Max Boot writes in his blurb for the book that it’s “not the work of some wild-eyed zealot,” but the book is clearly another of Yoo’s attempts to defend his more extreme legal theories, including those that have been roundly criticized by prominent Republicans who served in the Bush administration. Many of those theories — such as the executive’s right to authorize torture and to detain terror suspects indefinitely — are responsible for some of the worst conundrums that President Obama finds himself in today.

Whether cast as Hamiltonian or Machiavellian, Yoo’s point is that “great” presidents have always interpreted their powers broadly in times of crisis, and pesky critics at the time always denounced them for breaking the law. To illustrate this, Yoo rolls out the usual examples — Abraham Lincoln suspending habeas corpus during the Civil War, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt interning the Japanese during World War II.

Although careful not to call George W. Bush a “great” or even “above-average” president, Yoo argues that Bush’s decisions to suspend habeas corpus, use “coercive interrogation methods” (Yoo never uses the word torture) and indefinitely detain without charge “al Qaeda terrorists” (actually, terror suspects) were all simply par for the course — the actions any decent president would take under the circumstances. In Yoo’s view, this is not presidential lawbreaking, even if the president’s actions do violate existing laws. Rather, Yoo argues, the Constitution accommodates such lawbreaking — what Yoo calls “the need to respond to extraordinary events through the President’s executive power” — which apparently is limitless.

This is how, at the Office of Legal Counsel, Yoo managed to advise the president that he could ignore the legal bans on torture and even the Bill of Rights on U.S. soil. It’s too soon to know if that was wrong, Yoo says, since we’re still confronting the terrorist threat. “Only when we have the benefit of distance will we know whether Bush’s aggressive use of executive authority was too much, too little, or just right,” he writes, so complaints about torture and warrantless wiretapping are little more than Monday-morning quarterbacking.

It’s worth remembering that Yoo, now a law professor at University of California – Berkeley, is the subject of a still-unreleased ethics investigation as well as a pending lawsuit, both of which address charges that he not only misconstrued the law but was actively involved in breaking it. His aggressive defense of limitless executive authority sounds even shadier when read in that light.

But Yoo is at his most disingenuous when he criticizes President Obama. In his afterword, Yoo writes that under Obama’s executive orders, the CIA now must conduct interrogations according to the rules of the Army Field Manual — which “amounts to requiring — on penalty of prosecution — that CIA interrogators be polite.”

In fact, the Army Field Manual allows for prolonged isolation, sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation, and inducing fear and humiliation of prisoners, as the Center for Constitutional Rights and others have noted. These can be used in combination, and can cause, as former Bush appointees and a congressional investigation have found, long-lasting psychological and physical harm.

Nonetheless, doing away with “the Bush system” means “we will get little timely information from captured al Qaeda terrorists,” Yoo asserts, especially if Obama allows them trials in federal court.

Yoo’s book was released too soon for his own good. Within just the last two weeks we’ve learned that an al-Qaeda terror suspect who tries to blow up a plane can be captured, arrested, charged in federal court and promptly provide information about others planning similar attacks on U.S. targets.

If Yoo’s views weren’t already thoroughly discredited, that last section of his book does the job — which just goes to show that Professor Yoo really should have stayed in academia. Yoo may have good stories to tell about the theories of executive power at work under Madison, Truman and Roosevelt, but when he applies theory to practice he fails miserably. Unfortunately, that’s not just a problem for his publisher. The entire nation is suffering for it now.

Detainees at Guantanamo Bay (The Toronto Star/ZUMApress.com)

The Supreme Court dealt a harsh blow on Monday to victims of abuse by U.S. officials during the “war on terror.” The court announced it would not review a federal appeals court ruling that dismissed a lawsuit by four British citizens who claim they were wrongly arrested, detained and mistreated by American officials at the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., had ruled in April that government officials were entitled to “qualified immunity” from suit because it wasn’t clear at the time that abusing Guantanamo prisoners at was illegal.

[Law1] That appeals court decision in Rasul v. Rumsfeld effectively doomed many more cases that might have been brought by the more than 500 detainees who’ve been released from the Guantanamo prison, many of whom were subjected to so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Those techniques include a broad range of abusive tactics, from weeks of sleep and food deprivation to stress positions, sexual humiliation, death threats and “waterboarding,” or simulated drowning. The four men who sued former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other senior military officers for approving those techniques claim that between 2001 and 2004, when they were released, they were subjected to repeated beatings, prolonged sleep deprivation, extremes of hot and cold, forced nakedness, death threats, interrogations at gun point, menacing with unmuzzled dogs, and religious and racial harassment. The use of such techniques has been documented in Congressional reports, and Justice Department memos reveal that such tactics were explicitly approved by Bush administration lawyers.

The court’s decision not to review the Rasul case does not mean it agrees with the lower court’s decision. But it leaves the court of appeals’ ruling in effect and places a stumbling block in the path of Guantanamo detainees who claim they have been abused in U.S. custody and seek redress in court.

“When the court decides not to hear a case, it doesn’t say anything about the merits,” said Stephen Vladeck, professor at American University’s Washington College of Law and expert on national security and constitutional law. “But it leaves intact a fairly sweeping opinion by the D.C. Circuit — one that I think will be hard to overcome for any future plaintiffs suing based on abuse that allegedly occurred at Guantanamo.”

Shayana Kadidal, a senior attorney at the Center for Constitutional Rights and one of the lawyers who brought the Rasul case, agreed. “This decision is certainly bad news for the majority of people who could conceivably want to sue for damages at some point,” he said. In addition to monetary compensation, he said, many former Guantanamo detainees are seeking rulings to clears their names, because when they return to their home countries they’re often still suspected of terrorism and unable to secure employment.

At issue is an aspect of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion that found that government officials cannot be held legally responsible for any mistreatment because when the plaintiffs sued in 2004, “it wasn’t clearly established in the law that they were entitled not to be tortured or subjected to religious abuse,” said Kadidal. Since then, several Supreme Court cases have ruled that Guantanamo detainees have at least some constitutional rights. Which ones, however, remain unclear.

The D.C. Circuit’s ruling “reads out the good faith requirement in qualified immunity,” said Eric Lewis, a Washington, D.C., attorney who brought the Rasul case with CCR. “The whole notion of qualified immunity is that officials acting in good faith should have some protections.” But the law has long been clear that torture is not legal, said Lewis, citing the Convention Against Torture, among other laws. The Rasul decision, and the Supreme Court’s refusal to review it, he said, “makes it hard to know, what’s the law for next time?”

In fact, the D.C. Circuit’s latest Rasul opinion (the appeals court has ruled twice in this case) suggests in non-binding language that Guantanamo detainees have no constitutional rights other than the right of habeas corpus (the right to challenge the lawfulness of government detention), which the Supreme Court had already ruled applied to Guantanamo detainees. That finding cleared the way for the Obama administration, like the Bush administration before it, to argue that there is no constitutional right not to be tortured or otherwise abused in a U.S. prison abroad.

The high court today refused to weigh in on that issue. “I was hoping that the Supreme Court wouldn’t allow the last word on torture at Guantanamo to be that [detainees] have no rights and if they do, nobody knew at the time,” said Lewis. “That’s very disappointing.”

The D.C. Circuit opinion is not binding on courts in other parts of the country, however, which still could rule differently on some of these issues. A federal court in San Francisco, for example, ruled in June that Jose Padilla, an American citizen imprisoned as an “enemy combatant” without charge at a U.S. Naval brig in South Carolina, can sue former Justice Department lawyer John Yoo , whose legal opinions during the Bush administration approved the harsh and abusive treatment Padilla received. The court in that case denied Yoo’s claim to qualified immunity. That case is now on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.

Qualified immunity is hardly the only obstacle to holding government officials liable for torture and other abuse, however. Other cases, brought on behalf of former prisoners who were deemed “enemy combatants,” are barred by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, in which Congress stripped the courts of jurisdiction over any lawsuits complaining about the treatment of enemy combatants. (At least one case, Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, is now challenging the constitutionality of that law.)

Then there’s the lawsuit brought by Canadian citizen Maher Arar, arrested while changing planes in New York and sent to Syria by U.S. officials, where he claims he was interrogated under torture. That case was recently dismissed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York on the grounds that “special factors” — such as potential implications for national security and foreign relations — counseled against allowing the case to proceed. (Arar could still seek review in the Supreme Court.)

Other cases have been dismissed on similar grounds. “The more structural, fundamental problem is where the cause of action comes from,” said Vladeck , referring to the basis for a victim’s right to sue. Although in some cases federal courts will imply a right to sue government officials for a constitutional violation, “the Supreme Court over the last 20 years has been incredibly hostile to damages suits against federal officers,” said Vladeck.

In its latest move, the Supreme Court’s refusal to consider whether government officials can reasonably claim they didn’t know it was unlawful to torture prisoners in U.S. custody reinforces the viability of that argument for the future.

The court’s inaction also effectively ends the four British plaintiffs’ quest for a remedy — and likely stymies similar actions from many more former Guantanamo prisoners who hoped for official acknowledgment or compensation for what they endured. “Nothing legally would stop the executive branch or Congress from conceding that mistakes were made and these guys are entitled to some kind of reparations,” said Vladeck. “But I cannot imagine that’s going to be very politically feasible.”

While conceding that “Torture is illegal under federal law, and the United States government repudiates it”, even now the Solicitor General stops short of acknowledging that torture directed, approved and implemented by officials of the United States is so repugnant that it also violates fundamental rights; no less so when hidden from public view at Guantánamo Bay. Respondents appear willing to let the final word on torture and religious abuse at Guantánamo be that government officials can torture and abuse with impunity and will be immune from liability for doing so. Yet whether United States officials are free to engage in despicable acts in a place wholly controlled by the United States is the pre-eminent constitutional issue of our time, and it is squarely presented to this Court for decision in this case.

Rasul v. Rumsfeld, as I’ve explained before, is one of the first lawsuits brought by victims of the Bush administration’s torture and abuse policies. The plaintiffs claim they were in Afghanistan to do humanitarian relief work when they were captured by the Northern Alliance and turned over (or sold for bounty) to U.S. authorities. They were eventually shipped to Guantanamo Bay, where they were imprisoned in cages and, they claim, tortured and humiliated, forced to shave their beards and watch their Korans desecrated. All of these claims are backed up by the legal memos that have since been produced from the Department of Justice that authorized such techniques as part of “enhanced” interrogations. The men were returned home to the UK without charge in 2004.

Many other victims of the Bush administration’s abuse policies have been precluded from suing because in 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction over claims challenging the “detention, transfer, treatment, or conditions of confinement” of detainees who were considered “enemy combatants” by the U.S. military and detained abroad. (That provision of the law is being challenged in another lawsuit filed recently, which I describe here.) The plaintiffs in the Rasul case, however, were never even deemed “enemy combatants” by the U.S. military.

Still, the Obama administration is arguing, as it is in other cases, that it was not clear that foreigners picked up in Afghanistan and sent to Guantanamo Bay had a right not to be tortured by the U.S. government. But more than that, it’s arguing — as the lawyers in the Rasul case emphasize in the excerpt from their brief I quoted above — that there is no right under the Constitution not to be tortured at Guantanamo Bay, or at any offshore American-run prison.

As the Department of Justice recently wrote in another torture case: The “Fifth and Eighth Amendments do not extend to Guantánamo Bay detainees.”

In other words, it’s not just that former detainees can’t sue Bush administration officials for torture because the law wasn’t clear back in 2002 or 2003, but the Obama administration is arguing also that there is no fundamental right not to be tortured, and therefore any government official in the future could similarly claim to be immune from a lawsuit for torture.

Eric Lewis and the Center for Constitutional Rights, who represent the four British men in the Rasul case, are now pleading with the U.S. Supreme Court to say it isn’t so, and accept their appeal from a D.C. Circuit Court ruling that dismissed the case.

The government seeks “to leave the law unsettled and to pull a cloak of immunity, now and in the future, over government torturers,” they write in their brief.

It is essential that this Court lay down a strong and clear message that officially ordered torture is abhorrent and always a violation of fundamental rights. Without this Court’s guidance, the court of appeals’ studied indifference to the torture of Guantanamo detainees remains the final word on the issue and, indeed, could provide further cover for a claim of qualified immunity in the future in the unfortunate event that the specter of torture recurs.

So it’s significant that today they’ve released a report calling on the United States to follow its legal obligation to prosecute the leaders in the U.S. government responsible for the “torture, cruel and inhuman treatment” of detainees during its own “war on terror.”

“Investigations and prosecutions should focus on the engineers of official policies that were the basis of illegal abuses, to send a clear signal that the absolute prohibition of torture and the ban on cruel and inhuman treatment will be respected by the United States,” the report said, adding that if the U.S. government fails to initiate prosecutions, then other countries will take up the cause. Italy, for example, recently convicted 23 Americans for their involvement in “extraordinary renditions.”

“Failing to hold accountable the architects and overseers of a policy of abuse undermines the U.S. justice system and the fundamental idea that law provides a check on power,” Alex Boraine, acting president of ICTJ, said in a statement today. “As we have seen in countless examples around the world, abuse of power by allowing torture and cruel treatment can tear down what the law and democracy have built.”

While there’s support among many Democrats for some sort of accountability, whether through criminal prosecutions or an independent truth commission, Republicans vehemently resist any suggestion that the Bush administration even did anything wrong.

Since Attorney General Eric Holder announced on Friday that the Justice Department would try the alleged 9/11 co-conspirators in a U.S. federal court in New York, some Republicans have denounced the move as an illegitimate attempt to put the Bush administration, rather than the terrorists, on trial.

“The government is going to try to put Khalid Sheik Mohammed on trial. Defense lawyers will try and put the government on trial,” former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani told Fox News.

Tom Ridge, head of the Department of Homeland Security during the Bush administration, added that any effort to use the 9/11 trial to “delve into a fishing expedition” to go after Bush officials is “wrong and unconscionable.”

Meanwhile, in The Wall Street Journal today, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo — a potential target of any future criminal prosecution of Bush officials — attacked the decision to try the 9/11 detainees in federal court as a dangerous mistake. “The treatment of the 9/11 attacks as a criminal matter rather than as an act of war will cripple American efforts to fight terrorism,” Yoo wrote. “It is in effect a declaration that this nation is no longer at war.”

[buttons] One memo, drafted in November 2002 by personnel from the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit — the unit best trained to understand human behavior and how to interpret and manipulate criminal suspects — was among the documents released by the government on Friday as part of the ongoing Freedom of Information Act litigation brought by the American Civil Liberties Union. The memo was sent to the Commanding General and Jt. Task Force 170 — the unit of the Southern Command in charge of detaining and interrogating detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

The BAU, explained elsewhere in documents released on Friday, is “comprised of Supervisory Special Agents with an average of 18 years of experience in criminal and counterintelligence investigations.”

The memo lays out clearly and simply what the interrogation experts at the FBI knew about interrogations of terror suspects, what would or would not work on them, and what sort of conduct was illegal. And it reads much like the sorts of arguments we’re now hearing from the America Civil Liberties Union and other civil and human rights organizations arguing that senior defense department officials and lawyers who approved abusive techniques ought to be criminally investigated.

“Central to the gathering of reliable, admissible evidence is the manner in which it is obtained,” the authors write to the General. “Interrogation techniques used by the DHS [Defense Human Intelligence Services, part of DoD] are designed specifically for short term use in combat environments where the immediate retrieval of tactical intelligence is critical. Many of DHS’s methods are considered coercive by Federal Law Enforcement and [Uniform Code of Military Justice] standards. Not only this, but reports from those knowledgeable about the use of these coercive techniques are highly skeptical as to their effectiveness and reliability.”

Most of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay had already been interviewed repeatedly overseas by the DHS, so the FBI recommended a different approach be taken at Guantanamo.

The FBI favors the use of less coercive techniques — ones carefully designed for long-term use in which rapport-building skills are carefully combined with a purposeful and incremental manipulation of a detainee’s environment and perceptions.

The BAU staff explain:

FBI/CITF agents are well trained, highly experienced and very successful in overcoming suspect resistance in order to obtain valuable information in complex criminal cases, including the investigations of terrorist bombings in East Africa and the USS Cole, etc. FBI/CRT interview strategies are most effective when tailored specifically to suit a suspect’s  or detainee’s needs or vulnerabilities. Contrary to popular belief, these vulnerabilities are more likely to reveal themselves through the employment of individually designed and sustained interview strategies rather than through the haphazard use of prescriptive, time-driven approaches. The FBI/CITF strongly believes that the continued use of diametrically opposed interrogation strategies in GTMO will  only weaken our efforts to obtain valuable information.

The memo goes on to list the interrogation techniques being used, and then to list which ones are “not permitted by the U.S. Constitution.” Those include: the use of stress positions for more than four hours; hooding; 20-hour interrogation segments; stripping a detainee of all clothing; and exploiting individual phobias, such as fear of dogs, to induce stress. They also include the use of scenarios designed to convince a detainee that death or severe pain is imminent for him or his family; waterboarding (here called “use of wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of drowning”); and exposure to cold weather or water.

All of those techniques, we now know, continued to be used by the Defense Department.

The FBI also warned that the use of such techniques would make any evidence derived inadmissible in federal court and if admissible in a military commission, likely to be given “little or no weight.”

The FBI drafters of the memo further explained that most of those techniques, particularly the last four, would also violate the U.S. anti-torture statute. It recommended that they not be used.

We know that the Pentagon and CIA went ahead and used them anyway. Instead of relying on their top experts in the FBI, they relied on a plan developed by a couple of private psychologists with no experience whatsoever in interrogating terror suspects and who cribbed much of their plan from a study of Chinese Communist techniques used to obtain false confessions from American prisoners during the Korean war. Senior U.S. officials then sought legal opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel that would tell them that these techniques, contrary to the FBI’s opinions, were not illegal. Conveniently, those opinions did cast the techniques described in a completely different light.

The most recently released memos have not gotten much attention, as torture fatigue sets in and the Bush torture program becomes old news. But the FBI memo is important because it adds to the growing body of evidence that senior defense department and CIA officials deliberately ignored the opinions of the best trained and most experienced people in the government about interrogations that abusive interrogations would not work and were not legal. Add that to the rest of the evidence that senior Bush administration officials did not act in good faith in relying on the Office of Legal Counsel memos that justified the techniques the Defense Department and CIA were using, and this latest declassified memo adds weight to the argument that something fishy was going on at the highest ranks of government that demands further investigation.

This latest memo also sheds light on why some in the Defense Department and some Republicans are now so eager to try Guantanamo detainees in military commissions rather than in Article III federal courts. They know that the evidence extracted from the prisoners under the “enhanced” methods Cheney is still defending doesn’t stand a chance in front of an independent U.S. federal court judge.

These latest documents provide a glimpse of the early struggles between the FBI and the Pentagon over just how to conduct the “war on terror” and how to interrogate and treat that war’s detainees. Sadly, they reveal that the FBI knew perfectly well — and repeatedly warned Defense Department officials, as well as Justice Department lawyers — that the abusive interrogation techniques being used on detainees at Guantanamo Bay were likely to be ineffective and make subsequent prosecutions impossible.

As one memo says, while the interrogation techniques based on tactics used in the U.S. Army Search, Escape, Resistance and Evasion (SERE) training “may be effective in eliciting tactical intelligence in a battlefield context, the reliability of information obtained using such tactics is highly questionable, not to mention potentially legally inadmissible in court.”

That memo was written in May 2003.  The “enhanced” interrogation techniques, such as stress positions and prolonged sleep deprivation, were still being used and justified in memos as late as July 2007. The memo raises several important questions. Did the Office of Legal Counsel lawyers drafting those later memos for the CIA not know about the FBI’s earlier objections? Or did they just dismiss them out of hand? Were they told to ignore those earlier conclusions?

Then there’s the fact that senior officials from the Criminal Investigative Task Force, including the chief psychologist with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service “repeatedly argued for implementation of a rapport-based approach” and “lamented the fact that many DHS [Defense Human Intelligence Services] interrogators seem to believe that the only way to elicit information from uncooperative detainees is to use aggressive techniques on them.”

“Despite objections raised by the [Behavioral Analysis Unit of the FBI], the DHS initiated an aggressive interrogation plan for #63,” who elsewhere in the document is identified as Mohammed al-Qatani. “This plan incorporated a confusing array of physical and psychological stressors which were designed, presumably, to elicit #63′s cooperation. Needless to say, this plan was eventually abandoned when the DHS realized it was not working and when #63 had to be hospitalized briefly.”

Officials from the Criminal Investigative Task Force and the Behavioral Analysis Unit drafted a letter “reiterating the strengths of the FBI/CITF approach” and providing “a detailed historical record of the development of interagency policies regarding aggressive interrogation techniques in GTMO.” The letter also argued that they were a bad idea.

Not only did the officials not succeed in convincing DHS to abandon the techniques, but the document described how the military and DHS inaccurately portrayed to the Pentagon that the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit approved of and helped design the very techniques that the BAU warned would backfire.

Although we knew before that the FBI had disagreed with the so-called “enhanced” interrogation techniques and refused to participate in them, this latest release of previously classified information reveals the extent to which FBI officials made both the legal and practical case to senior Pentagon and Justice Department officials for why the usual rules on interrogations should be followed.

That they were so blatantly ignored suggests more than just bad judgment. It suggests a deliberate indifference to the facts and the law, which cries out for a more thorough investigation.

09 Memos

While that sounds good, remember that the Detainee Treatment Act was interpreted by the Bush administration’s Justice Department to allow such “enhanced interrogation techniques” as sleep deprivation, food deprivation, shackling, forced standing in stress positions, and a variety of “corrective techniques” that include physical slaps and grabs – either alone or in combination. The new “protections” in the MCA amendments are therefore not all that reassuring.

The amendments also continue to allow judges to admit hearsay evidence, even though the source of the evidence is unavailable for cross-examination by defense counsel. Classified evidence can also still be used against a defendant, although he does not have the right to see it. Protections were added, however, so that the procedures used to protect classified evidence essentially mirror those used in a civilian federal court.

This post has been updated.

“At Guantanamo, the U.S. government turned a jukebox into an instrument of torture,” said Thomas Blanton, the Archive’s executive director, in a statement released today. “The musicians and the public have the right to know how an expression of popular culture was transformed into an enhanced interrogation technique.”

The Washington Post notes today in a story setting out Cheney’s arguments that an Aug. 31, 2006 memo from Steven Bradbury, then-acting assistant attorney general in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, said his legal conclusions relied in part on assurances from CIA general counsel John Rizzo that “interrogations conducted pursuant to the program have led to specific, actionable intelligence about terrorist threats to the United States and its interests.”

Rizzo may well have said that, but even if it were true, that doesn’t make the techniques used legal. And it certainly doesn’t bolster Cheney’s argument now that an investigation is not warranted.

A look at those legal memos of 2006 and 2007 released on Monday reveal that the government’s lawyers went out of their way to twist and turn and manipulate the applicable law to approve the techniques that they were already using, notwithstanding the fact that by 2006, the law had changed. Congress had specifically outlawed abusive interrogations, and the Supreme Court had ruled, contrary to the Bush administration’s claims, that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to “war on terror” detainees.

So much for former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’s idea that the Geneva Conventions were a “quaint” relic of the past.

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the court ruled that the basic protections apply to all prisoners, even in an unconventional international conflict such as the one against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And Congress, which by that time had grown concerned about reports of abuse and deaths of detainees in U.S. custody, in 2005 passed The Detainee Treatment Act, or DTA, prohibiting the “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” of detainees and providing for “uniform standards” for interrogation.

Oddly, however, the arguments of the Justice Department’s lawyers justifying the techniques in existence remained essentially the same.

Take the July 20, 2007 OLC opinion on interrogation techniques, released for the first time on Monday. The memo defines techniques like prolonged sleep deprivation for up to 96 straight hours (or 180 hours in a 30-day period) while forced to stand, shackled, in diapers (and eventually in one’s own feces); which can be used in combination with restriction to a 1,000-calorie-a-day diet (half the normal minimum) and “corrective techniques” such as the “facial hold,” “facial slap,” and “abdominal slap”; as not violating Congress’s ban on “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” and not violating Common Article 3′s requirement that prisoners be treated “humanely.”

How does it do that? Largely by saying that to violate the laws, the techniques must cause “serious” mental or physical harm, and the lawyers just didn’t think that the sort of mental or physical pain involved here was “serious” enough. That’s because, just as the lawyers defined “waterboarding” in the past to not cause serious harm because the harm was not prolonged for years — or at least it wasn’t when used on soldiers undergoing SERE training — this sort of prolonged-standing, half-starved sleep deprivation in diapers wasn’t going to cause “prolonged” or “severe” harm either. I don’t know how you prove that, but the lawyers seem to have just decided it.

“It’s an attempt to analyze the interrogation techniques under a different sets of norms,” American Civil Liberties Union national security project lawyer Alex Abdo explained to me yesterday. “But it’s surprising how little the analysis in this memo changed from the past memos, notwithstanding the passage of the DTA and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan.”

“At the end of the day, it seems fairly commonsensical that you can’t beat up someone for information, and yet this memo contemplates that,” Abdo says. “It’s dodging bullets fired at the CIA by Congress and the Supreme Court.”

Cheney thinks this and other memos dodged those bullets effectively, and the investigation should end there. But for those who find it cavalier the way the Justice Department decided that obviously painful, physically destructive and likely terrifying interrogation techniques were not “serious” enough to fall under the prohibitions against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, then who ordered those techniques to be used, how they were used and why they were approved might merit further inquiry.

But the point made by the CIA’s chief of the Office of Medical Services, that the use of so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” on terror suspects under investigation and the use of those techniques on U.S. soldiers in SERE training is different is hardly a remarkable conclusion. In fact, critics have been making that point for months now. So is it really even possible that Bybee and Yoo didn’t consider the distinction? Did the lawyers really need a medical expert to tell them that repeated, persistent waterboarding, extreme sleep and food deprivation, stress positions and the range of other techniques that were used on terror suspects is different when used in the context of a real interrogation by hostile forces, than it is in military training by your own army?

Footnote 26 of the report makes the point that “the SERE waterboard experience is so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant,” and “there was no a priori reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the frequency and intensity with which it was used by the psychologist/interrogators was either efficacious or medically safe.”

Maybe it’s possible that the lawyers didn’t think of that themselves. And maybe it’s possible that, as I’ve noted before, they didn’t see how these techniques would “shock the conscience” — the Supreme Court’s standard for determining when government officials have violated the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of due process.

Maybe you’d even feel sorry for the poor OLC lawyers, who were just taking the information they were given and doing what they were told. Still, it would seem that any serious prosecutor probing whether CIA interrogators broke the law would have to also ask how and why the DOJ’s lawyers advised them based on a factual scenario that seems so patently implausible.