An ambitious plan to update the Carter-era Community Reinvestment Act that supporters hope to see signed into law in 2010 comes amid charges that this legislation was responsible for nothing less than the subprime crisis and the resulting collapse of the residential real estate market.

The plan, sponsored by Rep. Eddie Johnson (D-Tex.), would close some loopholes in the original act that let non-bank financial firms operate with relative impunity. It would levy negative ratings on a much wider array of institutions that practiced predatory or discriminatory lending, and it would require that non-bank entities like mortgage providers and insurance companies comply with all CRA tenets.

[Economy1] Why this piece of legislation is still such a lightning rod more than 30 years after its introduction is something both its supporters and detractors struggle to explain from their respective camps. “The idea that this was just some sort of carrot-stick regulation that didn’t work is a perception that goes very much in hand with a right-wing agenda,” said Jose Garcia, associate director for research and policy at advocacy group Demos. Demos is one of several progressive groups seeking to have the bill, the Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2009, made into law.

On the other hand, Mark Calabria, director of financial regulation studies at the Cato Institute, asserts that political pressure drives CRA support. “It fundamentally gets to some very emotional issues. [Supporters] see this as an issue of racism and social justice,” he said. The Cato Institute held a forum in November that was broadly critical of the CRA, asserting that the financial models at its core are faulty.

Federal Reserve chairman Benjamin Bernanke called the CRA a “catalyst” in 2007, although he touched on the trouble already brewing in the subprime mortgage sector as an imperative to revisit the Act in the wake of significant changes in the banking industry since its implementation.

At its heart, the CRA was created to try and legislate out some of the institutional discrimination in the financial services industry. It was conceived in a very different era from today’s world of global banking behemoths. In the wake of the civil rights movement, most banks were still small, often single-branch operations. Many would operate selectively in low-income and minority neighborhoods, accepting the deposits of local residents but only writing home or business loans in more affluent communities.

Regulatory changes in banking plus an agenda embraced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to boost homeownership cracked the mortgage market wide open beginning in the 1990s, and the CRA was initially credited with higher rates of homeownership among low-income and minority Americans. According to Kathleen Day, spokesperson for the Center for Responsible Lending, “The purpose of the CRA is to go into underserved areas and look for credit-worthy borrowers you overlooked because of red-lining,” she said, referring to the bank practice of categorically refusing to lend in certain neighborhoods.

The result of reckless lending practices is by now apparent to everyone, although concerns were swept under the rug in the go-go years of the mid 2000s. CRA supporters say brokers and non-bank mortgage outfits wrote nearly 95 percent of the bad loans, while the Act took the fall when these loans turned out to be unsustainable.

“Nine out of 10 of the people who got bad loans already had homes,” said the Center’s Day. “Six out of the 10 were refinances and three were selling one home and buying another.”

Often, Day adds, the unscrupulous vendors that preyed on subprime mortgage candidates cloaked their malfeasance in the language of the CRA’s mission, a sleight of hand that muddied the waters and assigned undue blame on the regulation when mortgages — and the huge numbers of securities backed by them — began to sour.

Even Lawrence White, a New York University who wants to see the CRA scrapped, says it’s not to blame for the financial meltdown. “The CRA has very little to do with the subprime lending debacle,” he said.

Aside from mortgage lending, the other goal of the CRA is to provide basic banking services to low-income and minority citizens. In these locations, “Pawnshops and the like literally became the banking services,” said John Taylor, president and CEO of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, the organization spearheading the modernization of the CRA.

“In some communities there are no financial institutions,” asserted Demos’s Jose Garcia. Geographic impediments and language barriers create a two-tier system that leaves low-income Americans, minorities and immigrants without access to the banking and lending services the middle class takes for granted.

If the legislation were better-enforced — something the NCRC’s Taylor believes the modernization bill would facilitate — banks wouldn’t be able to do things like close branches in these communities without repercussions. But preventing closures would just be the beginning.

In a 12-page statement, the NCRC spelled out major features of modernization. Key among them are inclusion of non-bank financial firms under the umbrella of CRA oversight, and a greater emphasis on the neighborhoods in which institutions write loans, not just the locations where their branches or offices are located. This is partially due to the rise of online and branchless financial institutions, but Taylor says the switch will also prevent companies like subprime mortgage-peddlers from operating under the radar.

Advocates also want to see enforcement of the CRA transferred to the not-yet-created Consumer Financial Protection Agency. The CFPA, as its supporters envision it, would consolidate regulatory oversight and enforcement of banking and lending activities in a single agency, rather than the patchwork of regulators some say let ruinous business practices slip through the cracks.

The modernization effort isn’t without roadblocks, though. The current House bill has yet to progress to the Senate, although Taylor says the NCRC’s goal is to have the modernization signed into law sometime this year. The CFPA doesn’t even exist yet, and might never come to fruition. Last week, Senate Banking Committee Chair Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.), the lawmaker who has championed the idea, indicated he may be willing to abandon the idea of a consumer protection agency.

In the end, it’s not clear what is ahead for the CRA. Some, like the Cato Institute’s Mark Calabria, think the need has run its course. “There was a logical raison d’être for the creation of the CRA at the time but that justification is no longer there,” he said. He admits that an outright repeal of the Act is unlikely, though. NYU’s Lawrence White also wants to get rid of the CRA, although he wants to replace it with a cap-and-trade system of credits similar to the protocol used to eliminate acid rain-causing sulfur dioxide in the 1980s.

Progressive and social-justice groups say that the CRA, while not perfect, needs to be improved, not thrown out. “We’re talking about trillions of dollars of private resources that could be available to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods,” said the NCRC’s Taylor. “We believe in banks. If we don’t have them active in these neighborhoods, it’s very unlikely they’re going to prosper. We want banks to see these neighborhoods as an important part of the economic future of this country and of their business plans.”

In the end, it might come down to that. If the notoriously profit-hungry banking industry sees economic potential in lower-income areas, this would go a long way towards keeping the predatory players out of the arena.

Tavis Smiley interviews Barack Obama in October 2007 (YouTube: BarackObamadotcom)

As the housing market began booming in the mid-2000s, Wells Fargo & Co. teamed up with prominent African American commentator and PBS talk show host Tavis Smiley and financial author Kelvin Boston, the host of “Moneywise,” a multicultural financial affairs show, to host something called “Wealth Building” seminars in black neighborhoods.

Smiley was the keynote speaker, and the big draw, according to Boston and Keith Corbett, executive vice president of the Center for Responsible Lending, who attended two of the seminars. Smiley would charge up the audience — and rattle the Wells Fargo executives in attendance — by launching into a story about how he hated banks, and how they used to refuse to lend him money for his real estate projects in Compton, Calif., and elsewhere. After Hurricane Katrina, Smiley also emphasized the importance of building assets and wealth, saying those who had done so were able to leave New Orleans, while people with nothing had to stay behind, Boston said.

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

“My spiel was the financial planning process, how you want to be able to save and invest for the future, and to have a plan of action,” Boston said. “Then Tavis talked about his experiences with the banks, and how people should be thinking about some real estate.”

The seminars in some cities drew standing room only crowds, with numerous Wells Fargo representatives on hand, seated at carrels to meet one-on-one with potential borrowers who lined up after the speeches, which were usually held in hotels. The free, day-long events were heavily advertised in the black media, and launched in eight cities, including Baltimore, Chicago, Richmond, Va., and San Francisco.

But what appeared on the surface as a way to help black borrowers build wealth was actually just the opposite, according to a little-noticed explanation of the “Wealth Building” seminar strategy, contained in a lawsuit recently filed by Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan.

Wells’ plan for the seminars all along was to target black borrowers for higher-cost subprime mortgages, not for wealth-building, the suit charged. And the seminars were a part of the bank’s overall illegal and discriminatory practice of steering black and Hispanic borrowers into riskier and more expensive loans, the suit said.

“According to a former Wells Fargo Home Mortgage employee, one of these ‘Wealth Building’ seminars held in Maryland was planned for an audience that would be virtually all African American,” the suit said. “The plan for the seminar was for Wells Fargo Home Mortgage employees to talk about subprime mortgages, although they were directed by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage to use the term ‘alternative lending’ when marketing these products.”

The former employee, who is white, was scheduled to speak at the seminar, but was told by a manager that she was “too white,” and that only black employees could make presentations, the suit said.

Wells Fargo, one of the nation’s largest mortgage lenders and a recipient of $25 billion in government bailout money, has denied all the charges in the Illinois suit, as well as other allegations of unfair lending. The bank did not respond to requests for comment on the seminars. Smiley, an author and advocate who hosts the late night talk show, “Tavis Smiley,” and who organizes the State of the Black Union symposiums each year, also declined comment.

Corbett pointed out that Wells’ outreach to the minority community through the seminars wasn’t unusual. Lenders sponsoring financial literacy sessions, holding wealth building seminars, or contributing to local minority advocacy organizations, became a common marketing strategy as the subprime market grew. Some of the efforts were genuine, aimed at finding new customers in minority neighborhoods once deprived of credit. But sometimes they were used instead as a cover to push predatory loans, Corbett said.

“The wealth building seminars are certainly needed,” Corbett said. “But, if, in fact, Wells was selling bad products out of them, it was totally wrong.”

Boston, for his part, described himself as the small player in the seminars, giving an opening talk before Smiley went on. Boston said he spoke in general terms about the need to save money and to invest. Neither he nor Smiley ever mentioned or discussed subprime loans, he said.

“Basically we were just speakers for hire,” Boston said. “We didn’t have any role or any control over what else happened. The main point is that we were not involved in any of their discussions or in anything they sold.”

Corbett said that after the speakers finished, bank employees and other financial experts were offering credit checks, real estate counseling, and other kinds of assistance. Corbett said he also believes some employees were signing up people for loan pre-approvals, on the spot, though he couldn’t be sure of what kind of loans they were. He said attendees lined up to talk to the Wells employees in both events. “If they weren’t actually selling loans, they were setting up borrowers for the kill,”  Corbett said.

Once their speeches were over, however, Boston said he and Smiley  had nothing to do with the workshops and counseling. He said he and Smiley together did about 15 seminars over a period of about two years. He declined to comment on how much he or Smiley were paid.

In 2005, before the subprime crisis, Boston said, the main worry in the black community over mortgage lending was the banks were lagging behind in their lending to minority neighborhoods. He said expressed his concerns about this to Wells Fargo. Smiley, he said, also later raised questions about subprime lending tactics with the bank. “Tavis definitely had some dealings with them on this issue,” Boston said.

Nonetheless, in hindsight and with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, Boston said he has second thoughts about participating in the seminars.

“Were we probably used? We probably were,” he said. “If I had the chance to do it over again, would I do it in a different manner? Probably.”

“You look back now and you feel for the homeowner who could have qualified for a better mortgage and got the costly type of mortgage. That concerns me a lot, not just for Wells Fargo, but for everybody out there, Citigroup, Countrywide … they were all doing the same events.”

But at the time, Boston said, having a major bank doing outreach in the black community was considered an encouraging development, after so many years of redlining and restricted access to credit. “We all thought at the time that we were doing a positive thing,” he said.

Boston said he quit doing the seminars after his contract ended two years ago. Smiley, he said, continued to work with Wells Fargo, particularly on his annual State of the Black Union symposiums. On his Website, Smiley recently posted a statement regarding Wells Fargo that said, “in this economic climate, we continue to be reminded every day that there is no perfect company.”

Smiley said in the statement that his relationship with Wells began in 2005, as part of the bank’s  “commitment to increase financial literacy in the African American community.” He said that “the partnership with Wells Fargo focused on building personal wealth, which for most Americans begins with buying a house.”

According to the statement, Smiley also has had partnerships with other companies, but has never served as a spokesperson or representative for any of them, including Wells Fargo. The statement also said Wells Fargo will no longer be one of the sponsors of his Black State of the Union event in 2010, although the bank sponsored the event as recently as last spring.

“Given the fact that Wells Fargo has been an industry leader, they have partnered with many African American and Latino national civil rights organizations on various community initiatives,” the statement said.

The Illinois lawsuit against Wells is one of many such actions winding their way through the court system around the country, offering more details of alleged discriminatory tactics by lenders during the height of the subprime boom. As TWI reported last week, housing advocates call these lawsuits the “smoking guns” of the housing crisis, providing what they see as proof that lenders deliberately targeted minorities for high-rate and risky subprime mortgages, while white borrowers with similar incomes and credit scores received lower-cost loans.

In a city of Baltimore lawsuit against Wells, former employees charged that Wells Fargo loan officers referred to minority borrowers as “mud people” and called subprime mortgages “ghetto loans.” But some prominent black bloggers find the “wealth building” seminars just as egregious, and question why Smiley, Boston, and anyone else who participated in them hasn’t been called on further to account for their actions.

“If Tavis Smiley was white, Wells Fargo and ‘Ghetto Loans’ would be front page news,” wrote Genma Stringer Holmes, a Nashville, Tenn., business owner and blogger who has blasted out several posts on the seminars.

Holmes said Smiley should speak out more against discriminatory subprime lending practices – but he hasn’t been forced to, because the black media has been silent on the issue, she said. The scandal that remains is that the ads and seminars targeted the most vulnerable members of black community, according to Holmes. “People who follow Tavis will follow him off a cliff,” Holmes said.

Boston said he still does seminars and presentations pushing wealth building, but he focuses on avoiding foreclosures and helping with loan modifications. He recently wrapped up work on an upcoming show on helping homeowners facing foreclosures, he said.

This story has been updated for clarity.

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Days after Rep. Michele Bachmann [R-Minn.] launched a petition against the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, ACORN is shooting back with a petition of its own.

“When you pick on ACORN, you pick on ME!” the petition says. “Congresswoman Michele Bachmann would rather pick on ACORN than stop the foreclosure crisis — even though Bachmann’s district has the highest rate of foreclosures in Minnesota.”

In April, the Minnesota Independent found that Bachmann’s 6th Congressional District had Minnesota’s highest rate of foreclosures as a percentage of households, at 1.80 percent.

Most striking is that Hope for Homeowners has attracted unexpected backers: Investors who had refused to consider the program’s requirement that they forgive some of a borrower’s mortgage balance if the home is worth less than is owed, known as being underwater, are now trumpeting that provision.

“Institutional investors that own securities backed by mortgages are extremely keen to write down principal in exchange for the borrower refinancing into a Hope for Homeowners loan,” said Tom Deutsch, deputy executive director of the industry group American Securitization Forum.

Investors that were previously unwilling to write down the value of their loans are increasingly on board with the practice — anything to get those loans off the books. A bird in the hand is worth two with a high probability of default, as they say. But there’s something amiss here. If investors believed that they would maximize their return on troubled loans by reducing principle, they would. That is, if they thought that by writing down the principle on a loan they would increase the odds of payment by enough to make the haircut worthwhile, then it would make sense for them to go ahead and do so. And if they were already doing so, then there would be no need for this program.

But clearly there is a need. Investors are only ready to write down principle if that allows them to shed default risk — which means they don’t think that writedowns lead to large reductions in default risk. And they’re probably right. Under this program, there are new borrowers waiting to pick up the loans because Federal Housing Administration is authorized to insure them — up to $300 billion. It kind of looks as though the government is working hard to absorb up to $300 billion in mortgage loan losses from various investors.

Hope for Homeowners seems primarily geared toward providing hope to investors, rather than homeowners. Given the extent to which unemployment is driving defaults in the current climate, a serious effort to stem foreclosures would focus on generous extensions of unemployment benefits, to the exclusion of most everything else.