begin to provide the P5+1?

One, as I mentioned, is to fulfill their obligations to the IAEA on Qom, on the clandestine facility.

They also have an obligation to be transparent about their entire nuclear program. In the past there was a period of time where they applied the Additional Protocol, which allowed for wider inspections by the IAEA in Iran. That’s certainly an example of the kind of thing that would help restore confidence.

But the bottom line is we need to see — not just we, but the international community needs to see — actions, not just words. Particularly in light of the most recent revelation.

At the same time, in addition to increased transparency, as I said, concrete steps to build confidence in the program too, whether it’s based on the proposal that we’ve had on the table for some time that begins with freeze-for-freeze or other kinds of ideas, but there have to be measureable results.

The Times:

American officials said that they had been tracking the covert project for years, but that Mr. Obama decided to make public the American findings after Iran discovered, in recent weeks, that Western intelligence agencies had breached the secrecy surrounding the project. On Monday, Iran wrote a brief, cryptic letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency, saying that it now had a “pilot plant” under construction, whose existence it had never before revealed.

In a statement from its headquarters in Vienna on Friday, the atomic agency confirmed that it had been told Monday by Iran that “a new pilot fuel enrichment plant is under construction in the country.”

So naturally reporters wanted to know what accounts for Medvedev’s shift. And since one of the conservative talking points on the missile defense decision is that it didn’t secure any concrete positive actions from the Russians — which isn’t totally true – speculation quickly turned to missile defense. Yet Michael McFaul, the Russia director at the National Security Council, wasn’t willing to go there. From the transcript of a briefing yesterday:

Q    The only thing we see that’s changed is the missile thing, so that’s how we read it.  And we’ve been told something else to read in –

MR. McFAUL:  Well, I guess I would just say it’s bigger than that.  I think it’s trying to develop a strategic relationship with Russia.  It’s trying to say we have common interests that are not just this thing for that thing, but a bigger framework.  It’s a lot of interests.  Today was all about Iran, but in July, we spent a great deal of time about Afghanistan.  And before nine months ago, we didn’t talk about Afghanistan as a common threat. Now we do.  This one I think we’ve achieved that.

Uh, what? Try again:

Q    Michael, are you denying completely that the shift in U.S. strategy on this missile defense actually did improve the climate for these kind of talks and may have –

MR. McFAUL:  Let me be very clear as somebody who is in every single meeting on missile defense, from the lowest to the highest levels, the notion that we need to do what we did as a concession for Russia never was brought up.  And I just defer — I refer you to Secretary Gates.  There is nobody that could say it clearer than him.  He said it — and when the historic — I know you’re looking at me like — but hold on, hold on.  I’m getting to — okay. So we did that and we did our review because of the threat in Iran, and that is what we did.  Is it the case that it changes the climate?  I think that’s true, of course.  But it’s not cause and effect I guess is what I’m trying to say. The causal arrow is the other way around for me.

Now, on the one hand, since the Obama administration has gone to great lengths to de-link the missile defense decision from anything concerning Russia, McFaul’s not really in a position to suddenly say, “Well, when we like the outcome, missile defense was responsible for it!” But on the other, McFaul treated the linkage like it was a cockroach running around his kitchen, and he did everything but take off his shoe and slam it repeatedly on the counter until the insect was nothing more than a stain. Maybe we’re not used to seeing that measure of intellectual honesty from someone who has to defend a controversial policy decision, but it’s one weird communications strategy.

For what it’s worth, here’s Medvedev on the administration’s missile defense shift:

We talked about missile defense with my colleague, President Obama.  We talked that the decision that he took was reasonable and that reflected the position of the current U.S. administration on missile defense, and also takes into consideration our concerns on the missile defense which is needed for Europe and for the world.  And we are ready to continue this work with our U.S. colleagues in this direction, as well as with our European colleagues, of course.

Since 2003, NATO and Russia have staged at least four simulated missile defense exercises. Both sides say they were successful.

“They showed (NATO’s and Russia’s) missile defense systems could be made interoperable,” [Dmitry] Rogozin told reporters Friday. “They showed this can enhance the level of security for everyone.”

There’s a talking point out there, reiterated by ex-Gov. Mike Huckabee, a respected defense intellectual, to our own Dave Weigel, that Obama got “nothing” in response to his decision to revamp European missile defense plans. Rogozin, by contrast, said that Russia will back away from plans to deploy its own missiles:

In Brussels, Rogozin, the Russian NATO envoy, said the shelving of the U.S. missile shield in Eastern Europe means Russia will now not deploy short-range Iskander missiles near Poland. “If you have no radars and missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland, we don’t need to find some response,” he said.

Imagine that. A diplomatic move that gets a bone out of the throat of a great power is immediately met with a gesture that actively contributes to the security of NATO allies. It’s almost like Huckabee, and the gaggle of braying conservative critics who find any change to the imaginary Strategic Defense Initiative to be an affront to St. Reagan, don’t actually have any idea what they’re talking about.

The President’s decision also opens the door to missile defense cooperation with Russia, which would send a powerful signal to Iran. It could also help increase our regional missile defense capability if Russia shares missile flight data from its Armavir radar. NATO has repeatedly supported U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense. President Obama’s decision will not threaten Russia, and it offers an opportunity for missile defense to serve as a uniting issue, rather than a dividing one.

I asked a Pentagon official about that, and the response I got was such a proposal didn’t in any sense guide the decision to jettison the Poland/Czech-based missile shield — “The main issue: why spend more money on a system that works less well?” the official said — but future U.S.-Russia anti-ballistic missile collaboration “may be a fringe benefit.”

Well, sure enough, here’s NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, sending up his own trial balloon from Brussels:

“We should explore the potential for linking the US, NATO and Russia missile defense systems at an appropriate time,” Fogh Rasmussen said.

“Both NATO and Russia have a wealth of experience in missile defense. We should now work to combine this experience to our mutual benefit,” he added.

What will Russia say?

“Scrapping the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic does little more then empower Russia and Iran at the expense of our allies in Europe,” said Representative John A. Boehner, Republican of Ohio, the House minority leader. “It shows a willful determination to continue ignoring the threat posed by some of the most dangerous regimes in the world, while taking one of the most important defenses against Iran off the table.”

First: there will still be a missile shield, of improved technological prowess, to deal with short-range Iranian missiles. Second: only someone who has no idea what they are talking about would describe Iran and Russia together as “some of the most dangerous regimes in the world.” There was this thing that happened in 1991 that changed the world. If what Boehner means is that Russia’s military capabilities make it one of the most dangerous regimes, then congratulations, America: you are the most dangerous regime in the world by orders of magnitude. This Boehner fellow has a subtle mind.

“This deeply regrettable decision sends the wrong message to Tehran, Moscow, and our European allies at a critical time in our effort to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program,” Senator Joe Lieberman says in a statement. “Moreover, it means that we will have a less capable missile defense system to protect the United States and our European allies against the Iranian threat. The administration must take immediate and tangible action to reassure our allies in Central and Eastern Europe that we are committed to their security and independence.”

Every part of this is blinkered. For the actual Iranian short-range missile threat, the Obama administration is substituting the next wave of anti-ballistic missile technology for an outmoded one. Only a fool or a reflexively right-wing Connecticut concern troll would actually believe better technology provides a more porous defense. Additionally, what actually contributes to the “security and independence” of eastern Europe is improved political ties with Russia, and what doesn’t is an outdated-before-it’s-ever-deployed missile shield that Russia justifiably interprets as a needless provocation. Focusing better technology on Iran rather than inferior technology on Russia is a positive-sum development. It’s statements like this that demonstrate why the only people who think Lieberman is a serious defense thinker tend to lose presidential elections.

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