Most of the juicy bits seem to be about these personality clashes, and in that context, it’s worth digging up this old gem from Joan Didion’s 1996 review of Woodward’s work:

…Mr. Woodward describes his role, “to sit with many of the candidates and key players and ask about the questions of the day as the campaign unfolded.” What seems most remarkable in this new Woodward book is exactly what seemed remarkable in the previous Woodward books, each of which was presented as the insiders’ inside story and each of which went on to become a number-one bestseller: these are books in which measurable cerebral activity is virtually absent. The author himself disclaims “the perspective of history.” His preferred approach has been one in which “issues could be examined before the possible outcome or meaning was at all clear or the possible consequences were weighed.”

Woodward, of course, does care about writing about issues that in his judgment will one day have historical import. As he told Charlie Rose in 2009:

The first nine months of the Bush administration I spent working on Bush’s tax cut, thinking that would be the center of gravity. Of course, I was dead wrong, and I still have boxes of interviews and notes if you run into anyone who wants to write a book about the Bush tax cut. It’s there. I worked for months on it thinking it was important. Of course, it’s important but compared to 9/11, which still defines our times, and the problems Obama has, the Bush tax cuts is probably not going to go in the history books.

Actually, with the “the perspective of history” (and the current debate on extending those tax cuts), those boxes of notes might be interesting. Any takers?

Eikenberry: “The review the president led was an extraordinary review,” with everyone encouraged to be candid. “The leaks that occurred are absolutely regrettable,” Eikenberry said. “At no time did I ever oppose additional troops being sent to Afghanistan.” What he said concerned him was a sufficient Afghan commitment. Note he suggests he did not leak anything but does not explicitly deny any leaking, either.

Same goes for McChrystal. “I agree with Ambassador Eikenberry,” McChrystal said. “The leaks made our job harder.” He said he was “shoulder to shoulder” with Eikenberry, but the leaks of Eikenberry’s cables made it appear like they were at loggerheads. He elided the question about the leak of his strategy review to Bob Woodward in September, but ends the point by saying, “I absolutely regret the leaks.” Not an explicit reference to the leak of his paper, and McChrystal’s aides have denied to me on the record that anyone in McChrystal’s command leaked it.

“I think a lot of different places are leaking. I’m confident that the Department of Defense is one of them.To have details or options that are being considered out there in the middle of the president’s deliberative process I think does not serve the country and it does not serve our military.’’

Mr. Gates then added a threat. “And frankly if I found out with high confidence anybody who was leaking in the Department of Defense, who that was, that would probably be a career-ender,’’ he said.

Noah Shachtman sums this up very well with an acronym I’m told I’m not allowed to use on this blog. I wonder if we’ll ever find out who leaked Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s Afghanistan assessment to Bob Woodward now!

“If I change my calculus based on what I think economic or political things are, then they are not benefiting from an absolutely untainted recommendation from me,” McChrystal said.

“I am not uninformed about the realities of the world. But what I am trying to do is be able to say: ‘This is what I think it will take, my best military advice.’ And then, of course, that will be factored in with all the other realities.”

It’s hard to imagine how McChrystal could say otherwise. And if he determines there isn’t a sufficient amount of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to fulfill U.S. objectives, McChrystal has a responsibility to report that to Defense Secretary Bob Gates. If the Obama administration doesn’t fulfill McChrystal’s request, the administration will be on notice that whatever the merits of deploying or not deploying additional troops, it’s going against the expressed wishes of its chosen commander. McChrystal’s quote indicates that he understands Obama’s preferences against further troop expansions and it’ll form one consideration in his ultimate recommendations, not the entirety of it.