WikiLeaks announced it will be revealing details on each detainee every day over the coming month. According to National Public Radio, the new information was made available to the The New York Times by another source, on the condition of anonymity; the two media outlets are reporting on the information in tandem.

In this latest secret documents release, WikiLeaks, headed by Julian Assange (who last week made TIME’s 2011 list of most influential people in the world), says it is “shining the light of truth on a notorious icon of the Bush administration’s ‘War on Terror.’”

All told, WikiLeaks released details on 758 out of 779 total cases of detainees at the Cuba prison — details obtained from thousands of pages worth of memoranda from the Joint Task Force at Guantánamo Bay to the U.S. Southern Command in Florida, from January 2002 to February 2009. Details include prisoners’ personal information, capture information, prisoners’ health assessments, given reasoning for detainment, detainees’ accounts, ‘enemy combatant’ status and photos of most of the 171 prisoners still held in the prison. In addition, the organization has released summaries of evidence and tribunal transcripts on the first 201 prisoners released between 2002 and 2004, which, according to WikiLeaks, have never before been made public.

Wikileaks says these documents reveal evidence that the U.S. detained innocent men by mistake and offered “substantial bounties” to allies for al-Qaeda or Taliban suspects.

From WikiLeaks:

Crucially, the files also contain detailed explanations of the supposed intelligence used to justify the prisoners’ detention. For many readers, these will be the most fascinating sections of the documents, as they seem to offer an extraordinary insight into the workings of US intelligence, but although many of the documents appear to promise proof of prisoners’ association with al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations, extreme caution is required.

The documents draw on the testimony of witnesses — in most cases, the prisoners’ fellow prisoners — whose words are unreliable, either because they were subjected to torture or other forms of coercion (sometimes not in Guantánamo, but in secret prisons run by the CIA), or because they provided false statements to secure better treatment in Guantánamo.

As details on detainees — and the evidence against them — makes its way to the public, The New York Times, The Guardian, and National Public Radio have provided varying insights on what this information tells us about the how the U.S. government has handled Gitmo.

From The New York Times:

What began as a jury-rigged experiment after the 2001 terrorist attacks now seems like an enduring American institution, and the leaked files show why, by laying bare the patchwork and contradictory evidence that in many cases would never have stood up in criminal court or a military tribunal.

[...]

The government’s basic allegations against many detainees have long been public, and have often been challenged by prisoners and their lawyers. But the dossiers, prepared under the Bush administration, provide a deeper look at the frightening, if flawed, intelligence that has persuaded the Obama administration, too, that the prison cannot readily be closed.

[...]

The dossiers also show the seat-of-the-pants intelligence gathering in war zones that led to the incarcerations of innocent men for years in cases of mistaken identity or simple misfortune.

[...]

[F]or all the limitations of the files, they still offer an extraordinary look inside a prison that has long been known for its secrecy and for a struggle between the military that runs it — using constant surveillance, forced removal from cells and other tools to exert control — and detainees who often fought back with the limited tools available to them: hunger strikes, threats of retribution and hoarded contraband ranging from a metal screw to leftover food.

From The Guardian:

The files depict a system often focused less on containing dangerous terrorists or enemy fighters, than on extracting intelligence. Among inmates who proved harmless were an 89-year-old Afghan villager, suffering from senile dementia, and a 14-year-old boy who had been an innocent kidnap victim.

[...]

The range of those still held captive includes detainees who have been admittedly tortured so badly they can never be successfully tried, informers who must be protected from reprisals, and a group of Chinese Muslims from the Uighur minority who have nowhere to go.

One of those officially admitted to have been so maltreated that it amounted to torture is prisoner No 63, Maad al-Qahtani. He was captured more than nine years ago, fleeing from the site of Osama bin Laden’s last stand in the mountain caves of Tora Bora in 2001. The report says Qahtani, allegedly one of the “Dirty 30″ who were bin Laden’s bodyguards, must not be released: “HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.” The report’s military authors admit his admissions were obtained by what they call “harsh interrogation techniques in the early stages of detention.” But otherwise, the files make little mention of the widely-condemned techniques that were employed to obtain “intelligence” and “confessions” from detainees such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation and prolonged exposure to cold and loud music.

The files also detail how many innocents or marginal figures swept up by the Guantánamo dragnet because US forces thought they might be of some intelligence value.

A few key findings outlined by National Public Radio:

• A former detainee, Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamuda Bin Qumu, who is believed to be training rebel forces in Libya, has closer ties to al-Qaida than previously understood publicly.
• Tariq Mahmud Ahmad al Sawah, who claimed to have designed the prototype for a shoe bomb that failed to ignite on a U.S. plane in 2001, was recommended for release from the prison.
• Shaker Aamer, also known as Sawad al-Madani, said he had no connection to al-Qaida. His military assessment says he was Osama bin Laden’s personal English translator.
• Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the suspected plotter of the USS Cole attack in Yemen, reported directly to Osama bin Laden.
• Guantanamo officials were aware that they had innocent men in captivity, yet it took months to return them to their home countries.
• One detainee from Yemen informed on so many of his fellow detainees that authorities decided the reliability of his information was “in question.”
• A Russian detainee was transferred to the control of Russian authorities, on the basis of assurances that he would be incarcerated back in Russia, only to be released from Russian custody a short time later. A Saudi detainee threatened to arrange the murder of “four or five” Americans in revenge for his imprisonment but offered not to follow through on the threat if he were paid $5 million to $15 million in compensation.

The Times and NPR have created a database featuring government documents, court records and media reports on the 779 detainees at Guantánamo.

In Crowley’s resignation statement, he does not apologize for his comments, instead taking “full responsibility” for them and exhorting the government to exercise power in a way that is “prudent and consistent with our laws and values.”

Crowley wasn’t the only public official last week to decry the ongoing treatment of Manning at the Marine Corps Brig in Quantico, Virginia. Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) announced back in February that he had requested an audience with Manning in Quantico. On Friday, he said in a radio interview that his request has not been officially denied, but that he has been bounced around the Department of Defense and two branches of the military for the last month without getting an answer. “The fact that he’s awaiting trial and they’re doing this to him raises serious questions about our criminal justice process.”

The news that Kucinich is being stonewalled in his attempts to visit Manning comes just days after a report that Rep. Allen West (R-Fla.), a freshman congressman affiliated with the Tea Party, will this week visit Guantánamo Bay with five other congressmen whose names have not been disclosed. The purpose of the visit is said to be an investigation of detainee treatment and a review of military trials at Guantánamo. West, a retired career Army officer, faced disciplinary action following a 2003 incident in which he used gunplay as an intimidation tactic during an interrogation in Iraq. He was ultimately ordered to pay a $5,000 fine but avoided court-martial.

Christi Parsons reports for the Chicago Tribune:

Writing to members of the Illinois delegation in Congress, Asst. Atty. Gen. Ronald Weich reaffirmed the administration’s “commitment to acquiring the facility this year,” and provided details about steps planned for the next few months.

The Justice Department’s Bureau of Prisons plans to hire and train employees while other administration officials “work with Congress to obtain authorization and funding for a portion of the Thomson facility,” Weich wrote in the letter, obtained by the Tribune Washington bureau.

No timetable for the purchase, though. Will Obama punt on this until after the midterm elections?

Brookings’ Benjamin Wittes, no fan of a civilian trial for KSM, tells Gerstein that the Obama team’s punting is “disgraceful and they should be embarrassed by it.” For an administration attempting to place adherence to the rule of law at the centerpiece of a global order, it’s especially problematic.

But it probably has one political-legislative impact. One thing you haven’t read about over the past couple of months is an effort by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) to create a new legislative architecture for reviewable indefinite detention of terrorism suspects. Graham wants that more than he wants the KSM trial held in a military commission or the closure of Guantanamo Bay, which he has held out as the chit for the administration if it tries KSM in a military venue. And Attorney General Eric Holder signaled his assent to Graham’s proposal in testimony earlier this spring. But the inertia of the White House most likely drains the impetus for any such new system during the current legislative year.

Eliminates availability of funding for the construction of a military detention facility in Thomson, Illinois.

Restricts the transfer of detainees at Guantanamo Bay detention facility to certain countries where Al Qaeda has an active presence.

The full text of the bill isn’t yet available. Robert Gibbs, the White House spokesman, last week floated that the money to buy Thomson — key to the administration’s plan to close Guantanamo Bay — could come from the Justice Department’s budget, which is still before the congressional judiciary committees.

[S]ection 1037 of the Act [page 403 of the PDF], titled “Inspector General Investigation of the Conduct and Practices of Lawyers Representing Individuals Detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,” instructs the Department of Defense IG to “conduct an investigation of the conduct and practices of lawyers” who represent clients at Guantánamo and report back to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees within 90 days.

“Reasonable” basis for an investigation of these lawyers includes such vagueries as believing an attorney “interfered with the operations of the Department of Defense at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” As Vladeck points out, this can mean any attorney, since the overlapping DOD commands at Guantanamo Bay (the Office of Military Commissions; the Naval Base; Joint Task Force-Guantanamo; the Office of the Secretary of Defense) ensure that any lawyer will inevitably “interfere” with some operation on the base. Consider the chilling effect that will have on detainees’ access to counsel in the commissions.

For instance. Right this moment, the chief commissioning authority for the military commissions at Guantanamo, Vice Adm. Bruce MacDonald, is in talks with detainee Omar Khadr’s attorneys to see if the Khadr’s case can be resolved through a plea deal. The government’s interest in seeking a plea? First, a judge might throw out a lot of the basis for its case against Khadr as improperly coerced; and more broadly, a detainee who was 15 years old when first captured by U.S. forces might not make the best poster boy for the justice dispensed by the military commissions.

So how cooperative might Khadr attorneys Barry Coburn and Kobie Flowers be in those plea talks if a different military command is investigating their activities at Guantanamo Bay? More broadly, how might an appeals court consider the overall fairness of a system that allows for detainees’ access to counsel — but places the specter of military investigation over counsel’s heads?

We’ll see whether this survives the Senate committee mark-up or the floor vote in the House.

Last week, however, the committee only released a summary of its language. Now the full text is available, ahead of this week’s House floor vote on the bill. Here’s what the Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Authorization actually says about Obama’s Guantanamo plan:

SEC. 1034. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FUNDS TO MODIFY OR CONSTRUCT FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES TO HOUSE DETAINEES TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
(a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to construct or modify any facility in the United States, its territories, or possessions to house any individual described in subsection (c) for the purposes of detention or imprisonment in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense.

But the committee doesn’t close a door without opening a window, so the mark-up text requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report by next April ahead of any such Thomson-based or Thomson-like transfer of Guantanamo detainees, spelling out in more detail what the administration’s planning is on the controversial subject.

(d) REPORT ON USE OF FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES TO HOUSE DETAINEES TRANSFERRED FROM
GUANTANAMO.—
(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than April 1, 2011, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the con- gressional defense committees a report, in classified or unclassified form, on the merits, costs, and risks of using any proposed facility in the United States, its territories, or possessions to house any individual described in subsection (c) for the purposes of detention or imprisonment in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense.

(2) ELEMENTS OF THE REPORT.—The report required in paragraph (1) shall include each of the following:
(A) A discussion of the merits associated with any such proposed facility that would justify—
(i) using the facility instead of the facility at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and
(ii) the proposed facility’s contribution to effecting a comprehensive policy for continuing military detention operations. (B) The rationale for selecting the specific
site for any such proposed facility, including details for the processes and criteria used for identifying the merits described in subparagraph (A) and for selecting the proposed site over reasonable alternative sites.
(C) A discussion of any potential risks to any community in the vicinity of any such proposed facility, the measures that could be taken to mitigate such risks, and the likely cost to the Department of Defense of implementing such measures.

(D) A discussion of any necessary modifications to any such proposed facility to ensure that any detainee transferred from Guantanamo Bay to such facility could not come into contact with any other individual, including any other person detained at such facility, that is not approved for such contact by the Department of Defense, and an assessment of the likely costs of such modifications.
(E) A discussion of any support at the site of any such proposed facility that would likely be provided by the Department of Defense, including the types of support, the number of personnel required for each such type, and an estimate of the cost of such support.
(F) A discussion of any support, other than support provided at a proposed facility, that would likely be provided by the Department of Defense for the operation of any such proposed facility, including the types of possible support, the number of personnel required for each such type, and an estimate of the cost of such support.
(G) A discussion of the legal issues, in the judgment of the Secretary of Defense, that could be raised as a result of detaining or imprisoning any individual described in subsection (c) at any such proposed facility that could not be raised while such individual is detained or imprisoned at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

On Friday, however, White House Press Secretary Robert Gates floated the prospect that the House committee’s setback could prompt the Justice Department to use its budgeted money to fund the Guantanamo transfer, thereby keeping the prospect of closing Guantanamo this year alive.

* We recognize Congress’ responsibilities and the Committee’s important oversight interests.

* We will continue to provide humane and transparent treatment of detainees at GTMO until the GTMO facility is closed.

A bit of backstory: The move here to block the Thomson funding was “in the chairman’s mark,” according to committee spokeswoman Jennifer Kohl, referring to Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.). But the provisions on allowing Congress to review administration plans to send Guantanamo detainees to the U.S. for further detention and for repatriation in third countries came after the committee rejected an amendment by Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.) to ban all detainee transfers to U.S. soil for whatever reason.

“The Committee did not believe that a full prohibition was a good idea,” Kohl said in an email, “as it could impede the ability to effectively prosecute terrorist suspects and removed flexibility in unforeseen circumstances where a transfer would be necessary for national security reasons.”

Tomorrow, the House Armed Services Committee marks up H.R. 5136, its final committee step in the House before heading to the House floor. And within Title XIV of the bill is something called the “Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund.” The version reported on April 26 — the final markup version is now in congressmen’s hands — authorizes $1,551,781,000 for that fund. But if it sounds like you don’t know what that “transfer” fund means, it’s because the opacity is to protect the fund from legislators.

Robert Hale, the Pentagon comptroller, explained in a press conference when the budget was released this winter that part of that money is for closing the detention facility at Guantanamo. “In fiscal year ’11, there is a transfer fund that could be used for all aspects of detainee operations, $350 million,” Hale told reporters. “It would permit us to transfer funds to places where we need to close or transition Guantanamo. It would permit us to transfer funds to accounts that would let us open the Thomson, Illinois site.”

If that fund makes it through the markup, then it’s just passed a major hurdle. The House will approve the entire defense budget, probably as early as next week, and it’s highly unlikely to hold up a huge bill that contains next year’s Afghanistan and Iraq war money for the controversy of closing Guantanamo. (The Senate Armed Services Committee’s markup comes at the end of the month.) If the fund money gets stripped out of the bill during markup, however, then it gets much harder to shut the detention facility down. Given the likelihood of increased Republican ranks in Congress after November, it may become effectively impossible.

That’s been a concern of Holt’s for a while. He’s argued that not only will videotaping interrogations function as a measure to prevent detainee abuse, but it’ll create a useful lessons-learned library for training interrogators or honing their skills. Last October, he got a measure requiring the videotaping into the conference report for the defense appropriations bill.

“The Pentagon’s long awaited regulation of the provision I secured in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act continues the process of putting our detainee policies back on sound legal footing while improving our ability to get actionable intelligence,” Holt said in response to a request for comment from TWI (and subsequently emailed out in a press release). “As President Obama and local law enforcement officials across the country already know, we get better intelligence and protect both the interrogator and the person being interrogated by requiring recordings.”