International inspectors who gained access to Iran’s newly revealed underground nuclear enrichment plant voiced strong suspicions in a report on Monday that the country was concealing other atomic facilities. [...]

In unusually tough language, the International Atomic Energy Agency appeared highly skeptical that Iran would have built the enrichment plant without also constructing a variety of other facilities that would give it an alternative way to produce nuclear fuel if its main centers were bombed. So far, Iran has denied that it built other hidden sites in addition to the one deep underground on a military base about 12 miles north of the holy city of Qum. The inspectors were given access to the plant late last month and reported that they had found it in “an advanced state” of construction, but that no centrifuges — the fast-spinning machines needed to make nuclear fuel — had yet been installed.

American nuclear experts have long suspected additional secret facilities exist in Iran for atomic research and development, and the late-September disclosure in Qom only intensified their concerns that there are still other Qoms concealed by the regime. Iran continues to equivocate on a deal reached in Vienna to process its uranium abroad for conversion into a state suitable only for peaceful purposes.

U.N. inspectors found “nothing to be worried about” in a first look at a previously secret uranium enrichment site in Iran last month, the International Atomic Energy chief said in remarks published Thursday.

Mohamed ElBaradei also told the New York Times that he was examining possible compromises to unblock a draft nuclear cooperation deal between Iran and three major powers that has foundered over Iranian objections.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has rejected revisions to the deal, though there are those who urge her to reconsider.

Iranian negotiators on Wednesday expressed support for a deal that — if accepted by their leaders — would delay Tehran’s ability to make nuclear weapons by sending most of its existing enriched uranium to Russia for processing, diplomats said. International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei said that representatives of Iran and its three interlocutors — the U.S., Russia and France — had accepted the draft for forwarding to their capitals. ElBaradei said he hoped for approval from all four countries by Friday.

For an analysis of the importance of a possible deal to the Iranian nuclear program specifically and President Obama’s general diplomatic strategy, see this piece.

Iran may agree to send only a bit of its LEU stockpile out at a time, maintaining the bulk of it on Iranian soil (where in theory it could be further enriched to weapons grade). French officials have made clear in the past few days that they will only sign on to the deal if it involves all 1200 kg LEU suggested at Geneva.

Talks may go on until Wednesday.

Ivanka Barzashka of the Federation of American Scientists emailed me to say that we can’t verify that statement independently yet.

Until Iran submits design information to the IAEA, the Administration’s statement cannot be verified. The good news here is that Iran has announced the facility (although it is unclear if it decided to do so because the cat was already out of the bag) and has said that it would comply fully with the IAEA. Unfortunately, as cool as ISIS’ satellite photos are, they only show tunnel entrances in a mountain (there are many of those around that area, if you play around on Google Earth). Moreover, the locations are just guesses based on information that has been disseminated by the media. We cannot tell much about the number and type of centrifuges that will be installed at Qom from the ISIS satellite imagery.

What might we look for to draw the 3,000-centrifuge inference? Barzashka:

How could the administration know that Iran is installing 3,000 machines? One way would be to compare the area of the Qom facility to that of the enrichment plant at Natanz. Centrifuges do not take up a lot of space and if you knew the average area per cascade, you could approximate how many machines can fit in a given space. You can come up with an estimate for the size of the facility based on the amount of rock that the Iranians are throwing out (if they are digging a hole in a mountain, they have to dispose of the material somewhere). You can tell something about the size also if you knew how much explosive they used to blast the hole. There is no way to know that a particular tunnel will be used to house centrifuges until you have more information provided by other sources. You can also consider the power lines that are going inside the facility. Still, the conclusion is that we cannot independently verify this information.

That’s a task for Thursday’s P5+1 meeting in Geneva, when the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Russia and China will demand full IAEA access to the facility under threat of sanctions. Ivanka has a great, informative blog post going through more of the ambiguities surrounding Qom.

The disclosure of Iran’s nuclear facility under construction for years in secret near Qom — the second such undisclosed facility operated by Iran — deepens “a growing concern,” President Obama said in Pittsburgh this morning, “that Iran is refusing to live up to those international responsibilities, including specifically revealing all nuclear-related activities.” But notice that neither Obama, French President Nicholas Sarkozy nor British Prime Minister Gordon Brown accused Iran of a specific violation of its international nuclear responsibilities, and pivoted their case instead on Iran’s concealment. That’s because it’s not actually clear whether Iran has committed a specific violation of either the Nuclear Nonprofileration Treaty or its follow-on agreements negotiated separately with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Under the NPT, each state negotiates a safeguards agreement to the IAEA so the atomic watchdog can work out where and how to establish monitoring devices like cameras at declared facilities. “Iran’s specific safeguards agreement doesn’t say anything about the time limits for the provision of design information,” says Ivanka Barzashka, an analyst with the Federation of American Scientists’ Strategic Security Program. Specific time-frames for site or design disclosure typically occur in additional “subsidiary arrangements,” and usually provide for disclosure around 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into a given facility. But Iran’s subsidiary arrangement with the IAEA “has not been made public as far as I know,” Barzashka says.

That said, in its Aug. 28 report, the IAEA criticizes Iran for not adopt implementing a section of its subsidiary arrangement that dealt with design notificiation. “The absence of such information results in late notification to the Agency of the construction of new facilities and changes to the design of existing facilities,” the IAEA warned. Barzashka translates that such adoption would require Iran to notify the IAEA “of the construction of a new plant, any kind of new facilities, as soon as a decision has been authorized by the government.”

And that clearly hasn’t happened. According to an U.S. intelligence official who would only speak on background, “We’ve known about this facility for years. Over time, a clearer picture evolved of Iran’s intentions and activities at this covert site — one that, it turns out, wasn’t unknown to us.”

That’s still not the same thing as a broken obligation binding under international law. But the lack of a specific broken obligation, in turn, isn’t a reason to dismiss today’s disclosure. “It adds to the fact that Iran’s behavior is ambiguous,” Barzashka says. “The issue for Iran should be to do anything to dissuade this concern, like [implementing] further transparency measures … that should be the issue Iran should address.”

Update: Just in case, maybe this post from Barzashka and her boss, Ivan Oelrich, can clarify the point:

The latest IAEA report (GOV/2009/55) states that Iran has not yet implemented early provisions of design information in accordance with the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, which would require Iran to notify the agency of the construction of new facilities or modifications to existing ones as soon as such a decision has been authorized by the government or the plant operator.  The original agreement required Iran to submit such information no later than 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into the facility (GOV/2003/40).

So that looks like an if-then trigger for a violation. If there was some reason to suspect that Iran was going to place nuclear material for enrichment at the Qom facility within the next six months — and I’m not sure what that may have been, to be clear — then that, as well, might explain why this announcement came when it did. Thanks to reader/pal MWH for the tip.

Update 2: Much much more on that here.

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· A revitalized commitment to work toward a world without nuclear weapons, and calls for further progress on nuclear arms reductions, urging all states to work towards the establishment of effective measures of nuclear arms reduction and disarmament.

· A strengthened Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a Review Conference in 2010 that achieves realistic and achievable goals in all three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The resolution supports universality of the NPT, calls on all states to adhere to its terms and makes clear the Council’s intent to immediately address any notice of intent to withdraw from the Treaty. The resolution also notes the ongoing efforts in the NPT review to identify mechanisms for responding collectively to any notification of withdrawal.

· Better security for nuclear weapons materials to prevent terrorists from acquiring materials essential to make a bomb, including through the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, locking down vulnerable nuclear weapons materials in four years, a goal originally proposed by President Obama, minimizing the civil use of highly enriched uranium to the extent feasible, and encouraging the sharing of best practices as a practical way to strengthen nuclear security and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G-8 Global Partnership.

· The Security Council’s authority and vital role in addressing the threat to international peace and security posed by the spread of nuclear weapons and underscoring the Council’s intent to take action if nuclear weapons or related material are provided to terrorists.

· Addressing the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime, demanding full compliance with Security Council resolutions on Iran and North Korea and calling on the parties to find an early negotiated solution.

· The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) essential role in preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective safeguards. This is particularly important to ensure that the growing interest in nuclear energy does not result in additional countries with nuclear weapons capabilities.

· Encouraging efforts to ensure development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest standards for safeguards, security and safety and recognizing the inalienable right of parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

· National efforts to make it more difficult for proliferating states and non-state actors to access the international financial system as well as efforts to strengthen export controls on proliferation-related materials and stronger detection, deterrence and disruption of illicit trafficking in such materials.

· Key nuclear agreements, including START follow-on agreement, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment.

Work that still needs to be done: approving an “additional protocol” for the nuclear watchdogs at the International Atomic Energy Agency “so that the IAEA will be in a position to carry out all of the inspections necessary to ensure that materials and technology from peaceful nuclear uses are not used to support a weapons program.”

The New York Times’ William Broad and The Washington Times’ Sara Carter and Eli Lake have much more. While the declaration doesn’t reveal any military secrets, it documents at great length and in great detail the United States’ civilian nuclear energy facilities. The top Republican on the Senate intelligence committee, Kit Bond (R-Mo.), told Carter and Lake that the screw-up provided “a virtual treasure map for terrorists.” David Albright, one of the most respected nuclear-weapons experts in Washington, told both papers much the same thing. He explained to The Washington Times:

“The problem is there are a few places where it shows rooms inside of buildings where fissile material is located,” he said. Although terrorists still would have difficulty penetrating U.S. security to acquire the material, he said, the disclosure was potentially a violation of U.S. law.

It’s unclear how this all happened. The document lists the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on its cover sheet, but a committee spokeswoman told both papers that the committee had nothing to do with its publication. If I read this Bond quote from The Washington Times correctly — “Our best understanding is that this was sent to GPO by staffers of the House leader” — he’s blaming House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), and if so, it’s unclear what the basis for that is*. The foreign affairs committee spokeswoman, Lynne Weil, pledged an investigation; Bond’s staff is looking into the publication as well.

Aftergood told The New York Times that the disclosure is “a one-stop shop for information on U.S. nuclear programs.” Yet his organization, the Federation of American Scientists, still has the 267-page document on its Website.

Update: So as best I can understand, Bond is referring to the fact that the Speaker of the House appoints the House Parliamentarian (the link is a PDF), and it’s the Parliamentarian who delivered the declaration to the GPO.

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