But what did the Panetta-Jones trip reap from the Pakistanis? “Both parties acknowledged the extreme challenge of thwarting each and every plot and terrorist action, both sides pledged to intensify efforts, increase cooperation, and do everything possible to protect our citizens,” the statement reads. Here it is in full:

The productive discussions covered U.S.-Pakistan relations, the security situation in the region, the shared terrorist threat and fight against extremists, and the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. General Jones reiterated the United States’ long-term commitment to the strategic partnership with Pakistan, including support for creating economic opportunity for the Pakistani people. The talks provided an opportunity to review progress on the many areas addressed in the recent strategic dialogue held in Washington. Both sides expressed their commitment to strengthening ties across the broad spectrum of issues between our countries, including trade, economic growth, and development. The parties agreed to continue frequent government-to-government contacts and further senior-level engagement in order to advance our common interests and provide a better, more secure future for our people.

President Asif Ali Zardari said that militancy and terrorism was the common enemy and that the existing robust cooperation between the two countries must continue to fight the menace. General Jones and Director Panetta provided an update on the ongoing investigation into the Times Square terrorist incident. General Jones expressed appreciation for the excellent cooperation the United States is receiving from Pakistan as well as the tremendous sacrifice of the Pakistani military, law enforcement and people in their efforts to combat extremists. The talks covered measures that both countries are, and will be, taking to confront the common threat we face from extremists and prevent such potential attacks from occurring again and both parties acknowledged the extreme challenge of thwarting each and every plot and terrorist action, both sides pledged to intensify efforts, increase cooperation, and do everything possible to protect our citizens. President Zardari noted that Pakistan desires a long-term, multifaceted, and durable relationship with the United States which no incident should be able to adversely impact.

Watch if U.S. intelligence officials still tell reporters that Pakistan is withholding crucial terrorism intelligence after Jones and Panetta fly home.

[A]s expected, a diplomatic “We’re Just Not That Into You” move on the civilian nuclear deal and drone strike technology, but a thumbs up on the substantial topics, i.e. development. That is certainly a plus, depending on how well it’s implemented and allocated.

She points to this Washington Post wrap-up as well for the goods:

Most of the agreements announced after the one-day meeting had been decided earlier, including disbursement of a new $7.5-billion, five-year U.S. aid package for Pakistan’s energy, water, agricultural and education sectors. Long-standing Pakistani complaints about nearly $1 billion in promised but unpaid U.S. reimbursements for Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations had been largely resolved, with the remaining money to be paid by the end of June. The administration said that it would improve on what Pakistan has described as slow delivery of military hardware and that it would keep trying to facilitate better Pakistani access to U.S. markets and a transit trade arrangement with Afghanistan.

All of which is in keeping with Special Representative Richard Holbrooke’s perspective that Pakistan needs to feel like the U.S. is willing to assist Pakistan as it attends to its national and domestic interests if Washington wants to see more robust counterterrorism results.

Pakistan sent a 56-page document to the U.S. ahead of strategic talks scheduled for Wednesday, seeking expanded military and economic aid in what some American officials believe is an implicit offer to crack down in return on the Afghan Taliban.

The previously undisclosed document includes requests ranging from U.S. help to alleviate Pakistan’s chronic water and power shortages to pleas for surveillance aircraft and support in developing the country’s civilian nuclear program.

As it happens, Richard Holbrooke, the administration’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, signaled his support for such an aid package in December, so as to convince the Pakistanis that the U.S. desires more than just a transactional counterterrorism relationship with Pakistan.

The chief of staff of the Pakistani Army, Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, arrived in Washington already and I understand met with Defense Secretary Robert Gates yesterday.

On March 24, the United States and Pakistan will hold their first Strategic Dialogue at the Ministerial level in Washington, DC. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi will co-chair the talks. Topics for discussion will include economic development, water and energy, education, communications and public diplomacy, agriculture, and security. High-level officials from both governments will come to the table to discuss issues of common concern and shared responsibility.

President Obama and Secretary Clinton have repeatedly stressed the breadth and depth of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, a partnership that goes far beyond security. The Strategic Dialogue represents the shared commitment of both nations to a strengthening the bilateral relationship and building an even broader partnership based on mutual respect and mutual trust.

I’m reliably informed that Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the chief of staff of the Pakistani Army, will join Foreign Minister Qureshi, but don’t have more on that at the moment. The Obama administration wants a broader and deeper relationship with the Pakistanis than just one focusing on terrorism issues, despite the feeble efforts of callow bloggers like myself to write posts reorienting the meeting around Baradar when it will obviously cover much much more than that. Still, maybe the administration will emerge from the talks with a better sense of what the Pakistanis’ strategic intent behind the capture was.

Pakistan’s decision to go after the Afghan Taliban leadership reflects a quiet shift underway since last fall, said officials from both countries, who cited a November letter from President Obama to Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari as a turning point.

The letter, which was hand-delivered by U.S. national security adviser James L. Jones, offered additional military and economic assistance and help easing tensions with India, a bitter enemy of Pakistan. With U.S. facilitation, the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers have agreed to meet next week, the first high-level talks between the two countries since terrorist attacks in Mumbai in late 2008.

The letter also included an unusually blunt warning that Pakistan’s use of insurgent groups to pursue its policy goals would no longer be tolerated.

That Barack Obama sure doesn’t know how to deal with terrorism, does he?

Update: Although maybe that Baradar capture wasn’t quite so thoroughly planned…

Even if the Army clears away the whole area, quite a lot of militants have melted away in the population, and they continue to operate. There’s a need for a major effort from the government to reestablish the police and administration.

One thing is very clear. The Army can do firefighting. It cannot do policing duty. In fact, actually, there’s a need to strengthen the police force in Swat and in other places, in the Northwest Frontier Province, because the police now will be the frontline force. And without a strong police force, the Army cannot control the situation.

The Obama administration’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund is partially designed to bolster a Pakistani policing capability.

Although U.S. Special Operations teams are on continuous alert on the Afghan side of the border, the Obama administration has not authorized any ground operations in Pakistan, and the military is divided over their advisability. “We ask all the time,” said a military official who favors such raids. “They say, ‘Now is not a good time.’ ”

And yet the drone strikes continue at the pace set by the Bush administration, despite the protests of counterinsurgency experts close to Petraeus. Interviewed on NPR last week, Petraeus conceded their points but declined to comment on the drones, which are operated by the CIA.

Now, it’s apparently the case that the Pakistani government has a healthy tolerance for the drones, despite what it feels compelled to say in public. But the CIA’s prerogatives in Pakistan aren’t to build a long-term relationship with the Pakistanis. They’re to kill members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And the Post reports that the CIA has authority from the Obama administration to fire missiles from the drones without prior White House approval. So it’s hardly the case that the CIA is acting in Pakistan outside the boundaries of administration policy. But how much coordination does Petraeus really have with the CIA? And how much incentive does the agency really have to think of a broader strategic picture than the job it’s tasked with executing? And if there’s an element of incoherence in administration strategy, how can it be reconciled before the tensions damage the U.S.-Pakistani relationship?

In the course of replying to my query about his thoughts on ending the drone strikes — and really read his whole post — Bill Roggio reminds that Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the commander of the Pakistani military, isn’t so hot on counterinsurgency. (“[E]xcept for very specialized weapons and equipment, high technology, no generalized foreign training is required.”) More broadly, the Pakistani appetite for a protracted counterinsurgency remains unproven.