Pakistan’s decision to go after the Afghan Taliban leadership reflects a quiet shift underway since last fall, said officials from both countries, who cited a November letter from President Obama to Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari as a turning point.

The letter, which was hand-delivered by U.S. national security adviser James L. Jones, offered additional military and economic assistance and help easing tensions with India, a bitter enemy of Pakistan. With U.S. facilitation, the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers have agreed to meet next week, the first high-level talks between the two countries since terrorist attacks in Mumbai in late 2008.

The letter also included an unusually blunt warning that Pakistan’s use of insurgent groups to pursue its policy goals would no longer be tolerated.

That Barack Obama sure doesn’t know how to deal with terrorism, does he?

Update: Although maybe that Baradar capture wasn’t quite so thoroughly planned…

Pakistan’s top court has declared an amnesty that had protected the president from corruption charges was illegal, state and private TV outlets reported. The ruling Wednesday paves the way for challenges to President Asif Ali Zardari’s shaky rule and adds to political turbulence just as the U.S. wants Islamabad to step up its fight against militants.

The court decision apparently also leaves thousands of other officials, including Cabinet ministers loyal to Zardari, facing reopened corruption and other criminal cases. That prospect is sure to further weaken the U.S.-backed leader, who is unpopular and under pressure to give up much of his power.

Not that ousting Zardari would in any way aid the cause of going after al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, but still.

Due time is apparently a long time. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari sent a letter to President Obama, the Washington Post reports, making that clear:

In a written response to a letter from Obama late last month, Zardari said his government was determined to take action against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and allied insurgent groups attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan from the border area inside Pakistan. But, he said, Pakistan’s efforts would be based on its own timeline and operational needs.

The message was reinforced Monday by Pakistan’s military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, who told Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of the U.S. Central Command, that the United States should not expect “a major operation in North Waziristan” in the coming months, according to a senior U.S. defense official. North Waziristan, one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on the Afghan border, is a sanctuary for the Afghan Taliban.

Holbrooke said last night he was committed to bolstering a bipartisan consensus for the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. He also said, as I reported, that he thinks Congress should appropriate more aid to Pakistan. But will Congress really be so inclined to dole out cash in the middle of a recession to a country that, as evidenced by four grueling hearings last week, is seen on the Hill as intransigent or worse?

Zardari:

President Obama spoke with Pakistani President Asif Zardari by telephone this morning. The two leaders discussed the President’s decision on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The President recognized the profound sacrifices Pakistan has made in its efforts to combat extremists in its northwest and emphasized that our goal is to defeat al-Qaida and to ensure stability in the region. The two presidents agreed that the close partnership between Pakistan and the United States is vital to success, and President Obama promised to continue to assist Pakistan in its efforts against extremists.

Karzai:

President Obama spoke with President Karzai on the evening of November 30 via video teleconference for one hour about the way ahead in Afghanistan. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to work closely together to ensure stability in Afghanistan and to prevent the country from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. They also discussed a range of related issues, including security, governance, corruption, economic development, and regional relations.

President Obama underscored the need for more rapid development of the Afghan National Security Forces so that Afghans themselves can assume greater responsibility over the security of their country. The President also emphasized that U.S. and international efforts in Afghanistan are not open ended and must be evaluated toward measurable and achievable goals within the next 18 to 24 months. Both Presidents agreed to redouble their efforts to improve the delivery of services to the Afghan people, particularly at the local level, and to reinvigorate economic development and investment, especially in the areas of agriculture, mining, water management, and energy.

An exception to this trend is Rep. Joe Sestak (D-Pa.), the former Navy admiral who has served in Afghanistan and who’s looking to oust Arlen Specter, a newly-minted Democrat, from a Pennsylvania Senate seat. Sestak is firmly in favor of both a troop increase and an ultimate exit strategy. What the congressman is listening for tonight, when Obama makes his speech at West Point, is a strategy that tamps down some of the more ambitious goals in Afghanistan and emphasizes the central threat emanating from Pakistan. “That goal must be the eradication of the safe haven that al-Qaeda has in Pakistan,” Sestak said in an interview today with TWI. “I want to hear, however, how much emphasis he has on the training of the Afghan military and police, and nation-building, because I don’t believe we can put an over-emphasis on that, because the cost may be too much.”

That’s not to say Sestak thinks such Afghan institution-building is unimportant. It’s “an effort that should be tried, but it shouldn’t be the central focus,” he said, as it isn’t “imperative [for] the success of our strategy.”  He’s concerned by recent administration statements that seem to indicate the resource distribution from Obama’s strategy might favor Afghanistan instead of Pakistan, and is waiting to hear Obama address that balance.

Sestak said he thinks ultimately concluding the war on terms favorable to U.S. interests requires “a three to five-year effort,” though not necessarily at the elevated troop levels Obama will announce tonight. Yet when asked what a successful conclusion to the war ultimately looks like, Sestak described it as piecemeal elements measured by benchmarks he hopes the president will announce. “That should be measurements particularly [about] the top leadership of al-Qaeda,” he said. “We know who they are, we don’t know where exactly they are, but have we got the masterminds?” Additional elements of success, as Sestak describes it, include Pakistani action against their Taliban elements and “their efforts with our support in economic aid and other types of efforts” proceed to prevent backsliding; “neutralizing” the most-rejectionist and al-Qaeda-aligned Afghan Taliban; and “measurements of how many villages, provinces, towns have we been able to have buy-in from the local, not just the national, centers of gravity.”

Politically, Sestak concedes that maintaining Congressional buy-in will be “a challenge” that will require a “deliberate cost-benefit analysis” of the war’s fortunes and merits, as well as the end of an “open-ended commitment.” While he said that he doesn’t support Rep. David Obey’s (D-Wis.) version of a war tax, he supports “bringing it into the normal budget process” and offsetting spending with cuts to irrelevant defense programs. “Now, if that will take a tax, because we can’t find the programs — for example, the $79 billion given to oil companies, fossil fuel companies in tax cuts, incentives and those types of, I believe, … benefits that can help pay for this war — if we’re not willing to go there, then we should stand up and say, here’s how we should raise the revenues,” he said. “We should be paying for this up front.”

And what about Specter, his Senate primary rival who opposes the troop increase? What would Sestak tell a skeptical or antiwar Pennsylvania voter? “I need them to know, very, very much, that political calculation cannot enter into my deliberations on this,” he said, citing his Navy experience and the time he spent directing defense policy for the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton. “It’s too important for you and for Americans, and I would be giving you short shrift, at least in my experience, to take a political position rather than a national security position after I have looked at the issues.”

“I do not want to abdicate that constitutional responsibility I have in Congress, and will have in the Senate also,” Sestak added. “People did that for Iraq, and George Bush made the decision for them that it was indispensable, and they voted for that war. I won’t do that, because the constitutional requirement is for me to make an assessment whether [a war] is indispensable or not, and I have said it is, and I need [voters] to know why.” (Specter voted for the Iraq war.)

Beginning in 2007, candidate Obama suggested that his administration might take unilateral action against extremists in Pakistan if the Pakistani government proved to be intransigent. It brought him reproach from then-Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), now his secretary of state, and Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), still the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee. And over the past year, as the Pakistanis have, with U.S. pressure and guidance and support, launched military offensives first to drive the Pakistani Taliban out of the Swat Valley and then to extirpate it in south Waziristan, the vow has faded. But it’s apparently returned.

A recent letter from Obama to his Pakistani counterpart, Asif Ali Zardari — whose position is rather tenuous at the moment as he faces a restive military — outlined a series of carrots in the event of accelerated action against the extremists, including “enhanced development and trade assistance; improved intelligence collaboration and a more secure and upgraded military equipment pipeline; more public praise and less public criticism of Pakistan; and an initiative to build greater regional cooperation among Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.” And then the stick, shown by national security adviser Jim Jones:

Jones, a retired Marine Corps general, was more precise in conversations with top Pakistani government and military leaders, U.S. and foreign officials said, stating that certain things have to happen in Pakistan to ensure Afghanistan’s security. If Pakistan cannot deliver, he warned, the United States may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan’s western and southern borders with Afghanistan.

That’s a modified version of the vow, but there it is. Officials on the campaign stressed that it was a last resort, and a very conditional one. And it’s a questionable thing to reiterate after the Pakistani military has done more to go after al-Qaeda and its affiliates in 2009 than it did in the previous eight years. But with Obama planning to outline the ultimate end of the Afghanistan war on Tuesday night, perhaps it means something rather specific: if you won’t bring us the head of Osama bin Laden, we’ll get it ourselves.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi (securityconference.de)

The foreign minister of Pakistan vowed that President Asif Ali Zardari’s government had forged an “unprecedented national consensus” to defend a “stable, democratic country where terrorism and extremist ideologies have little or no support” in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations Wednesday afternoon.

Shah Mahmood Qureshi, who met yesterday with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, urged the United States not to delay or place conditions on promised U.S. aid for Pakistan’s democratically elected civilian government and said the U.S. needed to provide Pakistan with greater “access to your markets” in order to provide a durable alternative to extremism. Political and ideological space for extremism in the beleaguered nuclear-armed nation would only be prevented through “social safety nets for the poor” and “declining poverty.”

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

Qureshi spoke at a momentous time for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Last week, the Senate passed a five-year, $7.5 billion aid package known as Kerry-Lugar that President Obama is expected to sign in the coming days. The Pakistani Army is on the verge of launching a much-delayed offensive in the the mountainous region of Waziristan, where the Pakistani Taliban is headquartered and al-Qaeda’s senior leadership is believed to be hiding. And on Wednesday afternoon, the Obama administration’s war cabinet will assemble at the White House to debate potential changes in its strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, though Qureshi declined to offer advice to the U.S. on the question.

The foreign minister, who is on a public-diplomacy tour of the U.S. to bolster support for his government, said that Pakistan was at “a crucial phase in its fight against terrorism.” He described the Pakistani Taliban as being in “disarray” after its leader, Beitullah Mehsud, was killed in August by a CIA drone strike, saying “no single leader holds sway over disparate factions.” Qureshi did not address the forthcoming anti-Taliban offensive in Waziristan except in passing reference — and after his speech, the Pakistani ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani, declined to address the subject — but said that Pakistan needed expanded trade access to western markets for its textiles and other exports if it is to consolidate any military gains. “Is it wiser to keep fighting the fire or [to take] away the oxygen that fuels it?” he asked.

Yet Qureshi hedged when asked about taking action against the leadership of the Afghan Taliban, the former Pakistani client organization that is now based in Pakistan’s city of Quetta. “If we feel there is an element in Quetta that is destabiizing Pakistan, we will not hesitate” to take action, Qureshi said. Asked what that stance meant for the Waziristan offensive, he replied, “We want to clear our territory of all kinds of mischief.”

Similarly, Qureshi declined to give an opinion on whether the U.S. ought to increase troops in neighboring Afghanistan, an option the Obama administration is currently debating. But he said that it would be “useful” for the U.S. and NATO to include Pakistan in its military deliberations, “so our effort is more coordinated, more focused.” Discussions with members of the Obama administration left Qureshi with the impression that a decision will come by “late October [or] early November.”

Qureshi praised the Kerry-Lugar aid bill as the U.S.’s “first visible demonstration of engagement with Pakistan beyond terrorism” and a “very strong signal of a long-term commitment.” Qureshi met with Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the architects of the Senate version of the bill, who he said assured him there were no “conditions” on the aid package troubling to Pakistan. While Pakistan’s Geo TV reported earlier today that Obama was delaying signing the bill, a White House spokesman, Thomas Vietor, said there was no truth to Geo’s report.

At the State Department Tuesday, Clinton, who expects to travel to Pakistan soon, praised Qureshi and pledged an “enduring partnership with Pakistan, and to work with the government and the people of Pakistan to help spur sustainable economic development, enhance safety and security, and build on recent progress in the fight against the militants who have spread terror and instability in Pakistan.”

This Act represents a collaboration between both Democrats and Republicans, in both Senate and the House, to forge a new long-term relationship between the people of America and Pakistan. The fact that President Obama was able to announce this at the United Nations sends an important message to Pakistan and the world of our strengthened commitment to this relationship.

Lugar:

We should make clear to the people of Pakistan that our interests are focused on democracy, pluralism, stability, and the fight against terrorism. These are values supported by a large majority of the Pakistani people. If Pakistan is to break its debilitating cycle of instability, it will need to achieve progress on fighting corruption, delivering government services, and promoting broad based economic growth. The international community and the United States should support reforms that contribute to the strengthening of Pakistani civilian institutions.

Lynne Weil, a spokeswoman for Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.), who wrote the House counterpart in his foreign-affairs committee, says, “The chairman hopes to introduce the [counterpart] legislation soon,” but couldn’t give an exact date for when the House bill drops.

Conducted between March 7 and 30, it’s a grim one from an American perspective. More Pakistanis believe the United States was behind last year’s Mumbai terrorist attacks (20 percent) than believe the Pakistani anti-Indian terrorist group Lashkar e-Toiba — whom India accuses of culpability in the mass murder — was responsible (seven percent). As Holbrooke stated, there’s a strong base of support for the Swat deal that left the Taliban effectively in charge of the Swat Valley, with 80 percent backing it and 74 percent believing it will bring peace to the region, which it manifestly didn’t. Over half of Pakistani respondents, 56 percent, support similar accomodations with the Taliban “in areas such as Karachi, Multan, Quetta or Lahore.”

Support for President Asif Ali Zardari is a dismal 19 percent, which is unchanged since IRI’s previous poll from last October. His opposition, Nawaz Sharif, has skyrocketed from a 15 percent favorability rating to  75 percent. I suppose it’s fair to say that the Pakistanis are looking for a civilian savior after disillusionment with Zardari — and it’s worth noting that this poll was conducted amidst Sharif’s “Long March” standoff with the president — since 77 percent of Pakistanis prefer an unprosperous democracy to a military dictatorship that provides peace, land and bread. Perhaps that’s why Holbrooke talked more this morning about supporting a generic Pakistani democracy than about supporting the Zardari government. (Did I mention that government has a 79 percent disapproval rating?)

From a counterinsurgency perspective, this might be the most important finding in the poll:

When asked if they felt that their economic well being would improve or worsen during the upcoming year, the number saying that they thought it would improve increased 15 points to 29 percent, while the number saying that they thought their economic situation would worsen dropped 23 points to 36 percent, as compared to the October 2008 poll.  Although the majority of Pakistanis’ still felt pessimistic about their economic future, this gap has closed considerably.

Hope is a funny thing in counterinsurgency. It raises expectations and introduces an element of impatience with the gap between desire and reality. Counterinsurgents have to move expeditiously to match them, and that can explain Holbrooke’s fervent endorsement of the Kerry-Lugar Senate aid bill for Pakistan. That said, these are still dismal numbers the prospects for material improvement, and the refugee flows coming from the Pakistani counteroffensive against the Taliban can only provide more grist for perceptions of economic deterioration.