Detainees at Guantanamo Bay (The Toronto Star/ZUMApress.com)

The Supreme Court dealt a harsh blow on Monday to victims of abuse by U.S. officials during the “war on terror.” The court announced it would not review a federal appeals court ruling that dismissed a lawsuit by four British citizens who claim they were wrongly arrested, detained and mistreated by American officials at the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., had ruled in April that government officials were entitled to “qualified immunity” from suit because it wasn’t clear at the time that abusing Guantanamo prisoners at was illegal.

[Law1] That appeals court decision in Rasul v. Rumsfeld effectively doomed many more cases that might have been brought by the more than 500 detainees who’ve been released from the Guantanamo prison, many of whom were subjected to so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Those techniques include a broad range of abusive tactics, from weeks of sleep and food deprivation to stress positions, sexual humiliation, death threats and “waterboarding,” or simulated drowning. The four men who sued former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other senior military officers for approving those techniques claim that between 2001 and 2004, when they were released, they were subjected to repeated beatings, prolonged sleep deprivation, extremes of hot and cold, forced nakedness, death threats, interrogations at gun point, menacing with unmuzzled dogs, and religious and racial harassment. The use of such techniques has been documented in Congressional reports, and Justice Department memos reveal that such tactics were explicitly approved by Bush administration lawyers.

The court’s decision not to review the Rasul case does not mean it agrees with the lower court’s decision. But it leaves the court of appeals’ ruling in effect and places a stumbling block in the path of Guantanamo detainees who claim they have been abused in U.S. custody and seek redress in court.

“When the court decides not to hear a case, it doesn’t say anything about the merits,” said Stephen Vladeck, professor at American University’s Washington College of Law and expert on national security and constitutional law. “But it leaves intact a fairly sweeping opinion by the D.C. Circuit — one that I think will be hard to overcome for any future plaintiffs suing based on abuse that allegedly occurred at Guantanamo.”

Shayana Kadidal, a senior attorney at the Center for Constitutional Rights and one of the lawyers who brought the Rasul case, agreed. “This decision is certainly bad news for the majority of people who could conceivably want to sue for damages at some point,” he said. In addition to monetary compensation, he said, many former Guantanamo detainees are seeking rulings to clears their names, because when they return to their home countries they’re often still suspected of terrorism and unable to secure employment.

At issue is an aspect of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion that found that government officials cannot be held legally responsible for any mistreatment because when the plaintiffs sued in 2004, “it wasn’t clearly established in the law that they were entitled not to be tortured or subjected to religious abuse,” said Kadidal. Since then, several Supreme Court cases have ruled that Guantanamo detainees have at least some constitutional rights. Which ones, however, remain unclear.

The D.C. Circuit’s ruling “reads out the good faith requirement in qualified immunity,” said Eric Lewis, a Washington, D.C., attorney who brought the Rasul case with CCR. “The whole notion of qualified immunity is that officials acting in good faith should have some protections.” But the law has long been clear that torture is not legal, said Lewis, citing the Convention Against Torture, among other laws. The Rasul decision, and the Supreme Court’s refusal to review it, he said, “makes it hard to know, what’s the law for next time?”

In fact, the D.C. Circuit’s latest Rasul opinion (the appeals court has ruled twice in this case) suggests in non-binding language that Guantanamo detainees have no constitutional rights other than the right of habeas corpus (the right to challenge the lawfulness of government detention), which the Supreme Court had already ruled applied to Guantanamo detainees. That finding cleared the way for the Obama administration, like the Bush administration before it, to argue that there is no constitutional right not to be tortured or otherwise abused in a U.S. prison abroad.

The high court today refused to weigh in on that issue. “I was hoping that the Supreme Court wouldn’t allow the last word on torture at Guantanamo to be that [detainees] have no rights and if they do, nobody knew at the time,” said Lewis. “That’s very disappointing.”

The D.C. Circuit opinion is not binding on courts in other parts of the country, however, which still could rule differently on some of these issues. A federal court in San Francisco, for example, ruled in June that Jose Padilla, an American citizen imprisoned as an “enemy combatant” without charge at a U.S. Naval brig in South Carolina, can sue former Justice Department lawyer John Yoo , whose legal opinions during the Bush administration approved the harsh and abusive treatment Padilla received. The court in that case denied Yoo’s claim to qualified immunity. That case is now on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.

Qualified immunity is hardly the only obstacle to holding government officials liable for torture and other abuse, however. Other cases, brought on behalf of former prisoners who were deemed “enemy combatants,” are barred by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, in which Congress stripped the courts of jurisdiction over any lawsuits complaining about the treatment of enemy combatants. (At least one case, Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, is now challenging the constitutionality of that law.)

Then there’s the lawsuit brought by Canadian citizen Maher Arar, arrested while changing planes in New York and sent to Syria by U.S. officials, where he claims he was interrogated under torture. That case was recently dismissed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York on the grounds that “special factors” — such as potential implications for national security and foreign relations — counseled against allowing the case to proceed. (Arar could still seek review in the Supreme Court.)

Other cases have been dismissed on similar grounds. “The more structural, fundamental problem is where the cause of action comes from,” said Vladeck , referring to the basis for a victim’s right to sue. Although in some cases federal courts will imply a right to sue government officials for a constitutional violation, “the Supreme Court over the last 20 years has been incredibly hostile to damages suits against federal officers,” said Vladeck.

In its latest move, the Supreme Court’s refusal to consider whether government officials can reasonably claim they didn’t know it was unlawful to torture prisoners in U.S. custody reinforces the viability of that argument for the future.

The court’s inaction also effectively ends the four British plaintiffs’ quest for a remedy — and likely stymies similar actions from many more former Guantanamo prisoners who hoped for official acknowledgment or compensation for what they endured. “Nothing legally would stop the executive branch or Congress from conceding that mistakes were made and these guys are entitled to some kind of reparations,” said Vladeck. “But I cannot imagine that’s going to be very politically feasible.”

The Obama administration, like the Bush administration before it, has argued in this case that there is no constitutional right not to be tortured or otherwise abused in a U.S. prison abroad.

The four men — Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, Rhuhel Ahmed and Jamal al-Harith — were captured in late 2001 in Afghanistan and transferred to Guantanamo in early 2002. They were returned to the United Kingdom in 2004.

Represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights and Washington, D.C., lawyer Eric Lewis, the four men sued former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and senior military officers for prolonged arbitrary detention, torture, cruel and unusual punishment, and denial of their religious rights. The former prisoners say they were subjected to repeated beatings, sleep deprivation, extremes of hot and cold, forced nakedness, death threats, interrogations at gun point, menacing with unmuzzled dogs, and religious and racial harassment.

Eventually, the Justice Department did step away from Yoo’s defense — although Yoo’s personal lawyer, former GOP judicial nominee Miguel Estrada, is still being paid by U.S. taxpayers.

Now, despite having already filed briefs on Yoo’s behalf in the district court arguing that as a former DOJ lawyer he should not be held liable for the consequences of his legal advice sanctioning torture, the Justice Department has filed yet another brief in the case, making essentially the same argument, this time on the government’s own behalf.

In an amicus (friend-of-the-court) brief filed to the appeals court yesterday (the lower court had refused to dismiss the case), the Justice Department argues that the court should not allow a lawsuit against a government lawyer providing advice to the executive branch where the case implicates national security and war powers. Such liability “could deter frank and full discussions within the Executive Branch regarding such matters.”

Of course, if the executive branch had actually had a “frank and full discussion” about the legality of torture with more than just a couple of hand-picked lawyers who believed in absolute executive power in the first place, John Yoo and the rest of the country wouldn’t be in the mess we’re in now. But set that aside for a moment.

Footnote 1 of the brief implicitly acknowledges the weird conflict involved in the DOJ’s even filing this brief, though without explicitly noting that the DOJ already made these same arguments on Yoo’s behalf earlier.

The first footnote essentially says that the Justice Department is going to repeat only some of its earlier arguments this time but not others. Specifically, it’s not going to make the argument now that Yoo didn’t do anything wrong because the right not to be tortured wasn’t clear at the time he approved it. That’s because since filing that first brief making just that argument, the department realized that, whoops, Yoo is under an internal ethics investigation, so maybe we should just stay out of this.

Dave Hoffman at Concurring Opinions interprets the footnote this way: “We’d like to join and expand on Yoo’s arguments about his good faith behavior. But other parts of us are still holding onto a report which may call into question the accuracy of that claim. Coincidentally and luckily, that report continues to be delayed, making it unnecessary for us to commit to a position that would be internally incoherent.  Do us a favor and resolve this on constitutional grounds, would ya?”

To be sure, that hasn’t stopped the Justice Department from making the argument elsewhere that torture wasn’t clearly illegal when Yoo sanctioned it. In the case of Rasul v. Rumsfeld, for example, that’s precisely the argument the Obama administration is still making. In fact, as I noted recently, the administration is going even further than that. In a brief recently filed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Obama Justice Department argued that under its own interpretation of the law, there is no constitutional right not to be tortured by U.S. authorities in U.S.-run prisons abroad.

While conceding that “Torture is illegal under federal law, and the United States government repudiates it”, even now the Solicitor General stops short of acknowledging that torture directed, approved and implemented by officials of the United States is so repugnant that it also violates fundamental rights; no less so when hidden from public view at Guantánamo Bay. Respondents appear willing to let the final word on torture and religious abuse at Guantánamo be that government officials can torture and abuse with impunity and will be immune from liability for doing so. Yet whether United States officials are free to engage in despicable acts in a place wholly controlled by the United States is the pre-eminent constitutional issue of our time, and it is squarely presented to this Court for decision in this case.

Rasul v. Rumsfeld, as I’ve explained before, is one of the first lawsuits brought by victims of the Bush administration’s torture and abuse policies. The plaintiffs claim they were in Afghanistan to do humanitarian relief work when they were captured by the Northern Alliance and turned over (or sold for bounty) to U.S. authorities. They were eventually shipped to Guantanamo Bay, where they were imprisoned in cages and, they claim, tortured and humiliated, forced to shave their beards and watch their Korans desecrated. All of these claims are backed up by the legal memos that have since been produced from the Department of Justice that authorized such techniques as part of “enhanced” interrogations. The men were returned home to the UK without charge in 2004.

Many other victims of the Bush administration’s abuse policies have been precluded from suing because in 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction over claims challenging the “detention, transfer, treatment, or conditions of confinement” of detainees who were considered “enemy combatants” by the U.S. military and detained abroad. (That provision of the law is being challenged in another lawsuit filed recently, which I describe here.) The plaintiffs in the Rasul case, however, were never even deemed “enemy combatants” by the U.S. military.

Still, the Obama administration is arguing, as it is in other cases, that it was not clear that foreigners picked up in Afghanistan and sent to Guantanamo Bay had a right not to be tortured by the U.S. government. But more than that, it’s arguing — as the lawyers in the Rasul case emphasize in the excerpt from their brief I quoted above — that there is no right under the Constitution not to be tortured at Guantanamo Bay, or at any offshore American-run prison.

As the Department of Justice recently wrote in another torture case: The “Fifth and Eighth Amendments do not extend to Guantánamo Bay detainees.”

In other words, it’s not just that former detainees can’t sue Bush administration officials for torture because the law wasn’t clear back in 2002 or 2003, but the Obama administration is arguing also that there is no fundamental right not to be tortured, and therefore any government official in the future could similarly claim to be immune from a lawsuit for torture.

Eric Lewis and the Center for Constitutional Rights, who represent the four British men in the Rasul case, are now pleading with the U.S. Supreme Court to say it isn’t so, and accept their appeal from a D.C. Circuit Court ruling that dismissed the case.

The government seeks “to leave the law unsettled and to pull a cloak of immunity, now and in the future, over government torturers,” they write in their brief.

It is essential that this Court lay down a strong and clear message that officially ordered torture is abhorrent and always a violation of fundamental rights. Without this Court’s guidance, the court of appeals’ studied indifference to the torture of Guantanamo detainees remains the final word on the issue and, indeed, could provide further cover for a claim of qualified immunity in the future in the unfortunate event that the specter of torture recurs.

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

Twenty-four-year-old Amir Meshal, the son of Muslim immigrants from Egypt, was a lifelong resident of New Jersey when, after living briefly in Cairo with extended family members, in 2006 he decided to go to Somalia to study Islam and experience living under Islamic law. The country appeared to have stabilized and a new Islamic government was on good terms with the United States.

But Somalia wasn’t as stable as Meshal had thought, and as violence erupted there again in January 2007, Meshal fled, along with many Somali civilians. He was arrested in a joint U.S.-Kenyan-Ethiopian operation along the border of Kenya.

[Law1]During the next four months, Meshal says, he was detained and interrogated in three different African countries without charge, denied the right to speak to a lawyer or family member, and refused the right to even appear before a judicial officer. Although a lifelong U.S. citizen with two U.S. citizen parents, Meshal was repeatedly threatened with torture, rendition to another country where he would be tortured, and forced disappearance. And he believes that U.S. officials, who interrogated him more than 30 times during this process, directed his arrest and treatment.

Those claims are the subject of a new lawsuit being filed Tuesday by the American Civil Liberties Union in Washington. Although it’s not the first lawsuit against U.S. officials seeking damages for torture and other mistreatment abroad, Meshal is only the second U.S. citizen to sue for U.S.-sponsored torture. That and a few other distinctive facts in this case may give him some advantages over those that have been dismissed.

“This is a U.S. citizen who was caught in hostilities abroad, and instead of helping him return, U.S. officials abused him and mistreated him and never charged him with a crime,” said Nusrat Choudhury, one of the lead lawyers from the ACLU representing Meshal. “Should they be allowed to do that without helping a U.S. citizen get home, and instead, denying him access to lawyers?”

That’s the question that will face judges in this case. In the past, the government has managed to convince courts to dismiss torture victims’ cases by saying that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity, or that the case would reveal state secrets, or that courts should not imply a right to sue government officials for constitutional violations when the case involves national security and foreign policy. But will courts be so willing to dismiss a case brought by a U.S. citizen, born to U.S. citizen parents, allegedly tortured directly by U.S. officials, and who has never even been charged with doing anything wrong?

American University Law Professor Stephen Vladeck, an expert on constitutional and national security law, says that although doctrinally the cases are not very different, the fact that Meshal is a U.S. citizen “practically, could make a difference to judges,” he said. “It would just highlight how wrong those other decisions are,” he said.

One of those decisions is Rasul v. Rumsfeld, decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals last year. In that case, the court dismissed the claims of four British men who’d been detained and allegedly abused at Guantanamo Bay because, the court reasoned, the federal officials were entitled to “qualified immunity” because it was not clear that Guantanamo detainees had rights under the U.S. Constitution at the time of their alleged abuse.

In that case, though, which is still on appeal (the Supreme Court remanded it back to the D.C. Circuit for reconsideration in light of intervening Supreme Court precedents), the court’s reasoning was based in part on the fact that the plaintiffs were all “aliens” — none were lawful U.S. citizens or residents.

Meshal’s U.S. citizenship may make his case more difficult to dismiss. “Mr. Meshal alleges there needs to be discovery in this case to determine whether what those officers did was objectively reasonable,” said Choudury, his lawyer. “Should an FBI officer think it’s objectively reasonable to threaten a U.S. citizen to send him to place where he will be tortured?”

Interestingly, recently released documents produced in the ACLU’s Freedom of Information Act case against the government have revealed memos written by FBI interrogation specialists in 2002 and sent to Defense Department officials specifically explaining that threatening a detainee with torture, death or disappearance is a violation of the U.S. Constitution and the anti-torture law. That could weaken the government’s argument that FBI officials reasonably thought it was legal to threaten Meshal in 2007.

The most recent case decided that presents similar facts is the case of Maher Arar, dismissed this month for the second time by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Arar, a Canadian citizen, was arrested by U.S. authorities while he was changing planes at JFK airport in New York in 2002. Arar was held briefly in the states, denied access to a lawyer, then rendered to Syria where he was held in a grave-like cell and interrogated under torture, he says, for almost a year. He was finally released without charge; Syrian authorities acknowledged that they had no evidence against him.

Arar sued the U.S. government for complicity in his treatment abroad. The court last week ruled that he has no right to sue under the U.S. Constitution in this case because the claims would “have the natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security of the nation.” As for his claims under the Torture Victims Protection Act, enacted to protect victims of torture in other countries, Arar could not claim compensation from U.S. authorities because it was the Syrians who tortured him, even if U.S. officials knew that he was likely to be tortured when they sent him to Syria, the court ruled.

In addition to the fact that Meshal is a U.S. citizen, his case may stand a better chance because he is suing the actual FBI officials who he claims conducted his interrogation and threatened him with torture, forced disappearance and execution to coerce him into confessing to associations with al-Qaeda that he says he does not have.

“It was a Kenyan jail, but he is alleging that U.S. officials were complicit with those officials in keeping him detained in secret,” said Choudhury. “During interrogations, U.S. government officials threatened to send him to Israel, where they would make him disappear.”

Meshal’s constitutional claims may also fare better because there appears to be nowhere else to bring them — an important factor courts consider. The government claimed that Arar, as a Canadian, could have objected to his rendition before U.S. immigration authorities. (Arar’s lawyers disputed that.)

In this case, there appears to be no alternative means for redress. Meshal has declined to speak to reporters about his ordeal, but according to his legal complaint, while he was in Kenya, Meshal repeatedly asked to speak to a lawyer, to his father, and to the international Committee of the Red Cross; his requests were denied. He was allowed to speak once to a U.S. consular official in Kenya who said he would help Meshal.

Before the consular official could do anything, though, Meshal was handcuffed, hooded and flown to Somalia, where he feared he would be killed, he says. Meshal was deposited in an excruciatingly hot 25-foot-square cave, without windows or toilets. When guards opened the door of the cell, Meshal “noticed that enormous cockroaches were clustered in the corners of the cell and large black millipedes were all over the walls,” the legal complaint charges. Meshal says he was left there, handcuffed in the dark, for two days.

He was then moved to a storage tent where he was given one meal a day of biscuits, marmalade and water. He was left there for about four days until he was transferred to Ethiopia for further interrogation.

The government could still argue that the “state secrets privilege” should doom the case. In many cases charging government wrongdoing in the national security arena, the Justice Department has argued that allowing a lawsuit to go forward would reveal sensitive state secrets and endanger national security. The government’s frequent invocation of the state secrets privilege has become something of a political embarrassment, however. In February, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) introduced a bill, which now has nine co-sponsors, that would severely limit the government’s ability to dismiss cases on that ground. Shortly after, Attorney General Eric Holder in September announced a new policy on state secrets, pledging to use the privilege more sparingly and according to strict new rules. However, he has continued to assert it in situations where advocates say the case should move forward, with the judge simply reviewing any sensitive evidence behind closed doors.

“It seems unlikely the government wouldn’t invoke state secrets again,” said David Luban, a law professor at Georgetown University and expert on legal ethics and international law. In this case, Luban said, the government would likely claim that allowing the cases to move forward would expose sensitive information about the United States’ relationships or agreements with the other countries that Meshal was rendered to. And “if the action is being shut off because of state secrets,” he said, “I don’t think you can get around that.”

“The government can raise that in the course of litigation,” Choudhury agreed. “But that’s not a reason for this case not to go forward.” The government would still have to convince a court that national security would be put at risk simply by responding to requests about the FBI’s treatment of one individual and its role in his rendition and alleged torture. Some courts have been skeptical about that argument, although in the case of German citizen Khaled Al-Masri, a lawsuit filed by a rendition victim against U.S. authorities, a federal judge in Virginia did dismiss the case on state secrets grounds.

And the court could still decide to dismiss the case based on its broader national security implications, as it did in Arar. “What’s been so disturbing is how judges have bent backwards to say this is a new kind of claim,” said Vladeck. In the Arar case, for example, the court cast his claim for compensation for extraordinary rendition as a new kind of constitutional claim that would require the court essentially to create a new right to sue. The court then could easily decline to create that new right, citing the “special factors” involved — in particular, the potential impact on national security and foreign policy. “What’s so distressing about Arar was that the Second Circuit endorsed such a limitless view of special factors,” said Vladeck. “If Arar’s rendition case can’t prevail, then I’m pressed to see what kind of case can win.”

Still, one case has survived dismissal so far. That’s the case of Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen deemed an “enemy combatant”, who is now suing John Yoo, the former lawyer at the Justice Department who justified torture and Padilla says personally helped to devise his illegal treatment. Although the Obama administration, representing Yoo, tried to have the case dismissed, a federal court in California refused, in part because there was no other way for a U.S. citizen to hold U.S. officials accountable.

Padilla was also the only U.S. citizen to have sued a U.S. official for torture. Until now. Choudhury hopes, at least, that Meshal’s U.S. citizenship might also make some difference. But the outcome is hard to predict. Judges and courts are sharply divided on when a victim of abusive federal government policies should have a right to bring their claims to court.

When the full Second Circuit court ruled in Arar’s case last week, the decision included four powerful dissents.

“The majority would immunize official misconduct by invoking the separation of powers and the executive’s responsibility for foreign affairs and national security,” wrote Judge Barrington Parker, in one of them. “Its approach distorts the system of checks and balances essential to the rule of law, and it trivilializes the judiciary’s role in these arenas,” he continued. The executive’s powers in foreign policy and national security “are not limitless” and their “bounds in both wartime and peacetime are fixed by the same Constitution,” he wrote. The court’s refusal to allow Arar a remedy, he continued, “immunizes official conduct directly at odds with the express will of Congress and the most basic guarantees of liberty contained in the Constitution. By doing so, the majority risks a government that can interpret the law to suits its own ends, without scrutiny.”

In the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the same act in which Congress unconstitutionally stripped “enemy combatants” of the right to habeas corpus — a right the Supreme Court eventually restored — “Section 7″ limits the ability of “enemy combatants” to sue the United States over their treatment.

‘(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.

The effect is, essentially, to shield government officials from liability for abuse, torture and other mistreatment of so-called “enemy combatants.” Another provision of the law makes it retroactive, back to September 11, 2001.

As Dorf puts it, the Military Commissions Act “eliminates any jurisdiction for a civil suit by someone who was detained as Hamdi was.”

Of course, not everyone held by U.S. authorities was deemed an “enemy combatant,” and some have successfully challenged that classification. The British former detainees suing over torture in the case of Rasul v. Rumsfeld, for example, which I’ve written about here, and the Canadian, Maher Arar, who’s suing over his extraordinary rendition and torture — which I’ve also written about — were never determined to be enemy combatants, at least as far as I can tell. And the government hasn’t tried to dismiss their cases based on the Military Commissions Act.

But those who were called “enemy combatants” appear to be out of luck.

In 2006, Congress helped the President and his Justice Department make it virtually impossible for illegally detained and abused prisoners to seek vindication. And, it obviated the need for prosecutors to require Gitmo detainees to sign these controversial waiver agreements promising not to sue for abuse or torture — if, that is, we were the kind of country that would ever do such things.

The case is very similar to the lawsuit filed by U.S. citizen and former enemy combatant Jose Padilla against former Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, which I’ve been following. The plaintiffs in Rasul v. Rumsfeld allege that former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other senior Bush officials are responsible for their torture; prolonged arbitrary detention; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; cruel and unusual punishment; denial of liberties without due process, and preventing the exercise and expression of their religious beliefs.

According to their legal complaint, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed claim they traveled to Afghanistan in October 2001 to offer humanitarian relief to civilians. In late November, they were kidnapped by Rashid Dostum, the Uzbeki warlord and leader of the U.S.-supported Northern Alliance. He turned them over to U.S. custody – apparently for bounty money that American officials were paying for suspected terrorists. In December, without any independent evidence that the men had engaged in hostilities against the United States, U.S. officials sent them to Guantanamo Bay. Over the next two years, they claim — as does a fourth British man — that they were imprisoned in cages, tortured and humiliated, forced to shave their beards and watch their Korans desecrated, until they were returned to Britain in 2004. None were ever charged with a crime.

Dismissed at the urging of the Bush administration, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. In December, the case was sent back to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington for reconsideration, because the Supreme Court had ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantanamo detainees have the right to challenge their detentions. It wasn’t clear what effect that ruling might have on the Rasul case.

Although some civil rights lawyers had hoped the Obama administration would change the government’s position — or at least try to settle this case, which is at the very least an embarrassment to the United States –  the former prisoners had no such luck. Today, the Justice Department filed a brief arguing, as it did in Padilla’s case against Yoo, that government officials are not liable for torture, abuse, denial of due process or religious rights, because the right of Guantanamo prisoners not to suffer those abuses at the hands of the U.S. government was not clearly established at the time.

That would seem to contradict previous statements by President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder that torture (including waterboarding) and other abuses are clearly illegal, now and always, and that the president can’t simply override that prohibition. It also may discourage those who are hoping the president will eventually support prosecutions of former Bush officials for exactly those crimes.

Reached today, the lead lawyer on the case, Eric Lewis, a partner at the Washington-based law firm, Baach Robinson & Lewis, said he was “disappointed” but “not surprised.”

However, as I’ve pointed out before in the context of the Yoo case, the defense does raise some serious questions about whether the Obama Justice Department really ought to be defending Donald Rumsfeld and his former colleagues in this case at all.

I’ll be writing more about this case and others like it, as well as their implications, in the coming week.

The three British plaintiffs involved in this case — Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed — claim they traveled to Afghanistan in October 2001 to offer humanitarian relief to civilians displaced by the war. In late November, they were kidnapped by Rashid Dostum, the Uzbeki warlord and leader of the U.S.-supported Northern Alliance. He turned them over to U.S. custody – apparently for bounty money that American officials were paying for suspected terrorists. In December, without any independent evidence that the men had engaged in hostilities against the United States, U.S. officials sent them to Guantanamo Bay. Over the next two years, they claim, they were imprisoned in cages, tortured and humiliated, forced to watch their korans decimated and have their beards shaved, until they were returned to Britain in 2004. None was ever charged with a crime.

Seven months later, the three men, plus another British citizen picked up in Afghanistan and imprisoned at Gitmo, sued former Defense Sec. Donald Rumsfeld and a host of other military commanders for authorizing their torture and violating their religious rights.

In January, the federal appeals court decided that even if all their claims are true, the US officials are immune from suit because, even though torture, physical abuse and humiliation of prisoners violate domestic and international law, the officials were doing all this “within the scope of their employment” and so aren’t personally responsible. They were also immune, the court added, because it wasn’t clear when they authorized the torture that detainees at Guantanamo Bay had rights. As for the men’s religious rights, the court decided that as foreigners, they were not “persons” entitled to the protection of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

As I’ve written before, this case could be the tip of the iceberg — given how many hundreds of people were detained at Gitmo and then released. (Tens of thousands more have been held in Iraq and Afghanistan, at prisons like Abu Ghraib and Bagram — and some of those could try to bring claims as well.)

And as I noted last week, it’s yet another reason for the new administration to quickly appoint an investigatory commission, with the authority not only to prosecute those who committed and authorized crimes, but to compensate the victims.

A slew of lawsuits isn’t hard to imagine. About 750 people have been detained as suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay. Thousands more have been held around the world. Many claim they were tortured, and we know from the Bush administration’s own documents that tactics such as waterboarding, stress positions, extreme hot and cold, blaring music and sleep deprivation, and sexual and religious humiliation were all among the tactics used to wring information out of them.

Although the Military Commissions Act tries to preclude lawsuits filed by enemy combatants, many of the people held were never determined to be enemy combatants, or were still held after they were cleared for release. Of the lawsuits already filed against US officials by detainees, none of them were ever deemed enemy combatants. The Second Circuit heard arguments in the case of Maher Arar this week, and lawyers on the other case (Rasul v. Rumsfeld) have asked the US Supreme Court for review. The court will consider the request when it meets on Friday.

Although all sorts of immunities protect US officials from wrongdoing on the job, there’s a strong argument to be made that torture can never be considered part of a government official’s job, so those immunities shouldn’t apply. And the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which protects against violations of detainees’ religious rights, such as having their Koran flushed down the toilet or being forcibly shaven, is very broad. (That didn’t stop the DC Circuit from dismissing four British detainees’ claims under it earlier this year, though, as I’ve written about before.)

But as I was talking to Carolyn Patty Blum the other day, an emeritus law professor at Berkeley and consultant to the International Center for Transitional Justice, she mentioned that a commission set up to investigate torture and other abuses perpetrated by Bush officials could also recommend, in addition to prosecution, a means by which torture victims can be compensated. Even if Bush were to pardon himself and his officials, a topic of much recent discussion, that wouldn’t shield anybody from future civil lawsuits demanding monetary compensation. But a statute that set up an investigative commission that had the power to, among other things, recommend compensating victims of torture and arbitrary detention, could also protect the US government from some costly future litigation.

“If a commission led to the creation of some sort of process that allows people to clear their name and apply for some sort of monetary compensation for being arbitrarily detained, one of the benefits is it would foreclose the ability for people to pursue another remedy,” Blum explained. “That would be a net gain in terms of cost savings for the new administration.”

Although that’s not the primary reason why Obama should create an investigative commission — Scott Horton at Harper’s has made the case for one quite well — it’s yet another argument in its favor.