But the document does have a level of detail about something British Foreign Secretary David Miliband hinted at during a Senate panel this afternoon — a new Afghan initiative for outreach to non-al-Qaeda-aligned Taliban forces.

President Karzai intends to appoint a committee of Afghanistan’s National Security Council to develop an Afghan government reintegration program. It will reach out to communities, individuals and groups, coordinate protection, amnesty, and support (such as employment) to those who reintegrate and disarm, and support monitoring and de-radicalization mechanisms.

This committee, with support from our Embassy team, will provide the political lead for ISAF’s military efforts. A joint ISAF-Embassy cell will establish principles and mechanisms for military commanders and civilians in the field to follow for approaches to and by insurgents.

We expect the Afghan government’s reintegration program will be shaped by these principles:

The Afghan government will take a strong political lead on the process, with ISAF and
commanders in the field in a supporting role.

Groups as well as individuals will be identified for reintegration.

Adequate resources will be provided for the livelihood of former combatants and their families; the availability of funds for this purpose is essential.

Commanders contemplating reintegration will receive credible security guarantees so that they need not fear that while they negotiate with one entity (e.g. the Afghan government) they will be detained or killed by another (e.g. counter-terrorist operatives).

A cynic would wonder if this level of detail in a State Department document indicates this isn’t really Karzai’s idea.

Miliband is before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee right now, outlining a few expectations for what the conference will produce. Some of it is vague: “coherence and clarity of the plan for Afghanistan” among the 70-odd foreign ministers expected to attend is the “biggest deliverable of all,” Miliband said. But Miliband set a specific expectation by saying a new mechanisms for persuading Afghan insurgents to come in from the cold were crucial for success, adding that he referred to “structures I hope that President Karzai will announce next Thursday.”

It’ll be interesting to see what Karzai might outline. There is a longstanding political consensus on the need for integrating insurgents and reconciling with those fighters who have no ties to al-Qaeda. But the mechanisms in place to date have yielded only sporadic results.

Another thing to expect from the conference: a new civilian counterpart to Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

There absolutely is and I don’t think it is necessarily not possible with the Taliban. Most of the fighters we see in Afghanistan are Afghans, some with foreign cadre with them. But most we don’t see are deeply ideological or even politically motivated; most are operating for pay; some are under a commander’s charismatic leadership; some are frustrated with local leaders.

So I believe there is significant potential to go after what I would call mid- and low-level Taliban fighters and leaders and offer them re-integration into Afghanistan under the constitution.

Notice two things. First, that’s the position adopted by the Afghan government. Second, it doesn’t say a thing about negotiations or ceasefires with the Taliban. The Taliban see little reason to talk to the government since they perceive themselves to be winning. On Monday, a government-announced ceasefire in Baghdis broke down “within hours.” Josh Foust has more on the folly of additional negotiations. Tough as it can be to hear, the incentive structure for the Taliban right now doesn’t favor negotiations; it favors fighting. It’s up to McChrystal to change that dynamic.

The Afghan government needs effective grass-roots initiatives to offer an alternative to fight or flight for the foot soldiers of the insurgency. Essentially this means a clear route for former insurgents to return to their villages and go back to farming the land, or a role for some of them within the legitimate Afghan security forces. Military pressure has an important role to play, it is complementary, not an alternative – these people must see the danger of remaining insurgents, but also believe that they will be protected from their former allies if they lay down their arms.

For higher-level commanders and their networks, we need to work with the Afghan government to separate the hard-line ideologues, who are essentially irreconcilable and violent and who must be pursued relentlessly, from those who can be drawn into domestic political processes.

So where are these Afghan officials to direct and coordinate distinctions between insurgent elements? What are the formal structures in place for identifying and exploiting divisions, or for inducing them? I can see an argument in place for why this has to wait until after the August presidential election sorts itself out, but the war has been going on for almost eight years.

Second issue:

In the face of this enemy, our ultimate objective in 2001 holds true for 2009: to protect our citizens from terrorist attacks by preventing Al Qaida having a safe haven in the tribal belt –in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

That’s one of only a handful of times Miliband mentions al-Qaeda. He donates a lot of effort to the question of the Taliban-led insurgent coalition and in drawing his distinctions he makes it clear that a great deal of the insurgency has peripheral connections to the terrorist entity we’re in Afghanistan to confront and defeat. Without a focus on how each step of the strategy contributes to that goal, the Afghanistan war described by the foreign secretary has something of a we’re-here-because-we’re-here-because-we’re-here-because-we’re-here quality.

Fair question - Senator John Kerry also addressed this issue in a typically eloquent piece today. The fact is that those on the streets have not asked for us to be their spokesmen. We need to stand for our deeply held commitment that it is for the Iranian people to decide on their government, and we will continue to call for peaceful respect for media and protestors. The fact is that many Iranians have severe doubts about the outcome announced on Friday. They deserve to have their doubts addressed.

These are fine lines but we know the cost of crossing them. The memory of foreign intervention throughout their history is deep within all Iranians. A proud people wants to decide its own future. We should defend that.

That “memory of foreign intervention” is a reference to the 1953 coup overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, which the United States signed onto after the British dreamed it up. Good for Miliband to remind people of that.