Gen. Stanley McChrystal (Zuma)

A not-yet-released Rolling Stone magazine profile of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, quotes him and anonymous aides expressing anger, disrespect and derision at various members of the Obama administration, including Vice President Biden, Amb. Richard Holbrooke and Amb. Karl Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador to the country.

The profile itself isn’t out yet. But reporters have gotten its flavor. “Who’s that?” McChrystal is quoted as saying about Biden, who in 2009 didn’t favor McChrystal’s preferred strategy in Afghanistan. Eikenberry, a retired war commander himself, authored cables to Washington questioning whether counterinsurgency can work in the nine-year war and whether President Hamid Karzai is a reliable ally. McChrystal apparently told the magazine, “Here’s one that covers his flank for the history books. Now if we fail, they can say, ‘I told you so.’”

Last night, McChrystal released a statement to reporters taking responsibility for the profile, while not addressing any specific quotes attributed to him. Here it is in full:

“I extend my sincerest apology for this profile. It was a mistake reflecting poor judgment and should never have happened. Throughout my career, I have lived by the principles of personal honor and professional integrity. What is reflected in this article falls far short of that standard. I have enormous respect and admiration for President Obama and his national security team, and for the civilian leaders and troops fighting this war and I remain committed to ensuring its successful outcome.”

Update: According to the AP, McChrystal is getting summoned to Washington to be called on the carpet. In the White House, many senior officials still have a bad taste in their mouths over McChrystal’s leaked strategy review — McChrystal and his staff did not leak it — which they considered part of a pressure campaign to get Obama to escalate the Afghanistan. Obama did, and McChrystal testified to Congress in December that he fully endorsed and will faithfully execute the administration’s strategy.

It’s perilous for Obama to fire McChrystal now, with only a year remaining before the July 2011 date for beginning to transition to Afghan security responsibilities and consequently beginning troop reductions. But it’s going to be on McChrystal to repair the trust with the White House this profile has clearly damaged. If McChrystal keeps his command, that Rolling Stone reporter got the general’s last big interview.

More on this story:

‘Angry’ President Will Meet McChrystal Tomorrow, but Strategy Likely to Remain the Same

Gates Gives No Hints to McChrystal’s Fate

Kerry on McChrystal: Stop the ‘Feeding Frenzy’

Biden Probably Wants to Renew His Rolling Stone Subscription

1. Unity, Stand Together as One. The priority message that “I will take back with me to the Afghan people,” in President Hamid Karzai’s words, was the “strong, steady, long-term relationship with America.” Whatever turbulence exists in the relationship between Washington and Kabul — some of which, President Obama said, was “simply overblown” — the “greatest contributor” to Afghanistan, by far, is the United States. If Karzai remains concerned by the July 2011 date for beginning the transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces or by the occasional White House dissatisfaction with his commitment to clean governance, he didn’t sound like it. Instead, he said that “frankness will only add to the strength” of the U.S.-Afghan relationship, and that the two countries are “much more strongly related to each other today than we ever were before.” So much for Bush nostalgia.

2. The ‘Peace Jirga’ Will Be as Successful as the War Effort Allows It to Be. A reporter expressed skepticism that the Taliban will embrace any reconciliation plan offered by a forthcoming “consultative peace jirga” in Kabul. That effort has been a signature agenda item for Karzai since the January international conference on Afghanistan in London, especially since polls show that the Afghan people badly want a negotiated end to the war. But while U.S. officials have been careful to emphasize the differences between reconciliation efforts with Taliban leaders and reintegration efforts to absorb low-level Taliban fighters, Karzai instead talked about the “thousands of Taliban who are not ideologically oriented, who are not part of al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks.” Those “country boys” have been radicalized, he said, “at times, [by] misconducted by us.”

Obama opened the reconciliation/reintegration distinction back up. He said the “the peace jirga [will] allow for a framework to move forward,” and the U.S. would support an Afghan-led effort to reconcile with insurgents who embrace the Afghan constitution, human rights and the rule of law and renounce al-Qaeda and other militancy. But he said that the “incentives” for a “portion of the Taliban to lay down arms and make peace with the Afghan government in part depends on our efforts in breaking their momentum militarily.” The war effort, in other words, will give the Afghan government an ability make peace from “the strongest possible position.”

3. Let’s Not Talk About Corruption. You’ll be shocked to hear that persistent issues in Afghan government corruption or capacity to deliver services for the Afghan people were addressed only in general terms from a joint presidential White House press conference, for all the talk about “frankness.” Karzai pledged his “dedication and extreme care to ensure” that U.S. economic aid to Afghanistan is “spent well.” Obama said that he was encouraged by Karzai’s words and initial actions since his second inaugural, but there is “more to do.” That was about it for a central concern in U.S.-Afghan relations that made Amb. Karl Eikenberry question Karzai as a strategic partner last fall.

4. “Long-Term Relationship.” Three words spoken very often by both presidents. “This is a long-term partnership that is not simply defined by our military presence,” Obama said. “After July 2011, we are still going to have an interest in making sure Afghanistan is secure.” Music to Karzai’s ears. Let’s see if Obama’s political enemies continue to misrepresent July 2011 as the beginning of a U.S. troop bugout.

5. Civilian Casualties Must Be Avoided. They’re “not just a political problem for me,” Obama said about the most inflammatory issue in Afghan eyes. “I am ultimately accountable” for every civilian death in Afghanistan. In a surprisingly personal recognition, Obama said that civilian deaths are “something I have to carry with me.” Karzai praised Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s efforts to avoid mistakenly killing Afghan civilians, but recent reports indicate those casualties are again on the rise.

Presidents Hamid Karzai and Barack Obama at the White House on Wednesday (EPA/ZUMApress.com)

At the White House this afternoon, Presidents Barack Obama and Hamid Karzai committed themselves to a “long-term partnership,” in Obama’s words, “that is not simply defined by our military presence.” Both expressed confidence in the ultimate success of a war in its ninth year.

All this happens as thousands of U.S., NATO and Afghan forces are moving into the city and surrounding environs of Kandahar. Senior officials in charge of shaping the operation have cautioned against viewing Kandahar as an iconic invasion campaign. Unlike the February operation in Marja, where 15,000 NATO and Afghan troops invaded and a governance structure of unproven capability was essentially airlifted into an area under Taliban control, the approach to Kandahar involves bolstering governance and economic efforts in parts of Kandahar currently under government control and expanding them outwards into Taliban-held territory. That will require intense and persistent coordination between NATO militaries, NATO civilians, their governments back home, Afghan security forces, local Afghan government officials and national Afghan government officials. A source in Kandahar considers it all a pipe dream.

[Security1] That source passed on the following assessment of how counterinsurgency efforts across Afghanistan are shaping up, over a year after Obama embraced them at the strategic level and nearly a year after Obama tapped Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Amb. Karl Eikenberry to implement them. The source’s reluctant viewpoint, which is making its way through official channels in Afghanistan, is that the coordination necessary for successful counterinsurgency between civilian and military forces is not in evidence. Neither is the coordination between NATO and Afghan forces. Lumbering bureaucracy inhibits the rapid application of services and economic aid after military forces clear an area, as Joe Klein recently documented with an Army company based on the outskirts of Kandahar. NATO forces do not adequately control information operations; they do not adequately explain to Afghan civilians the purpose of military or governance operations; and what understanding they have of their area of operations, they don’t adequately share with their partner units.

“It is evident that there is little attention to ensuring that the local population is prepared for the transition of combat troops occupying their home one month and then smiling faces knocking on their doors the next,” the source writes, comparing the difference between counterinsurgency theory and practice to the same experienced under communism. “The enemy still has the discipline to outlast our commitment to the area.”

The source’s assessment, titled “A Counterproductive Counterinsurgency,” is reprinted below in full, with minor interruptions in the text for clarity.

A Counterproductive Counterinsurgency

The counterinsurgency methodology which is currently being employed in Afghanistan is not going to lead coalition forces to victory in this war.

The idea of “counterinsurgency” appears to be a viable way for success on paper. Military units, along with NGO’s [non-governmental organizations], the Department of State, GIRoA [the Afghanistan government], and other government agencies work together to emplace the clear, hold, build strategy in key areas of the battlefield. Like communism, however, counterinsurgency methods are not proving to be effective in practice.

Counterinsurgency methods must make quick and effective use of information. However, the joint environment of the theater of operation makes it difficult for efficient information dissemination. Coalition units are still apprehensive about distributing information to consumers who do not wear the same uniform — and many units still have major breakdowns in following guidance directing the flow of information up to higher decision-making elements; or down to the soldiers on the ground. The result of stove-piped information sharing channels maximizes the amount of time that insurgent forces have to seek out coalition vulnerabilities and exploit them.

The passive approach taken to reintegrate the enemy is also proving to be ineffective. Coalition forces who are using the idea of projects and Provincial Reconstruction Teams to pacify local insurgents are experiencing long delays in getting their recommended courses of action approved, funded and then complete. Additionally, there is often a poor hand-off from kinetic [read: military] forces who relinquish control of a previously hostile area to non-kinetic groups who are empowered to “win hearts and minds.” It is evident that there is little attention to ensuring that the local population is prepared for the transition of combat troops occupying their home one month and then smiling faces knocking on their doors the next. Additionally, coalition participants are not yet capable of recognizing the human terrain of their area once they assume control of it.

The human terrain layer of the battlefield is a necessary component of mission planning and success in a counterinsurgency environment. Coalition forces have become aware of the utility of understanding it but have failed to quantify their efforts in exploiting it. The fact that insurgent groups are still integrated within the population of areas that have been under coalition control for long periods of time is indicative of their ability to more effectively exploit the human layer of the battlefield and mitigate the effects of a counterinsurgency campaign. The adage still holds true today that “we have the watches, but they have the time.” The enemy still has the discipline to outlast our commitment to the area.

As if the breakdown of communication and process methodology in place isn’t enough to negate the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations, we must also contend with the effects of the media, and a world population that cringes when it is witness to overt aggression and the marginalization of people. In this response, the leaders of this campaign have taken too many precautions to ensure that everyone is content with the tact taken. An effective counterinsurgency can only be waged by an organization that is capable of committing to support only those it empowers, remains quiet until it strikes, and effectively owns the world of information. Once it is capable of identifying the vulnerabilities in core infrastructure before the enemy is able to exploit them—and strikes with precision to seal them up, the enemy will dissolve and we will find the war is won.

The author of this paper clearly accepts several of the premises of counterinsurgency theory — in particular, the recognition that the sentiments of the local population are what McChrystal called “strategically decisive.” I asked what the author meant by the “core infrastructure” he identified as the key objective for operations in the memo’s last paragraph. The answer? All of the relevant considerations that shape an Afghan’s assessment of whether to side with the Taliban or with the Afghan government — the economic environment, the local power structure, and so forth. Spoken like a true counterinsurgent.

But the problem, in this individual’s view, is that NATO and Afghan forces are insufficiently and inconsistently contending for those key counterinsurgency prizes. Which is another way of saying the strategy is not succeeding on its own terms.

“Two things are happening,” said Richard Fontaine, a former foreign policy adviser to Senator John McCain. “One, there wasn’t much payoff from the earlier approach. And second, it’s sunk in, after the Afghan elections last year, that this is the guy who’s going to be here for four years and change, so we better get along with him because we don’t have an alternative.”

But there was a reason why the Obama administration kept the relationship with Karzai frosty: he’s an unreliable partner, as expressed by his election theft. Accordingly, the administration drew two conclusions. First, it needed to build deeper relationships with Afghan government institutions and focus its support to non-military institutions on what it likes to call “sub-national” efforts at the provincial and district levels — that is, further from Karzai’s control. Second, it needed to show Karzai that U.S. support to his priorities was conditioned on his performance. “The days of providing a blank check are over,” Obama said in his West Point speech announcing the “extended surge.”

At least part of the first lesson is still in evidence by Karzai’s humongous entourage of cabinet ministers, who’ve traveled to Washington to meet with their American opposites. The second lesson is in doubt. Not everyone in the administration appears comfortable with its prospective abridgement. Going forward, the key question isn’t whether Karzai feels adequately loved by President Obama, as he was by President Bush. It’s whether he feels like he can resist Obama’s pressure to deliver on capable governance and get rewarded with a fancy week-long celebration in Washington.

If anything, it mirrors a decision Obama made last year on Pakistan, when he instructed his administration to stop its public pressure in order to forge a more productive relationship.

Eikenberry, who emerged last fall as a skeptic of Karzai, pointedly declined to say whether Karzai has earned his confidence. “He’s the elected president of Afghanistan” and a “close friend and partner” was how the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan preferred to leave it.

McChrystal also tamped down some bellicosity about Iran when asked about sporadic reports that the Islamic Republic is arming the same Taliban forces that it used to oppose. “Iran’s reach into Afghanistan is fairly legitimate,” McChrystal said. Intelligence that indicated “malign activity” was present, but “not significant.”

I think the most immediate thing that we’ll be interested in discussing with President Karzai and his team next week has to do with the next upcoming event, which is the consultative peace jirga scheduled for perhaps just several weeks from now.  And in particular here, we’re interested in, as Ben [Rhodes of the National Security Council] suggested, in President Karzai’s objectives for the jirga, what he hopes to achieve; and then, most important for us, how it is we can best support him.

Karzai announced in January that he’d assemble a “peace jirga” to establish national Afghan consensus around an offer to Taliban leadership to stop the insurgency. We don’t know what it will include. Its prospect for receptivity are in doubt. Afghan human rights activists are worried about being cut out of the process and, effectively, sold out.

Meanwhile, the civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan, Amb. Karl Eikenberry and Gen. Stanley McChrystal, are about to brief the White House press corps on their end of the visit and what they’ve been up to recently.

What made it different today, of course, was that we were in Kabul and the most senior members of the government were participating. While President Karzai’s participation was relatively brief, the fact that he visited us at all, the fact that he heard what we were doing, the fact that he endorsed it in front of his ministers carries great importance to us, and we greatly appreciate the fact that he took time to do it.

And on and on in that vein during the entire press conference. It’s a pretty cost-free way to lower the temperature of U.S.-Karzai relations. Last week, Sarah Palin and Liz Cheney chided the Obama administration for pressuring Karzai. Andrew Exum of the Center for a New American Security had a choice response to that.

More substantively, what Karzai wants is the ability to control an independent election-fraud monitor. It’s one thing to play up nationalist bona fides, particularly after stealing your own re-election. But look to see if Karzai develops this line of argument in order to win the U.S.’s acquiescence for his scheme:

Despite his displeasure with the U.S. government, Karzai made the trip to Kandahar to build public support for a top U.S. and NATO goal of combating the insurgency with a major military push this summer into the districts around Kandahar.

He asked attendees whether they are happy about the upcoming operation. A loud murmur echoed across the vast meeting room.

“Listen to me carefully: Until you’re happy and satisfied, we will not conduct this operation,” he said to loud applause.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal has publicly stated that he wants buy-in from local Kandahar notables before he sends NATO forces into the city and its surrounding areas. It’s a position firmly in line with the counterinsurgency principle of seeking local partnership, with the Afghanistan-centric tweak of seeking that partnership at very local levels, something that has the effect of circumventing Karzai. For all Karzai’s reliance on U.S. money and security, Karzai could force a revision in U.S. planning if he decides to become an obstacle to the Kandahar offensive later this spring. How far is he willing to take this?

The working theory is a cautious one that takes into account the persistent divergence between Pakistani and U.S. interests. But it’s still beneficial for U.S. interests:

A top American military officer in Afghanistan on Wednesday suggested that with the arrests, the ISI could be trying to accelerate the timetable for a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

“I don’t know if they’re pushing anyone to the table, but they are certainly preparing the meal,” the officer said.

The idea is to compel the Afghan Taliban into peace talks that will leave it alive, reduced but intact, and able to represent Pakistani interests in a Karzai government. That carries with it the implication that the Taliban will survive the next 18 months’ worth of NATO/Afghan military efforts. Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Amb. Karl Eikenberry and Gen. David Petraeus repeatedly stated they were launching the current and planned offensives in southern Afghanistan in order to break the Taliban’s momentum and compel a peace settlement favorable to the new Afghan government. So, the strategic differences here may be ones of degree. On the other hand, if the military offensive in Afghanistan, if allowed to continue, can degrade the Taliban to a spent force, that — alongside renewed diplomatic ties between Washington, Kabul and Islamabad — might raise questions among the Pakistanis about whether the Taliban is even a viable mechanism for Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.

If the explanation held by this officer is correct, though, then we might be looking at the beginning of an endgame in the Afghanistan war.

The Vice President

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

Ambassador Susan Rice, Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations

Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg

Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (via videoconference)

Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (via videoconference)

Anne Patterson, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan (via videoconference)

Under Secretary of Defense Michele Flournoy

Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General James E. Cartwright, USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General David Petraeus, U.S. Central Command

General Stanley McChrystal, U.S. Commander in Afghanistan (via videoconference)
Lieutenant General Dave Rodriguez (via videoconference)

Lietenant General William Caldwell (via videoconference)

Vice Admiral Michael LaFever (via videoconference)

Admiral Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence

CIA Director Leon Panetta

Deputy Secretary of Treasury Neal Wolin

General James Jones, National Security Advisor

Tom Donilon, Deputy National Security Advisor

John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security

Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, Special Assistant to the President for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Robert Nabors, OMB Deputy Director

Adm. LaFever, if you didn’t recognize the name, is the Pentagon’s man in Pakistan.