But how about former Bush CIA and National Security Agency chief Mike Hayden? Asked on the same program about Obama’s counterterrorism record, Hayden replied, “I am heartened by the fact that the president consistently says we are at war with al-Qaeda its affiliates.” Former Bush secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff echoed Hayden. Expect neither Cheney’s behavior nor Politico’s to change even slightly.

The big reveal is that Blair, the nominal overall intelligence chief, wants a much bigger role over the CIA’s drone strikes in Pakistan.

Since the CIA’s establishment in 1947, its officers have had a direct line to the National Security Council. No cut-outs, no go-betweens.  Blair and his deputies believed that the CIA’s National Clandestine Service was failing to provide a full picture of several of the agency’s largest covert collection and special activity programs. In particular, the DNI would often find out about CIA-initiated drone strikes in Pakistan well after the fact. The CIA was conscientious about briefing the National Security Council, but did not bother to loop in the DNI.

That won’t happen any longer. The CIA will keep its unfettered access to national security principals, and the DNI still doesn’t have the authority to order covert action programs, but the White House is now requiring the CIA to fully brief the DNI on all covert action programs and will seek from the DNI regular assessments of whether any program fits in with the nation’s intelligence strategy, which is set by Blair. Since Blair briefs Congress more often than Panetta does, it makes sense for Blair to know as much about covert action programs as CIA briefers would.

That might sound like bureaucratic box-checking. But for years, the DNI’s office — long before Blair took over — has quietly absorbed many intelligence analysts who look at long-term geopolitical questions, rather than analyzing the crises of the moment. Since the big question with the drone strikes is whether they ultimately enrage Pashtun Pakistanis by the civilian casualties they create — and therefore raise the question of whether the strikes are counterproductive — it’s not inconceivable that Blair’s office would take a more skeptical view of the program’s value than the CIA does.

But that’s not the only big piece of news Ambinder uncovers. Check this out:

The conflict became public earlier this year, after the CIA protested when the Director of National Intelligence appointed a senior National Security Agency representative to be the DNI’s representative in Kurdistan. Traditionally, the CIA’s chief of station had served as the foreign nation’s principal intelligence representative. But the NSA has a bigger footprint in Kurdistan, and the DNI decided that he would be better served by appointing an NSA officer to be his representative.

The conflict is not new. But the fact that it took place over Iraqi Kurdistan most definitely is. And the additional fact that Kurdistan is home to a National Security Agency presence is big big news. I would bet a lot of money that such a presence is geared toward some serious spying on nearby Iran.

Attorney General Eric Holder (WDCpix)

On October 30, the Justice Department for the first time applied its new “state secrets” policy to a case charging the government with breaking the law. Open government advocates hoping for a significant change in the government’s stance toward secrecy in national security cases were sorely disappointed. Attorney General Eric Holder said that in the case of Shubert v. Obama — a class action filed in 2007 claiming that the National Security Agency has an ongoing dragnet surveillance program spying on the telephone and e-mail communications of ordinary Americans — the government would do the same thing it’s done repeatedly in the past: it would move to dismiss the case, because even to respond to the charges would endanger national security by revealing sensitive “state secrets.”

The state secrets privilege allows the government to ask a court to dismiss a case filed against it by claiming that merely allowing the case to move forward in court would reveal government secrets and jeopardize national security. It’s frequently used by the Justice Department in cases alleging warrantless wiretapping, “extraordinary rendition” and abuse of detainees by U.S. officials has angered open-government advocates, who claim that the Bush administration, and now President Obama, is using the evidentiary privilege to conceal government wrongdoing.

[Law1]Those concerns led Holder in September to announce a new policy that he said would limit the Justice Department’s reliance on the state secrets privilege. When he asked the federal court in San Francisco to dismiss the Shubert case in October, Holder said he was asserting the privilege in accordance with that new policy, after “following a careful and thorough review process” and “only because I believe there is no way for this case to move forward without jeopardizing ongoing intelligence activities that we rely upon to protect the safety of the American people.”

“We are not invoking this privilege to conceal government misconduct or avoid embarrassment, nor are we invoking it to preserve executive power,” Holder insisted, adding that “we have given the court the information it needs to conduct its own independent assessment of our claim by filing a classified submission outlining the underlying facts and providing a detailed record upon which it can rely.”

Because that information is filed with the court under seal, however, it’s impossible to know whether the government’s reasons are legitimate. That decision will be made by Judge Vaughn Walker, the federal judge in the Northern District of California who’s presiding over this and several other pending cases that the government also claims involve “state secrets.”

But lawyers and advocates for government transparency were dismayed that the Obama administration would even assert the privilege in the Shubert case after promising to severely restrict its use.

“What they’re saying is, ‘because of state secrets, we can’t tell you what the program is,’” said Ilann Maazel, a lawyer representing Virginia Shubert and the three other Brooklyn residents named in the the case who claim the government has been wiretapping them without a warrant. “There’s no limit to the state secrets privilege in their view. There’s no law they cannot violate that implicates national security in their view. Their view is, ‘just trust us.’ ”

Maazel is hardly the only one disappointed with how the Obama administration has used the privilege so far.

“The DOJ continues to embrace the very same “state secrets” theories of the Bush administration—which Democrats generally and Barack Obama specifically once vehemently condemned—and is doing so in order literally to shield the President from judicial review or accountability when he is accused of breaking the law,” wrote Salon blogger and constitutional lawyer Glenn Greenwald after the Justice Department moved to dismiss the Shubert case.

Daniel Metcalfe, a former Justice Department official and now Executive Director of the Collaboration on Government Secrecy at American University’s Washington College of Law, also thinks the new administration’s record on the issue overall has been disappointing.

“On the state secrets privilege as well as other transparency issues, the Obama administration has an easy act to follow, in that the Bush administration was so extremely secretive across the board,” he said. “But from early on, specifically as of February 9 when the Obama administration began following the Bush administration’s state secrets position in the case of Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,” a lawsuit challenging the government for its role in torture and extraordinary rendition, “open government advocates have been quite alarmed,” said Metcalfe. Although he acknowledged that it takes time for a new administration to develop its own policies, “the Obama administration’s eventual state secrets policy issuance of September 23 has done very little to assuage these growing concerns.”

The Collaboration on Government Secrecy gives President Obama a “D” on its secrecy/transparency scorecard for his use of the state secrets privilege so far. Metcalfe added that the Justice Department still has not completed a promised review of the cases where the government has invoked the state secrets privilege to dismiss them. The new state secrets policy announced in September did not mention that review.

The problem isn’t only that Holder wants to ues the privilege once again to dismiss a case that challenges government conduct. As Steven Aftergood, director of the Project on Government Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists has pointed out in his blog, the government may not even be following all aspects of its new policy.

Part of that policy, announced in September after months of delay, attempts to respond to the concern that the state secrets policy can be used to conceal government lawbreaking. The new policy requires more thorough review by senior Justice Department officials, including the Attorney General himself. But it also says that if the Attorney General believes the case “raises credible allegations of government wrongdoing,” he’s supposed to refer those allegations to an Inspector General for further investigation.

Shubert v. Obama claims the government is engaged in a broad surveillance “dragnet” that monitors ordinary Americans’ phone and internet communications without a warrant and without any suspicion that the targets have done anything wrong. It would all sound very sci-fi — and therefore, perhaps, not credible — if there weren’t strong evidence to back it up. That evidence was first introduced in the case of Jewel v. NSA, brought by the Electronic Frontier Foundation last year. In that case, a former AT&T telecommunications technician named Mark Klein submitted a sworn declaration describing how AT&T routed copies of Internet traffic to a secret room in San Francisco controlled by the NSA. Only employees cleared by the NSA were allowed to enter the room. The government has likewise moved to dismiss that case on state secrets grounds. The matter is still pending in the same federal district court in California where the Shubert case is filed.

After Klein’s testimony became public, another whistleblower came forward, this time a former NSA Intelligence Analyst. In January, Russell Tice told Keith Olbermann on MSNBC that “the NSA had access to all Americans’ communications – faxes, phone calls, computer communications. They monitored all communications.”

But is that enough evidence to require the Attorney General to refer the claims to an Inspector General for investigation, as the new policy requires? It’s impossible to know, because the new policy doesn’t say how the AG should decide which claims are “credible.”

Asked whether the Justice Department referred the matter to an inspector general, spokesperson Tracy Schmaler told TWI that she “can’t comment specifically” on that question, adding: “just to be clear, there is no automatic referral in the policy.”

As for whether guidelines or regulations govern the credibility determination, Schmaler said she couldn’t go beyond the statement made by the Attorney General when he announced his application of the state secrets privilege to the Shubert case.

Ultimately, critics say the problem with even the new state secrets policy is that it leaves too much discretion to the executive to decide what information is so sensitive that it cannot be disclosed even to a judge behind closed doors – and what constitutes a credible allegation against the executive branch that’s worth investigating. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides various ways that the government can produce information to a court and have it still remain secret, but allow a legal challenge to government conduct to proceed.

The Obama administration’s use of the state secrets privilege to try to dismiss the Shubert case “demonstrates that we can’t count on the executive to rein itself in when it comes to the state secrets privilege,” said Kevin Bankston, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation working on the Jewel case.

Although the debate over the privilege sounds technical, what’s at stake isn’t just courtroom procedure. It’s whether the government can get away with engaging in illegal conduct simply by claiming that the evidence is too sensitive to reveal.

“There is not a single person in the United States government who has disavowed the dragnet program, who has said that it’s stopped,” said Maazel, referring to the claims in the Shubert case. Although the government has said that warrantless wiretapping under the Terrorist Surveillance Program has stopped, the Obama administration has not said that warrantless wiretapping isn’t ongoing under some other program. “We have every reason to believe that the copping and splitting in San Francisco is continuing,” said Maazel, referring to the way the government allegedly duplicates messages for monitoring purposes.

Experts note that the state secrets privilege actually encourages illegal conduct in national security matters, since the government knows it can be invoked as a shield. “The basic nature of the state secrets privilege always has been that it can remove a disincentive that the government ordinarily would have against engaging in highly questionable, if not outright wrongful, conduct,” said Metcalfe.

Regardless of how Judge Walker rules in these cases (they’ve all be transferred to his court), the issue isn’t going away. Democrats in Congress have introduced legislation that would keep courts from dismissing cases based solely on the government’s assertion that the case would reveal state secrets. Last week the House Judiciary Committee approved the bill introduced by Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), after Nadler called the government’s use of the privilege “the greatest threat to liberty at present.”

President Obama, for his part, has avoided taking any position on it. In fact, when a House Judiciary subcommittee in June held a hearing on the proposed legislation, the Justice Department did not even send a witness to testify about its use, saying only that the policy was still under review.

A justice department attorney is expected to appear at a conference next week on the subject being held at Washington College of Law at American University, and will surely be asked about the administration’s views. Metcalfe, who’s convening the conference, hopes the department will also be prepared to report the results of the litigation review that Holder said the department was undertaking in February. That review could lead the government to change its position on asserting the privilege in some pending cases.

Ultimately, if Congress doesn’t pass legislation on the state secrets privilege, the matter could end up in the Supreme Court, which first recognized this controversial executive privilege back in 1953. The court dismissed that case, brought by widows of civilians killed in a military plane crash, because the government claimed it would reveal military secrets. But when the accident report was finally declassified in 2000, rather than military secrets, it revealed gross military negligence that would have been damning evidence against the government in the case. (The case settled in 1953 for $170,000.)

“The Supreme Court hasn’t heard a state secrets case since 1953,” said Maazel. “There’s no question they will have one sooner rather than later.”

What’s particularly interesting about the assertion this time, though, is that it doesn’t appear to be simply covering up Bush-era government misconduct. The case, Shubert v. Bush, suggests an ongoing illegal government data-mining program that intercepts and listens in on a huge range of communications by U.S. citizens. The complaint (PDF), filed by ordinary U.S. citizens living in Brooklyn, N.Y., who communicate with people in different countries, is a fascinating read that charges the government is engaged in a bizarrely vast surveillance dragnet. On the one hand, it sounds completely paranoid; on the other hand, it could be true.

We may never know, however, because if Attorney General Eric Holder has his way, the case will be dismissed before the lawyers even get a chance to investigate. That’s because the government has “to protect against a disclosure of highly sensitive, classified information that would irrevocably harm the national security of this country,” as Holder said in a statement released late on Friday. Holder has once again invoked the so-called “state secrets privilege,” this time reluctantly, he says, because “there is no way for this case to move forward without jeopardizing ongoing intelligence activities that we rely upon to protect the safety of the American people.”

In fact, federal courts handle classified and sensitive information all the time without disclosing it publicly, by filing records under seal and requiring the lawyers involved in the case to obtain security clearance. It’s unclear why that wouldn’t work in this case. But one implication of Holder’s statement is that the spying and data-mining program is ongoing, so to reveal it would harm national security.

Another equally disturbing implication of Holder’s statement is that even if the government were engaged in blatantly illegal conduct that violates the U.S. Constitution, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Wiretap Act and other federal laws, there would be no way for any U.S. citizen targeted by the government’s illegal conduct to find out, let alone to hold anyone accountable.

As Ilann Maazel, a lawyer representing the plaintiffs who filed the case, told the National Law Journal earlier today, “In the Justice Department’s view, the government is free to violate any law” based on the assertion that national security is involved. “What the government is doing is avoiding any inquiry into the program.”

Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of California, where the case is pending, has previously greeted the government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege with skepticism, and, in at least one case against an Islamic charity that claimed it was wiretapped, allowed the case to proceed.

We’ll be following closely to see what he does with this one.

The NSA authorized its warrantless wiretapping program shortly after September 11, 2001.

After defense lawyers representing Guantanamo detainees discovered they might have been wiretapped, CCR challenged the practice in a lawsuit in New York in May 2007. But the government refused to say whether it wiretapped the lawyers or not, citing national security concerns. The federal district court sided with the government, ruling that the NSA could refuse to either confirm or deny the existence of any related records because to do so “would reveal information about the NSA’s capabilities and activities.”

The case is Wilner v. NSA and it’s being argued before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals today.

The Obama administration is now saying the same thing.

Today, it assured reporters in a background briefing with administration officials that although the U.S. government will continue to send terror suspects to foreign countries for interrogation — what has notoriously become known as “rendition” — it will seek assurances from those countries that their interrogators won’t torture the suspects.

Of course, the Bush administration said it sought and received those same assurances. After all, it’s long been illegal, both under U.S. and international law, to send detainees to countries where they’re likely to be tortured. So what’s different now?

“The State Department will play a larger role to ensure that those assurances are credible,” said one senior administration official during the background briefing. (Why the briefing was on background and not for attribution to particular administration officials isn’t clear.)

So, asked Eli Lake of The Washington Times, will the United States simply stop sending suspects to countries that are known to torture suspects, such as Egypt or Syria?

No, the administration is not willing to go that far, a senior administration official said.  However, “we will ensure that we have the appropriate assurances in place that gives us strong confidence that the individuals in question will not be tortured.”

The Obama administration is now saying that, unlike the Bush administration before it, it will seek to verify that suspects aren’t being tortured. According to a paper released by the Justice Department today, the task force recommended that “agencies obtaining assurances from foreign countries insist on a monitoring mechanism, or otherwise establish a monitoring mechanism, to ensure consistent, private access to the individual who has been transferred, with minimal advance notice to the detaining government.”

That sounds like an improvement, though having to provide any advance notice to the detaining government is problematic. The policy still, to some extent, allows the U.S. government to trust foreign officials who promise they won’t torture a terror suspect, even if they are officials of a country that is known by the United States to torture terror suspects.

The State Department may play a larger role than it did before, but the new interagency process is ultimately under the control of the president’s National Security Council. That’s better then keeping it a purely CIA function, as it was before. But it still raises the question of why the United States plans to send terror suspects to foreign countries known to torture them, and just how vigorous — and how long-lasting — U.S. monitoring will really be.

That may be true, but there’s an aspect of one of Brennan’s recent speeches that, if actually implemented, would have the opposite effect.

As Spencer Ackerman reported here earlier, Brennan, in his speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, declared an end to the “war on terror.”

“This is not a ‘war on terror,’” Brennan said. “We cannot let the terror prism guide how we’re going to interact and be involved in different parts of the world.”

Well, if that’s the case, then how is the Obama administration going to justify “preventive detention” of terror suspects under the laws of war?

That power to detain supposedly “dangerous” people who can’t be proven guilty in any sort of court is a power the Bush administration relied on heavily and the Obama administration continues to claim. It’s at the core of President Obama’s claim that there’s a class of people who cannot be tried in criminal court or even by military commission, yet still must be held in prison because they’re “dangerous.”  That’s all been justified legally by saying that we’re at “war,” and terror suspects are warriors in the “war on terror.”

Now that the Brennan has declared an end to that war, is the Obama administration willing to relinquish its right to detain terror suspects picked up anywhere in the world?

So far, Obama has not made clear how he intends to use this “preventive detention” authority he claims that he has, though it’s as broad a detention authority as Bush Attorney General Michael Mukasey claimed over a year ago. But if Brennan really has the sway over the administration that Wheeler suggests he does, then maybe Obama will soon have to concede that the “war on terror” is over — and so is his corresponding power to seize and imprison its supposed “warriors” anywhere in the world.

Unsurprisingly, then, Ambinder’s sources tell him that Brennan indeed knew:

[S]enior intelligence officials with direct knowledge of Brennan’s role confirm that, indeed, as head of the National Counterterrorism Center (and of its earlier incarnation, called TTIC), he was privy to both the NSA’s “take” — the raw product — and the mechanisms used to collect it. The NCTC cross-checked NSA information with everything else collected by the intelligence community and prepared threat assessments.

Ambinder correctly notes that NCTC didn’t play an operational role in the surveillance programs. But he writes that that an aspect of its job was to “determine the significance of the information gleaned from those sessions.” And that’s what’s fishy. The inspectors general found that the information gleaned from those sessions was rather insignificant, mainly a matter of running down certain leads, but not actual utility in combating terrorism. So why did the programs receive their reauthorizations every 45 days? Was no one inclined at NCTC and TTIC to assess that the programs weren’t particularly useful in repelling a continuing terrorist threat?

2. The error rate in collecting terrorism communications. According to the inspectors general of the CIA, FBI and NSA, much if not most of the information collected by the program was unrelated to terrorism. The NSA inspector general found “no evidence of intentional misuse” of the surveillance efforts. Which is groovy. But it still doesn’t tell us how much irrelevant data the program collected, which is a crucial question when determining its efficacy.

3. How much so-called Fruit of the Poisoned Tree resulted. That’s a legal doctrine referring to evidence that has to be thrown out of court. Long story short: if an investigation or a technique to get information is inadmissible in court, no evidence yielded by such methods can be used either. Warrantless surveillance is most certainly a case that would generate inadmissible evidence. That’s one of the issues at stake in yesterday’s al-Haramain filing that I wrote about. And it’s huge. If information from warrantless surveillance made its way into indictments or prosecutions, then those cases are jeopardized. That’s the sort of thing that lets terrorists out on the streets.

Check this out, for instance: the Justice Department “was aware as early as 2002 that information collected under the PSP could have implications for DOJ’s litigation responsibilities under Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 and Brady v. Maryland.” Rule 16 and Brady prevent prosecutors from withholding germane information from a defendant — like, you know, whether part or all of an investigation is based on an illegal search. But what happened? “[N]o DOJ attorneys with terrorism prosecution responsibilities were read into the PSP until mid-2004, and as a result DOJ continued to lack the advice of attorneys who were best equipped to identify and examine the discovery issues in connection with the PSP.” That means that from 2001 to 2004, U.S. attorneys could have been given — from FBI or intelligence officials — information relevant to a terrorism prosecution that they would have no way of knowing came from a poisoned tree like the PSP, and could therefore never have disclosed that fact to defense counsel. And yet the report doesn’t tell us how often that happened.

Relatedly, this is dense but important:

Chapters Three and Six of the DOJ IG [inspector general] report describe how DOJ and the [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court] addressed the impact PSP-derived information had on the FISA process. The DOJ IG concluded that it was foreseeable that [PSP-derived] information might impact the process and that the initial delay in reading anyone from DOJ’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) or the [FISA Court] into the PSP unnecessarily jeopardized DOJ’s relationship with the Court.

That’s hard to follow, but what it appears to mean is that OIPR, the office responsible for generating FISA warrants, had no idea if information it submitted as probable cause to the FISA Court for such a warrant came from PSP surveillance. OIPR whistleblower Thomas Tamm realized in 2004 that there were special procedures for some warrant submissions that seemed to come from a certain subset of NSA information; he had no idea what PSP was. We still don’t know how many warrants for the FISA Court effectively laundered dirty information into the criminal-justice process.

Update: Sorry, just two more.

4. Any assessment, at all, of the legality of the warrantless surveillance programs collectively called PSP. Just a total dodge on this one.

5. Relatedly: the words “exclusive means.” Like for instance, the inspectors general write: “Prior to September 11, 2001, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and Executive Order 1233 were generally viewed as the principal governing authorities for conducting electronic surveillance for national security purposes.” Well, not exactly. What FISA actually says is this:

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.

My emphasis. By not mentioning these crucial words in the FISA statute, the inspectors general look like they’re running away from addressing the question of PSP’s legality.

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Former Bush administration officials gave the generic statement that the PSP was “of value,” to quote FBI Director Robert Mueller’s rather conspicuously understated judgment. But there’s no evidence given in the report about valuable contributions that the PSP uniquely provided to the counterterrorism fight, even when conceding that most of that stuff is classified.

For instance, here’s the Justice Department inspector general’s assessment:

Even though most PSP leads were determined not to have any connection to terrorism, many of the FBI witnesses believed the mere possibility of the leads producing useful information made investigating the leads worthwhile.

However, the DOJ [inspector general] also found that the exceptionally compartmented nature of the program created some frustration for FBI personnel. Some agents and analysts criticized the PSP-derived information they received for providing insufficient details, and the agents who managed counterterrorism programs at the FBI field offices the DOJ [inspector general] visited said the FBI’s process for disseminating PSP-derived information failed to adquately prioritize the information for investigation.

So: diligence on a wild goose chase. I guess that’s something. What was the value added for the National Security Agency?

In May 2009 [former NSA and CIA director] told NSA [inspector general] that the value of the Program was in knowing the NSA signals intelligence activities under the PSP covered an important ‘quadrant’ of terrorist communications. NSA’s Deputy Director echoed Hayden’s comment when he said that the value of the PSP was in the confidence it provided that someone was looking at the seam between the foreign and domestic intelligence domains.

Again: value in checking boxes, but no value in, like, stopping terrorism. What about CIA?

The CIA [inspector general] determined that the CIA did not implement procedures to assess the usefulness of the product of the PSP and did not routinely document whether PSP reporting had contributed to successful counterterrorism operations. CIA officials, including Hayden, told the CIA [inspector general] that PSP reporting was used in conjunction with reporting from other intelligence sources; consequently, it is difficult to attribute the success of particular counterterrorism case exclusively to the PSP.

For this the Bush administration violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and then gutted it, with the help of a Democratic Congress.

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