Maher Arar is a Canadian citizen who was seized in 2002 while changing planes at John F. Kennedy airport in New York and sent to Syria, where he says he was interrogated under torture and kept in a tiny grave-like cell. He was released almost a year later without charge, and with an acknowledgment by the Syrian government that it had no evidence against him.

After conducting its own investigation, the Canadian government confirmed that Arar had done nothing wrong, apologized for its role in providing faulty information to U.S. authorities, and paid Arar about $10 million in compensation for his ordeal. The United States, on the other hand, has never officially acknowledged the error (although former National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice once conceded in a congressional hearing that the case had been “mishandled”) and still refuses to allow Arar to enter the country.

Represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights, Arar sued former Attorney General John Ashcroft in January 2004, FBI Director Robert Meuller and other U.S. officials for sending him to Syria where they knew he was likely to be tortured. Today, the full Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard the case en banc in a dramatic 2-hour oral argument last December, ruled that Arar has no right to compensation from U.S. officials.

Although the opinion is long and complex, the essence of the court’s decision is that the lawsuit cannot be allowed to go forward because it would “have the natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security of the nation.” As for his claims under the Torture Victims Protection Act, Arar can’t claim compensation from U.S. authorities since it was the Syrians who tortured him, even if U.S. officials knew that he was likely to be tortured when they sent him to Syria.

The case does not bode well for other victims of the Bush administration’s “extraordinary rendition” and other abusive interrogation policies, since virtually all of those cases could similarly implicate national security concerns. The other major extraordinary rendition case, brought by five British victims of the policy against a Boeing subsidiary that assisted the CIA, is pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Obama administration recently won a re-hearing in that case, which it seeks to dismiss on the grounds that the litigation itself would reveal “state secrets” and endanger national security.

The Second Circuit judges voted seven to four to dismiss Arar’s case today. In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Guido Calabresi wrote: “I believe that when the history of this distinguished court is written, today’s majority decision will be viewed with dismay.”

Here is the court’s opinion, filed today:

From the report itself, John Yoo’s Office of Legal Counsel memo — and the lightning-fast reporting of Spencer Ackerman, Marc Ambinder and others on Friday — we now know that President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, aware that ignoring the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might come back to bite them later, sought the drafting of a legal opinion that would approve the president’s secret surveillance program and shield them from later attack.

The fact that the White House sought the assistance of Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo in the OLC, though is itself evidence that the White House was trying to get around, rather than comply with, the law.

As I’ve noted before, legal memos justifying an unreasonable or inaccurate legal position don’t necessarily provide a “golden shield” for the executive.

Yoo, after all, was known when he was hired as the Berkeley law professor and staunch Federalist Society member who held theories on executive power that were far outside the legal mainstream. And the memos and academic analyses he then proceeded to write were so extreme and so mischaracterized law and history in an effort to reconcile conservative “originalist” principles with his own aggressive view of an all-powerful president as Commander-in-Chief that they’ve been characterized as an “outrageous theory of presidental dictatorship” by Yale University law professor Jack Balkin and as “simply hooey” by Marty Lederman at Georgetown (now in the Office of Legal Counsel in the Obama administration).

The inspectors general report details how Yoo and the administration ignored parts of the FISA law that conflicted with his theory, for example, and made the outrageous argument that a warrantless search doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable” searches and seizures because it can’t be “unreasonable” for the president to authorize it in wartime. Why it’s “reasonable” to prevent even secret judicial review of such searches is never explained.

For an academic to hold extreme views of executive power, of course, is arguably a matter of academic freedom, and even a form of creative theorizing that one might admire. (Although some of Yoo’s Berkeley colleagues, such as economist Brad DeLong, among others, have described his theories as reaching so far beyond the bounds of creative academic theorizing as to be simply dishonest and undeserving of that protection.)

But Yoo’s memos at OLC were not part of an academic exercise; they were making policy. Setting aside for a moment the potential culpability of Yoo himself, the more important point here is that, as the inspectors general report makes clear, the White House specifically sought him out and excluded his superiors, ignoring the usual chain of command in the Justice Department, apparently because they knew that John Yoo would give them the legal opinions that they wanted to hear.

That is not the purpose of the Office of Legal Counsel, as Dawn Johnsen, the Obama nominee to head that office has repeatedly made clear, along with more than a dozen other alumni of that office.

As Johnsen wrote in a law review article describing the ten “Guidelines” that should govern the Office of Legal Counsel: “OLC should provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will constrain the administration’s pursuit of desired policies … In short, OLC must be prepared to say no to the President.”

That the president and vice president apparently chose someone who they knew in advance would not say no to the president is more than an abuse of that legal office; it strongly suggests an intentional and unlawful abuse of executive power.

The latest news accounts that Attorney General Eric Holder is leaning toward appointing an independent prosecutor suggest he may finally be starting to reach the same conclusion.

Morning prayer for detainees in Camp 4 of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility (Zuma Press)

Ever since President Obama said in his speech at the National Archives that he believes there’s a category of people at Guantanamo who can’t be tried in criminal court or by military commission but are too dangerous to release, legal and national security experts have been vigorously debating just what kind of “preventive detention” scheme the president can or should embrace.

As TWI’s Spencer Ackerman wrote on Wednesday, many civil liberties groups adamantly oppose the idea of “preventive” or “indefinite” detention at all. Since Obama made his pronouncement in May, representatives from Human Rights Watch, the ACLU, Human Rights First, New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice, the Constitution Project and many others have argued strenuously against the idea.

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

So when the Washington Post and ProPublica reported on Friday that the Obama administration is considering issuing an executive order setting out a long-term preventive detention authority, and that some civil liberties groups had actually encouraged such an order, many of those groups were stunned.

“Our position is that there is no category of individual who can’t be prosecuted,” said Jonathan Hafetz, an attorney with the ACLU’s National Security Project. “To say the president can order indefinite detention by executive order, that’s just what Bush did for the last eight years.”

Even conservative scholars have been arguing against the idea since the Post reported that the administration was considering an executive order. As former Bush administration lawyer and Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith wrote with Brookings Institution scholar Benjamin Wittes in an op-ed in the Washington Post on Monday: “Obama, to put it bluntly, seems poised for a nearly wholesale adoption of the Bush administration’s unilateral approach to detention.”

Wittes and Goldsmith instead argue that any preventive, indefinite detention scheme should be debated, authorized and spelled out clearly by Congress. Otherwise, they say, it will face opposition and modification by the courts, which will ultimately undermine the president’s detention power, as happened during the Bush administration. “Over time, the judiciary grew impatient with ad hoc detention procedures that lacked clear and specific legislative authorization, and judges began imposing novel and increasingly demanding rules on the commander in chief’s traditionally broad powers to detain enemy soldiers during war,” they write. “Ironically, one of the biggest casualties of this misadventure was the executive authority the Bush administration held so dear. At least in detention policy, Bush left a weaker presidency than he inherited, one encumbered by unprecedented restrictions imposed by judges.” An act of Congress, then, would be a way of enhancing, rather than limiting, the executive power of indefinite detention.

And that’s where the debate now lies — between those that believe existing systems of detention under the laws of war and criminal prosecution are sufficient to handle current terrorist threats, and those who claim that the so-called “age of terrorism” demands a broader authority that Congress must create.

Although staunch civil libertarians oppose preventive detention altogether, many left-leaning lawyers would prefer an executive order issued by President Obama clarifying his authority to detain prisoners under the laws of war to an entirely new, broader system of preventive detention created by Congress, as Goldsmith and Wittes propose.

Perhaps most prominently, an influential group of military and criminal defense lawyers and academics on June 8 sent President Obama a letter urging him not to create a new system of long-term preventive detention, but to rely on the systems we already have — with modifications, if necessary.

“Our country can achieve its legitimate goals through existing laws which authorize the detention of those who should be detained in the fight against international terrorism,” says the letter, which has not been released publicly but was obtained by TWI. The letter is signed by eleven prominent lawyers, including Retired Rear Admirals Donald Guter and John Hutson of the Navy’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps; Abner Mikva, a former federal appellate court judge, University of Chicago law professor, White House counsel under President Bill Clinton and a mentor to President Obama; and Thomas Wilner, a corporate defense lawyer who’s represented Guantanamo detainees in some of the landmark cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.

“Longstanding law-of-war principles authorize the detention for the duration of armed hostilities of those who engage in armed conflict against the United States or its allies,” says the letter, adding: “Some modifications to the existing system may be warranted, but no new system is necessary.”

Although the letter doesn’t explicitly call for an executive order, that’s one obvious way such “modifications” could be made. Ken Gude at the Center for American Progress made a similar argument recently, supporting preventive detention of fighters captured in a combat zone during a military conflict, on the Center’s web site and in The Guardian. And in a memo written with Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, the authors write that the “ambiguities” left by the Bush administration over who is detainable under the laws of war “compound the lack of fundamental fairness in treating suspected criminals as combatants and holding them without trial.” Given how the detention authority has been used over the past eight years, “the new administration should now reassert the traditional understanding of the limits of the law of war and reject the former administration’s effort to read the word “organization” in the AUMF [Authorization for the Use of Military Force] as effecting an unprecedented extension of the traditional understanding of the military’s extraordinary powers of detention during war.”

In an e-mail on Wednesday, Gude said that although he didn’t specifically propose an executive order to the administration, he supports the idea and opposes new legislation. Martin has said the same thing.

Even Georgetown law professor David Cole, ordinarily a staunch civil libertarian, has argued that the administration has such detention authority, calling it “an appropriate and necessary means of dealing with enemy fighters during wartime.”

Of course, there’s plenty of disagreement about who is an “enemy fighter” and how to define the “war on terror.”

The Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld affirmed that the executive can detain enemy fighters during wartime, but that case pertained directly only to the detention of Taliban fighters while the United States was at war with the Afghan government. Since then, the Bush administration and now the Obama administration has argued for much broader authority than that. In habeas corpus cases for Guantanamo detainees, the Obama Justice Department has argued it has “the authority to detain persons that the President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001?; “persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks; “and “persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or [al-Qaeda] forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.” Different judges have interpreted that authority slightly differently, and some haven’t accepted that the president’s authority reaches those providing “substantial support” to terrorist groups, but they all agree that the President has the authority to detain indefinitely those fighting a war with the United States.

An executive order, some argue, would further clarify the Obama administration’s position — and, potentially, limit its authority going forward.

Their primary aim, however, seems to be to prevent legislation that codifies a new, broader system of preventive detention based on “dangerousness”, as Goldsmith, Wittes, and Deputy Solicitor General Neal Katyal (before he was in the Obama administration) have promoted.

Wittes, in particular, a Brookings Institution scholar, last week proposed, with his colleague Colleen Peppard, model legislation that would create an entirely new system of preventive detention that’s not limited to the president’s authority under the laws of war. In his op-ed co-authored with Wittes on Monday, Goldsmith, who briefly headed the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel under George W. Bush, appeared to endorse such a plan. (Goldsmith declined to be interviewed for this article.) Last Friday, NPR’s Ari Shapiro reported that the proposal is “already being discussed in the Obama administration.”

The idea is to create a system that allows the government to detain an individual who officials believe is dangerous and acting as an agent of an organization that is fighting the United States, yet against whom it does not have enough evidence, or the right kind of evidence, that would support a criminal prosecution. Instead of having to prove guilt “by a reasonable doubt,” which is the standard in criminal law, the government would need only prove “dangerousness” by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is the standard of proof in civil cases. Evidence provided by intelligence officers based on hearsay, for example, would be admissible, even though it would not be allowed in a criminal proceeding. Coerced evidence, however, would not be admissible.

“It’s a lot of probablilistic human intelligence stuff that people use every day, including to target and even kill people, that U.S. courts choose not to admit,” Wittes said on Wednesday. “There are all sorts of people who you wouldn’t have a problem going to court and saying, ‘we can show this guy is dangerous. But if you force us to make a criminal case, we can’t do it. Either we don’t have enough evidence, or the proof we have, a lot of it won’t be admissible.’ ”

Civil liberties and criminal defense lawyers argue strenuously that such evidence is unreliable and therefore shouldn’t be used to deny a suspect their liberty, potentially forever. In Wittes’ proposal, the government could detain a suspect for up to 14 days without providing him a right to a lawyer or to challenge his detention. After that, the government would have to justify continued detention to a judge every six months. Wittes compares this sort of detention authority to the government’s authority to detain criminal defendants before trial, some illegal aliens, and mentally ill people who a court has deemed a danger to himself or others.

“The concept of ‘dangerousness’ is inherently somewhat speculative,” Wittes admitted. “By its nature it’s based on future activity. Imagined future activity,” he added. But “we do manage the concept of dangerousness” in these other situations. “It’s not ideal. You’d like a moral certainty as to whether or not someone is going to do something scary. As a practical matter you can’t do that.”

Gude and Martin, in their memo sent to the Obama administration’s Detainee Policy Task Force, “strongly oppose” such a plan. “While we strongly support the effort to prevent such individuals from engaging in future terrorist activities, experience demonstrates that sufficient intelligence and law enforcement tools exist to meet real national security requirements and disable such persons. Legislating a new legal framework for detaining such individuals would be unprecedented and unjustifiable as an application of the law of war. To the contrary, it would blur the important line between criminal and military spheres and undo decades of effort by the United States to encourage other countries to cabin properly the realm of military vis a vis civilian authority.”

David Golove, a Constitutional law professor at New York University, similarly calls the Wittes plan “extraordinarily problematic and dangerous.”

“One of the core features of liberal democracy is precisely that preventive detention is not allowed,” he said. “The struggle for constitutional liberty is in many ways a struggle against preventive detention.” The Wittes proposal “treats that whole problem incredibly cavalierly.” The wartime detention model, by contrast, has “deep historical roots,” he said. And detention of the the mentally ill or the accused in pretrial detention are “carved out exceptions based on very specific rationales. Every time we add a new one we’re breaking down the whole idea that preventive detention is problematic in a liberal country.”

To Wittes and some others, however, the terrorist attacks of September 11 demand just such a new exception. A preventive detention system “is the result of the unique nature of America’s conflict with transnational terrorist organizations and the limits of existing laws, both international and domestic, in responding to current threats,” he writes with Peppard in their paper, Designing Detention: A Model Law for Terrorist Incapacitation.

Whether such a system would be constitutional is another matter, and one that Wittes does not directly address in his proposal. “All of these issues are up for grabs in the courts, and both sides of the administrative detention debate can point to recent signals by the Supreme Court in Guantanamo cases to support their claims,” said Matthew Waxman, a law professor at Columbia University whose work Wittes cites for support in his paper.

It’s not clear where the Obama administration will come down in this debate, and administration officials have insisted that no decision has yet been made. On Monday, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs assured reporters that the president is not considering issuing an order that “relies on legal theories that we have the inherent authority to detain people.” But he did not rule out reliance on a preventive detention system based on some other authority — which could be the laws of war, or an act of Congress.

As Spencer wrote today, someone in the administration told ProPublica’s Dafna Linzner and The Washington Post’s Peter Finn that yes, civil liberties groups support the idea of an order that “would embrace claims by former President George W. Bush that certain people can be detained without trial for long periods under the laws of war.” That statement amazed the civil liberties groups that Spencer then spoke to. I’ve gotten similar reactions from civil liberties lawyers I’ve been speaking to since Friday as well.

But it turns out that there are some progressives, and some who’d even traditionally be called civil libertarians — though not representatives of the traditional civil liberties groups Spencer and I have spoken to — who have been floating the idea, but in a more limited way than the Post story suggested.

Specifically, a group of prominent military and criminal defense lawyers and academics on June 8 sent President Obama a letter urging him not to create a new system of preventive detention, but instead, to rely on the one we already have — with modifications, if necessary. Although they don’t specifically recommend an executive order, that’s the logical way for the administration to modify and clarify its authority.

“Our country can achieve its legitimate goals through existing laws which authorize the detention of those who should be detained in the fight against international terrorism,” says the letter, which I received just this afternoon. It’s signed by 11 prominent lawyers, including Retired Rear Admirals Donald Guter and John Hutson of the Navy’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps; Abner Mikva, a former federal appellate court judge, University of Chicago law professor, White House counsel under President Bill Clinton and a mentor to president Obama; and Thomas Wilner, a prominent corporate defense lawyer who’s represented Guantanamo detainees in some of the landmark cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.

“Longstanding law-of-war principles authorize the detention for the duration of armed hostilities of those who engage in armed conflict against the United States or its allies,” these experts write, adding: “Some modifications to the existing system may be warranted, but no new system is necessary.”

The letter specifically tries to steer President Obama away from proposing or supporting any new legislation that would create a new preventive detention authority.

Ken Gude at the influential Center for American Progress has also suggested that the president should clarify his authority of detention under the laws of war. In a recent memo he co-authored with Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies, he and Martin write that the “ambiguities” left by the Bush administration over who is detainable under the laws of war “compound the lack of fundamental fairness in treating suspected criminals as combatants and holding them without trial.” Given how the detention authority has been used over the past eight years, “the new administration should now reassert the traditional understanding of the limits of the law of war and reject the former administration’s effort to read the word “organization” in the AUMF [Authorization for the Use of Military Force] as effecting an unprecedented extension of the traditional understanding of the military’s extraordinary powers of detention during war.”

In an e-mail this afternoon that he sent from Paris, Gude says he never specifically proposed an executive order, but supports the idea and adamantly opposes new legislation.

Gude laid out his support publicly for a limited system of preventive detention, authorized by the laws of war which allow detention of combatants during a military conflict, on CAP’s site and in The Guardian.

Even David Cole, the normally staunch civil libertarian law professor at Georgetown, has argued that the administration has that authority, calling it “an appropriate and necessary means of dealing with enemy fighters during wartime.” (Cole was pilloried for taking that position by Kenneth Anderson in Opinio Juris, who asks, “if it’s sensible and legal now, why wasn’t it sensible and legal during the Bush years? Is this the same David Cole who appeared on panels with me over the last few years and who didn’t seem in those years to have any daylight between him and the Center for Constitutional Rights, Human Rights Watch, or Human Rights First on the principle of try-or-release?”)

Let’s set aside for now the very legitimate question of whether these progressive civil libertarians would have taken the same position during the Bush years, or if they just inherently trust President Obama to handle battlefield detention against a non-traditional enemy better than Bush did. The positions these people are taking is informed, at least, by what the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, although that case pertained only to the detention of Taliban fighters, while we were at war with Afghanistan. And it’s in line with what the federal courts have been ruling, with some variations, in a string of habeas corpus cases.

The proposal for an executive order to clarify the Obama administration’s position on the extent of its wartime authorities of preventive detention is very different, however, from the controverisal position that some more conservative lawyers and think-tank scholars like Jack Goldsmith, Benjamin Wittes and Neal Katyal (traditionally a moderate Democrat and now deputy solicitor general in the Obama administration) have been promoting. The Wittes proposal released on Friday with Brookings colleague Colleen Peppard, for example, would create an entirely new system of preventive detention that’s not limited to the president’s authority under the laws of war.

On Monday, Goldsmith, a Harvard law professor and former head of the Office of Legal Counsel at DOJ under President Bush, joined Wittes, a Brookings scholar, in a Washington Post op-ed to argue that a preventive detention scheme should be debated in Congress and spelled out clearly through legislation, not by the president by executive order. To them, an executive order would be “a nearly wholesale adoption of the Bush administration’s unilateral approach to detention.”

That, it seems, is where the current debate lies. Committed civil liberties advocates such as the ACLU, Center for Constitutional Rights, Human Rights Watch and others may still be arguing against a preventive detention scheme entirely, but given that the Obama administration has consistently argued its right to detain “combatants” (however they’re defined) during what it continues to call a “war” — not only in the Gitmo habeas cases but in regards to the detention of some 600 men imprisoned at the U.S. Air base in Bagram, Afghanistan — it’s impossible to imagine that the administration is going give up that authority in the future.

Although as Spencer pointed out, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs did say on Monday that the president is not considering issuing an order that “relies on legal theories that we have the inherent authority to detain people,” he certainly didn’t rule out basing a preventive detention system on some other authority — whether granted by the laws of war, or by an act of Congress.

I’ll be writing more soon about what that Congressional act might look like.

Why is that bad news for the Big Three? Because there’s been this line of argument that Ford, General Motors and Chrysler would be performing splendidly right now if only they’d focused more resources on the production of gas-sippers instead of gas-guzzlers. While there’s certainly truth in that criticism, Toyota’s announcement indicates that auto companies are suffering across the board, regardless of what models they’re able to produce. Indeed, Prius sales in November dropped more than 48 percent relative to the same month a year ago.

So even if GM were shooting its plug-in Volt off the assembly line like Pez, it still wouldn’t solve the company’s troubles because the credit crunch and lack of consumer confidence means no one’s buying anyways. That’s a tough message for supporters of the Detroit bailout, who’ve been arguing that the Big Three will be fine if they just get some help retooling their factories to make higher mileage cars.

As David Cole, chairman of the Center for Automotive Research, said just a few minutes ago in what’s probably an understatement, “All automakers are in big trouble right now.”

Thurgood Marshall Courthouse (Flickr Creative Commons License)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Tuesday had an opportunity to consider a question that may become more pressing in coming years: Should the U.S. government have to pay damages to a innocent man arrested and secretly sent overseas where he faced certain torture?

That’s the issue at the heart of Arar v. Ashcroft, the case heard by 12 judges in an overflowing courtroom in New York. Over the course of an en banc argument that lasted more than two and half hours, the judges peppered lawyers on both sides with questions on arcane matters of immigration procedure and on the central moral issue of whether a victim of torture overseas at the behest of the U.S. government can seek a remedy from the government.

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

As I’ve written before, Maher Arar, a 34-year-old Syrian-born Canadian, was arrested on his way home to Canada after a vacation visiting relatives in Tunisia in 2002. While changing planes at JFK airport, he was picked up by FBI agents and taken into custody, denied access to his lawyer and then secretly sent to Syria to be questioned about his alleged ties to Al Qaeda. In Syria, Arar said he was held in a grave-like cell and severely tortured until he confessed to weapons training in Afghanistan, where he’d never been.

Arar was released in 2003 after Syrian authorities said they found no evidence that he’d done anything wrong. A Canadian investigation reached the same conclusion and issued a formal apology and reparations.

Yesterday’s argument centered on whether Arar, assuming that all his claims are true, has any recourse against the U.S. government. The answer could affect many more victims of alleged government abuse in the “war on terror.” (Another case, that of four British men who claim they were illegally detained and tortured at the Guantanamo Bay prison, is the subject of a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.)

Georgetown University law professor David Cole, on behalf of the Center for Constitutional Rights, which is representing Arar, argued that Arar has a right to sue the government for monetary damages because he was refused access to U.S. courts when he was first detained and because U.S. officials conspired to send him to Syria where torture is an often-used interrogation technique.

As Cole told the judges: “I don’t see any reasonable argument that a federal official can torture somebody or outsource that torture to somebody else.”

But that wasn’t really the concern of the government, according to Deputy Assistant Atty. Gen. Jonathan Cohn, who is representing former Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft and other federal officials and agencies. He argued that even if torture is immoral and illegal, that doesn’t give Arar the right to sue the government or any federal official for being tortured.

“This is about separation of powers,” contended Cohn, insisting that there is no precedent for allowing a non-citizen deported by the immigration service to sue the United States for damages. That he was deported in secret, was not intending to immigrate to the United States and was intentionally sent to a country where he would likely be tortured should make no difference, Cohn told the appeals court.

That argument seemed to outrage Judge Guido Calabresi. He said that if he were changing planes in France and was picked up by the French authorities and whisked away to Syria where he faced the likelihood of being tortured for some alleged crime, he sure would hope the U.S. would have a problem with it. “You might have a very strong interest in creating an action in this country to prevent other countries from doing that,” he told Cohn.

Cohn’s other main argument was that the Arar case is too intertwined with national security and foreign policy, the prerogatives of the president, for the appeals court to get involved.

That didn’t sit well with Judge Barrington Parker, among others. “We look at matters that raise national security and foreign policy issues all the time,” he said, noting that the court frequently reviews petitions for political asylum and petitions for relief under the U.N. Convention Against Torture, which is supposed to prevent deportation to a country where someone has a reasonable belief they will be tortured. In such cases, “We’re always making comments in the international arena about international affairs.”

Some of the judges seemed more sympathetic to Cohn’s arguments. Judge Dennis Jacobs frequently tried to shush his colleagues so the government’s lawyer could make his argument, and Judge Jose Cabranes worried that allowing Arar to sue the government would open the door to thousands of other disgruntled immigrants who each year believe they were wrongly deported.

But several judges noted that the State Department has repeatedly assured the U.N.’s Committee Against Torture, in writing, that victims of torture at the hands of U.S. officials have cause to take civil action against the United States. They asked how Cohn could now suggest that the victims don’t.

In response, Cohn tried to distinguish between federal officials who send detainees to countries knowing they faced torture there from those who actually do the torturing themselves.

After allowing Cole a brief rebuttal, the court asked the government to produce more information — specifically, an unredacted copy of a report by the Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security about the Arar incident.

While the Second Circuit court could rule on Arar’s case at any time, it’s likely to wait at least a few months. After all, the Obama administration could take a different position in the case — prompting a new 12-judge, multihour argument all over again.

As I reported earlier, the 34-year-old computer consultant of Syrian descent was apprehended by U.S. authorities in 2002 while he was changing planes at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport, on his way home to Canada after visiting relatives in Tunisia.

After a harsh interrogation without access to counsel in New York, he was flown to Syria against his will, where he was kept in a tiny underground prison cell and tortured until he eventually “confessed” to training for terrorism in Afghanistan; in fact, he’d never even been there.

For those with a strong stomach, here’s the federal district court’s description of Arar’s early days in Syrian detention, which he claims was coordinated with US authorities:

During his first twelve days in Syrian detention, Arar was interrogated for eighteen hours per day and was physically and psychologically tortured. He was beaten on his palms, hips and lower back with a two-inch-thick electric cable. His captors also used their fists to beat him
on his stomach, face and back of his neck. He was subjected to excruciating pain and pleaded with his captors to stop, but they would not. He was placed in a room where he could hear the screams of other detainees being tortured and was told that he, too, would be placed in a
spine-breaking [*11] “chair,” hung upside down in a “tire” for beatings and subjected to electric shocks. To lessen his exposure to the torture, Arar falsely confessed, among other things, to having trained with terrorists in Afghanistan, even though he had never been to Afghanistan
and had never been involved in terrorist activity.

Arar was eventually deemed innocent and returned home to Canada in 2003, where the Canadian government confirmed that he’d done nothing wrong and apologized for its role in his arrest.

With the help of the Center for Constitutional Rights and Georgetown law professor David Cole, in 2004 Arar sued American officials in a U.S. federal court for sending him to Syria to be tortured.  But his case was dismissed on the grounds that an investigation might reveal state secrets and harm national security.  The court also ruled that, as a foreigner deported by immigration authorities, he had no right to challenge his treatment by the United States.

Although a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Arar has no right to sue federal officials no matter what was done to him, the full court  of appeals in August made the highly unusual decision to re-hear the case.  All 12 active judges of the court are scheduled to hear the arguments from both sides at 3 p.m. in New York.  The argument will stream live on C-Span.org.

For more on the Arar case and the US government’s program of extraordinary rendition, check out Jane Mayer’s excellent piece on the subject in the New Yorker.