This Thursday in Wilmington, N.C., officials from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the government agency responsible for overseeing the country’s nuclear energy activities, are slated to present a report laying out the environmental impacts of a proposed uranium enrichment facility, a key step in approving the facility’s license. While NRC staff will spend nearly five hours in Ballroom 5 of the Warwick Center at the University of North Carolina going over the details of their report, it is what they won’t discuss that has arms control advocates worried.

[Security1] Advocates are focusing their attention on the proposed General Electric Hitachi uranium enrichment plant in Wilmington to shine a spotlight on what they see as a systemic flaw at the NRC: The commission does not conduct broad assessments of the proliferation concerns associated with licensing projects.

The proposed facility would, if successful, use laser technology for the first time to enrich uranium to power commercial nuclear reactors. Arms control advocates say that commercialization of the technology in the United States could lead other countries to follow suit, raising concerns about the technology falling into the wrong hands. Countries like Iran and South Korea have worked in the past to develop laser enrichment programs, and the experts fear successful commercialization of the technology in the United States would prove the technology’s viability and lead them to redouble their efforts.

There are a number of lingering questions surrounding the technology. Arms control advocates say it is unclear just how easy it would be to produce highly enriched uranium, which is used to make nuclear weapons, with the technology. And they worry that laser enrichment facilities could be difficult to detect for purposes of inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the group responsible for enforcing nuclear safeguards.

“The benefits might be worth the risks,” said James Acton of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “But the problem we have at the moment is we don’t know what the risks are. We don’t know how serious or significant they are. There’s just no way to make an informed decisions.”

The NRC and the Department of Energy have no mandatory framework for answering these questions, the arms control advocates say. While the Energy Department has conducted voluntary assessments of proliferation risk in the past, the NRC has long maintained that it does not need to conduct such an analysis.

GE Hitachi, for its part, maintains that the Energy Department and the State Department have “been tasked” with considering proliferation risks of the project, but the company could not provide any details on the results of any such assessment. The NRC, though it maintains that a separate proliferation assessment is not warranted, says that it follows a number of procedures to “guard against the unauthorized transfer of the technology.”

Responding to a Jan. 20 letter from Tom Clements, Southeast nuclear campaign coordinator for Friends of the Earth, the NRC said the commission “considers a nuclear nonproliferation impact assessment outside the scope of the agency’s statutory responsibilities.” The letter — signed by Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Director Michael Weber — notes that the NRC already “limits the availability of special nuclear material”; “controls proliferation of sensitive technologies, both information and equipment, through physical protection, personnel security, information protection, and export controls”; and “participates in international activities to control nuclear materials, technology, facilities and equipment.”

Clements, in an interview with TWI, said the unwillingness of NRC to conduct a proliferation assessment “reveals a dangerous double standard, in my opinion, that the U.S. is more concerned about the proliferation risk of other countries and not from U.S. technology and materials which in the long run may pose global proliferation risks.” Clements, who is a staunch opponent of nuclear power, said the Energy Department has voluntarily prepared proliferation assessments in the past, but there is no requirement to do so.

“The lack of proper review of the proliferation risk of nuclear technologies is a problem endemic with both the NRC and [the Energy Department],” Clements said. “I am not aware of any requirement for the preparation of a document assessing the proliferation risk of U.S.-origin nuclear technologies.”

Miles Pomper, senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, says that other countries are more likely to begin to adopt laser enrichment technology if GE Hitachi is able to demonstrate its success on a commercial level. The federal government needs to determine what the proliferation risks are if other countries begin commercializing this technology, he said. “What we’ve really been looking for is just someone to take this into account before moving forward with the technology,” Pomper said. “There’s no kind of studies, there’s no kind of action in terms of the government or others doing anything about this.” Pomper added that the Energy Department has no “formal responsibility” for conducting such an assessment.

Pomper, along with a number of other arms control advocates, signed on to a Sept. 30, 2009, letter to the NRC raising questions about the proposed laser enrichment facility. “Given the great difficulty of detecting laser isotope enrichment facilities, their spread could undermine U.S. nonproliferation efforts and the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear activities,” the letter said.

Acton, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, raised similar concerns. Although he says he is not “ideologically opposed” to laser enrichment technology, he pointed to what he calls the “follow the leader” effect. “Once one country tries to commercialize a technology like laser enrichment, if it does so successfully, it’s more or less inevitable that other countries are going to follow,” he said.

Acton laid out two main questions that need to be answered in a proliferation assessment. The first is how easily the technology can produce highly enriched uranium, which is used in nuclear weapons. The second is whether laser enrichment facilities would be difficult to detect and inspect if they were used in other countries like Iran. Acton said it is very difficult to detect the presence of nuclear centrifuge plants for the purposes of inspection.

“So, what about laser enrichment? Would a small, secret laser enrichment plant be easier to detect than a centrifuge plant? If the answer is yes, I’m not particularly worried about it,” Acton said. “If it’s harder to detect than a centrifuge plant, it would add to our problem very significantly.”

Michael Tetuan, a spokesperson for GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, said “protecting this technology is obviously our highest concern.” He also said that both the State Department and Energy Department “have been tasked with looking at the proliferation aspects of this,” but he was not able to offer any further details on what specifically the departments considered. Tetuan also said that much of the information is likely classified, leaving little opportunity for the public to evaluate the proliferation risks.

Responding to the concerns, David McIntyre, an NRC spokesperson, said, “The idea that U.S. development of laser enrichment technology would set an example that other countries would follow presupposes that other countries would be able to procure or develop the technology.”

NRC’s current procedures ensure against proliferation, McIntye said. “NRC limits the availability of special nuclear material; controls proliferation of sensitive technologies, both information and equipment, through physical protection, personnel security, information protection, and export controls; and participates in international activities to control nuclear materials, technology, facilities and equipment,” McIntyre said. He also noted that the government conducted an assessment of the proliferation risks of laser enrichment technology when it negotiated an agreement with Australia to allow use of the technology in the United States.

“As to whether U.S. development of laser enrichment capacity will set an example for other countries to follow, that is a policy question for the president, other federal agencies such as the Department of State, and the Congress,” McIntyre said.

A spokesperson for the Nuclear Energy Institute, the nuclear industry’s trade association, directed requests for comment to GE Hitachi. An Energy Department spokesperson did not respond to requests for comment.

But that’s the face of it. The United States is in its strongest position ever at the United Nations Security Council to place economic sanctions on Iran, thanks in large part to consistent Iranian rebuffs of U.S. outreach. That means the smart strategy for Iran is a late-breaking show of superficial reasonableness. “This is a potentially important breakthrough and could signal a return to engagement, which everyone wants to see,” proliferation expert Jacqueline Shire tells Politico’s Laura Rozen. But it remains to be seen if what everyone wants to see gets in the way of what they should see.

The Obama administration has yet to comment on the prospective Turkey enrichment move.

We have the opportunity, as partners, to ensure that our progress is not a fleeting moment, but part of a serious and sustained effort. And that’s why I am so pleased to announce that President Lee has agreed to host the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Republic of Korea in two years. This reflects South Korea’s leadership, regionally and globally, and I thank President Lee and the South Korean people for their willingness to accept this responsibility.

For more on what fills the gap between the 2010 and 2012 nuclear security summits, see my new piece.

Unlike under previous accords, there won’t simply be a reliance on data provided by the parties to make sure the deployed missiles, subs, bombers and warheads numbers add up. (Ironically, if the treaty relied entirely on so-called telemetric data — basically, observing this stuff from long distance and by technological inference — that might be bad for U.S. missile-defense plans.) Verification will be a key aspect of getting the treaty through the Senate.

The question that arms controllers are going to have isn’t going to concern New START. It’s going to concern what comes after New START. The lifespan of the treaty is ten years. After ten years, the U.S. and Russia will each possess … up to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed things with which to deliver them. But last year in Prague — where this treaty will be signed — President Obama outlined an ultimate vision of a nuclear-free world. How to get from here to there?

“A great deal depends on the presidential statements in Prague — what they say about what the next steps are,” said Joe Ciricincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund. If they “rest on their laurels” in Prague on April 8, then it won’t be enough. And that’s going to be a moment of great momentum: It’ll build up to a 44-nation conference in Washington next month on nuclear security, which will then build up to a spring summit in New York about strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In other words, to other nations, both non-nuclear and nuclear — recall that the U.S. and Russia account for over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons — the gains of New START don’t look as great as the gap between their capabilities and the U.S.’s and Russians’. And on the path to a nuke-free world, that’s a big deal.

Obama has “got to stay with the vision he articulated a year ago,” Cirincione continued, urging the nuclear negotiating teams — exhausted after months of arduous work to cobble together New START — to “enjoy the victory of the moment, get some R&R and come back for another tour of duty.” If Obama shows the rest of the world that he really is committed to lead on nuclear security and disarmament, even beyond New START, “this could be one of the defining moments of his presidency.”

Beyond Iran and the other urgent nuclear threat the United States is confronting in North Korea, Clinton said the U.S. would take a variety of multilateral steps to shore up the global nonproliferation regime. In addition to existing administration desires to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Clinton declared the administration prepared to offer states additional access to nuclear-power technology, and proposed initiatives like “international fuel banks” and global “spent fuel repositories” that allow states to “pursue legitimate civilian nuclear” activities.

On the harsher side of the equation, the secretary of state also urged increasing both legal authorities and resources to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the global nuclear watchdog, particularly to inspect “suspect nuclear activities … even when no nuclear materials are present.” Similarly, while Clinton pledged a comprehensive look at the United States’ own nuclear posture and to negotiate a new nuclear weapons reduction treaty with Russia, she said the U.S. would maintain its own nuclear stockpile for deterrent purposes and the Obama administration would support a “new stockpile management program” to be “confident in the capabilities we have.”

But this isn’t the first time Obama administration officials have affirmed an assessment that the intelligence does not endorse.

Last month, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that Iran has enough fissile material to make a nuclear weapon. It was up to Secretary of Defense Bob Gates — a former CIA director — to implicitly correct Mullen, saying Iran was “not close” to a bomb. But this is a tone set from the top: in his first press conference after winning the election, President Obama said that “Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon I believe is unacceptable,” even though the intelligence community backed away from presuming Iran was engaged in such development in 2007.

While it’s not as if Obama is going to start bombing Iran — he’s gone out of his way to engage the Iranians; and even promised in Prague to “support Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections” — nevertheless, as Blair said in his confirmation-hearing statement, facts are stubborn things. A coalition of progressive and realist foreign policy experts known as the American Foreign Policy Project warned yesterday that “Pressure is mounting on the President to deliver an ultimatum to Iran that it must immediately suspend all enrichment of uranium or face draconian economic sanctions, or worse,” pressure that mounts through a misrepresentation of the current intelligence assessment on Iran’s nuclear energy program.

As a result, Blair also should clarify whether he stands behind something he told Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) during his confirmation hearing.

LEVIN: … Are you committed to speak truth to power and committed that when your factual assessments, your intelligence assessments say one thing and public say another thing and don’t delineate between your own personal views and what the intelligence community has informed them that you will speak to them about that?

ADM. BLAIR: Yes, sir. I think that’s the only way to proceed.

Anyway, SteelJaw at the U.S. Naval Institute’s blog makes this point:

While one presumably successful space  launch (still awaiting independent confirmation) does not a missile force make, the fact that the Iranian program marks this success, that it is outside the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and is known to have strong ties with the North Korean  and Syrian programs, bodes ill for future proliferation schemes. As the US and its European partners gather this week to review the way ahead for continued engagement regarding Iran’s nuclear program, this shot, coming on the eve of that meeting and near the 30th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution should give the assembled party pause to consider just what are  Iran’s intentions, particularly vis-a-vis negotiated agreements and arms control.

It’s a good point. Whether the Iranians actually succeeded in the test or not, the fact that they announced launching their satellite on the eve of new nuclear-program negotiations is significant, and intended to put pressure on the western coalition.

But I’m not sure that SteelJaw is right that the test “bodes ill for future nonproliferation schemes.” It’s a challenge for them, to be sure. But consider that Iran has been encircled by U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past five years, with the Bush administration dropping hints throughout its time in office that it might destabilize the regime as it did the two on Iran’s borders. Obviously, Iran’s nuclear ambitions go back to the Shah, so it’s not as if the United States in any way caused Iran to become more bellicose. But it’s an entirely rational decision on Iran’s part to bolster its defense capabilities after seeing the world’s remaining superpower adopt a more hostile posture to it.

And that’s a point independent of the strength of proliferation accords. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2002 and accelerated its nuclear weapons production in 2003 when it looked like the United States was going to overthrow the nuclear-incapable Saddam Hussein. At the time, many people worried that the North’s actions meant that nuclear nonproliferation regimes were doomed. But then the Bush administration flip-flopped, began intensive multilateral negotiations with the North led by Ambassador Chris Hill, and — with recent problems, to be sure — secured important disarmament steps. With Dennis Ross likely to explore bilateral dialogue with Iran, there’s no obvious reason why a similar round of arduous, frustrating, stop-and-start diplomacy can’t achieve similar results.

It’s true that nonproliferation regimes don’t look like appealing options to countries that perceive themselves, credibly, under constant threat. But getting rid of the persistent fear is the greater stumbling block to nonproliferation, not inherent weaknesses in the accords.

“If the United States once again leads and constructs” a firm global series of rules on nuclear proliferation “we can isolate the bad actors.”

Sen. Dick Lugar (R-Ind.), dean of nonproliferation statesmen, is busting his buttons with pride.

Bob Joseph, the U.S. special envoy for nuclear nonproliferation: “It’s important to support the new president in his efforts to deal with historic problems and challenges facing the United States, both in regard to the economy and in regard to national security,” he says. Very generous. He talks about Russia, where he says the “fundamental” issue is Russian leadership “seeking to reestablish Russia as a great power… to exercise Russian power and prestige around the world.” That’s not necessarily problematic, but what is a problem is Russia’s “increasingly aggressive actions abroad,” and its view of American power as a zero-sum game. (It’s kind of funny how Bush administration officials can say that about other countries.) Joseph says that outside “direct and intrusive sanctions” imposed by the U.N. Security Council, Iran will acquire nuclear weapons, and that requires “cooperation from Russia.”

Daniel Poneman, a longtime nuclear energy and proliferation official, ties the discussion to global climate change, “a different tipping point” than the one Perry mentioned. Moots the idea of a massive expansion of nuclear energy as a part of a solution — the process of creating nuclear power produces enriched uranium and plutonium, which “increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.” Poneman fears that avoiding a climate tipping point, the world might end up bringing about a nuclear tipping point. The alternative is to “talk to the utilities”: in other words “a leasing regime” to provide fuel for reactors but than to remove the spent fuel that could be used for nuclear weapons. He’s riffing — this is really difficult — but says “you have to avoid the third rail of political discrimination,” by which he means the regime has to include the entire world. “This will not solve the Iran problem or the North Korea problem,” Poneman concedes, but it will “put a sharp light of scrutiny on the international outliers.”

Now here’s Wendy Sherman, who offers perhaps the best window into the Obama administration. (She’s a protege of Madeleine Albright and is close with Secretary of State-designee Hillary Rodham Clinton. Wow, she just said “Bill Perry is one of my heroes.”) But she says she’s done with “all transition work” for the new administration and instead talks starkly about how she was eight hours away from staying at the Islamabad Marriott that Pakistani terrorists destroyed in the fall. Sherman talks about the need for President-elect Barack Obama to renegotiate nuclear weapons reduction treaties with Russia and other countries. In 2010, the Nonproliferation Treaty’s review conference will get underway, which requires “enormous leadership” from the United States to “impose a range of penalties for withdrawal from the NPT” while “creating access to a nuclear fuel cycle for everyone,” which speaks to Poneman’s point. The nuclear-watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency should be strengthened, as should the Bush administration’s signal proliferation effort, the Proliferation Security Initiative. “No– new– states” obtaining nuclear weapons capability. She also underscores the need for North Korean disarmament and preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The baton “won’t become a magic wand” in an Obama administration, though, Sherman concludes, which is a pretty cringe-inducing cliche.

Sherman says “it is quite crucial to maintain our deterrent” as Obama has said, “while we move toward the goal” of a nuclear-free world. Striking the balance is the difficulty, but she says the United States has to “define the norms” for nuclear reductions.