Co-released by the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute, the authors of the study sought to demonstrate teachers are not underpaid, contrary to popular refrain, and when factoring in health and retirement benefits, earn 52 percent more than “fair market levels.”

Many progressive voices in the teacher-pay debate show the obverse to be true. The Economic Policy Institute publishes an ongoing policy brief on the gap in wages between public-school teachers and better-paid private-sector workers with similar college degrees. Since 1996, that difference, or “wage penalty,” has increased from a 4.3 percent difference to 12 percent last year. Among men, the wage disparity increased from 15 percent to 23 percent in the same period.

Researchers for the same organization wrote (PDF) in September 2010 that public-employee compensation in general lags behind the private sector, to the tune of nearly $23,000 for bachelor’s holders and $33,600 for those with a master’s.

But the authors of the AEI-Heritage Foundation report eschew the whole idea of education experience forecasting a worker’s earning potential.

“Public-school teachers earn less in wages on aver­age than non-teachers with the same level of education,” the authors write, “but teacher skills generally lag behind those of other workers with similar ‘paper’ qualifications.”

Jason Richwine, co-author of the 26-page report who holds a doctorate in public policy, spoke to The American Independent about the paper.

“The cognitive ability [portion] is just one part in trying to explain why traditional measures, like education, are not adequate to capture teacher skill,” he said.

The authors point to research spanning 50 years indicating degrees in education are easier to obtain with high marks. They include a recent study by economist Corey Koedel in which he examined grade-point averages of graduates at three large research institutions, and found education majors finished with an average GPA of 3.65, while math, science and economics majors graduated with a 2.88.

Meanwhile, the researchers also looked into a robust data set dating back to 1979 called the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth that surveys the same 9,964 men and women biennially on questions relating to education, wages, health and other characteristics. Relying on a military-designed cognitive exam called Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), the authors of the report concluded teacher scores lagged behind private-sector professionals with similar academic backgrounds.

The authors did, however, note teacher pay lines up with an equally educated private-sector employee when cognitive scores are similar.

“The takeaway is that we should not trust just years of education,“ Richwine told TAI. He also cautioned his analysis included all teachers, including gym, art and music instructors, who may sag the cognitive scores of subject-oriented teachers in math and science.

Federal education law under No Child Left Behind has stricter knowledge requirements for educators teaching core subjects.

Sara Mead, an education policy analyst with Bellwether Education Partners, told TAI, “using IQ tests is less common than looking at college entrance exams.” She did say current teachers are, however, “disproportionately drawn from the lower end of the spectrum relative to their peers who pursued a different career path” when comparing SAT and ACT scores.

But a 2004 report from the National Council on Teacher Quality indicates (PDF) soft attributes, like motivating and energy, are the most telling characteristics of how prepared a teacher is for the profession, while SAT scores “account for only a small portion of why some teachers are more effective than others.”

Still, Mead says whether teachers are underpaid or overpaid is a “silly conversation in the sense that there’s a huge variation in teacher pay geographically.”

She added, “If you make generalizations, you’ll be wrong about something.”

Voicing that criticism, during a presentation of the paper’s findings that included its authors at AEI yesterday, guest panelist and economist Robert Costrell, of the University of Arkansas department of education reform, said, “I’m not so wild about this over-under payment exercise.”

The country’s largest teacher unions objected to the report findings. The American Federation of Teachers statement read, in part, “[this study is] the reason many Americans pay no heed to what goes on in Washington, D.C. The AEI report concludes that America’s public school teachers are overpaid—something that defies common sense—and uses misleading statistics and questionable research to make its case.

“Rather than rehashing AEI’s previous anti-public worker reports, let’s spend time heeding the lessons of top-performing nations, which invest heavily in recruiting, developing, supporting and compensating teachers.”

And Kim Anderson, director of advocacy for the National Education Association, said in an email, “not only should we question the reliability of this study, but we should also consider the source.

“The study is funded by the very same groups that are trying to eliminate the right of workers to have a voice in their workplace all together.”

During the media event at AEI, the authors of the report pointed out their methodology attempted to account for summer vacation and the higher job security teachers enjoy during non-recession years, something they called a “separate benefit value.”

They also explained the Bureau of Labor Statistics omits public-sector retirement health plans in its calculations for total teacher compensation, a benefit many public-sector workers receive. Conversely, the authors noted only 18 percent of private-sector workers have employers who foot that bill.

The Ohio Business Roundtable study, conducted by Andrew G. Biggs of the American Enterprise Institute and Jason Richwine of the Heritage Foundation, reached its conclusion by relying on numerous faulty assumptions, says the Economic Policy Institute.

According to EPI’s brief:

Biggs and Richwine double count retiree health benefits and inflate the costs of employee pensions, among other errors. They also create a “job security premium” for public sector workers even though more than 40,000 Ohio public employee jobs have been lost in the last five years. In addition, Biggs and Richwine use calculations in their study that cannot be replicated.

EPI’s Jeffery Keefe found that, when looking at total compensation, which includes both wage and non-wage benefits, public employees tend to make a little less than their private sector counterparts:

Looking at total compensation (wages and nonwage benefits), Ohio public employees annually earn 6.0 percent less on average than comparable private-sector employees and 3.5 percent lesson on an hourly basis. The analyses were adjusted for the increases in employer contributions to pension and retiree health insurance from 12 percent to 15 percent of total compensation, which reduced the hourly total compensation comparison to zero. In other words, public employees in Ohio earn no more and no less than similar private-sector employees in the state.

Despite earning less money on an hourly basis, those in the public sector tend to be more highly educated than their private sector counterparts. Nearly half — 49 percent — of all of Ohio’s public sector employees hold at least a bachelor’s degree, compared with just 26 percent of the state’s full time private sector workers.

Public sector employees do tend to receive better benefit packages than their private sector counterparts. However, they sacrifice wages in order to receive better health and retirement benefits. According to Keefe:

While some benefits are more generous in the public sector, it would be wrong to conclude that comparability of compensation between the public and private sectors requires that every element of compensation be the same. What is important is this: Considering both the cost of employer-provided benefits and direct wages, public-sector workers in Ohio receive compensation that is equal to what they would receive in the private sector.

SB5, signed into law by Ohio Gov. John Kasich (R) in February strips state public employees of bargaining rights. A referendum on SB5, known as Issue 2, heads to Ohio voters on the Nov. 8 ballot.

Jones’ big news: as arduous as it’s been for the U.S. government’s civilian agencies to implement the so-called “civilian surge,” that surge is getting surgier. In the coming weeks, the Obama administration will ask Congress to provide additional funding for more civilian advisers and experts to deploy to Afghanistan, “beyond” the roughly 1,000 civilians expected to be in-country by next month. New consulates will open around the country, Jones said, including in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat. Since the majority of U.S. forces in Afghanistan will focus on the south and the east, those new consulates suggest additional diplomatic activity in the north and the west will be the lion’s share of U.S. efforts at maintaining stability (in the west) or rolling back creeping insurgent advances with non-U.S.-NATO forces (in the north).

But the overall effort is one that focuses on deliverable governance and economic development below the national level, particularly in the southern and eastern insurgent-plagued Pashtun areas. “That does not mean we ignore Kabul,” Jones emphasized. Instead, the United States will focus on “supporting those ministries” that will provide “direct impact” to Afghan civilians and “broadening their support and engagement at the provincial and district levels.” In other words, the Obama administration’s effort is geared toward making those ministries a relevant and positive force in Afghan daily life. The Karzai government’s contribution to this, Jones said, will be “fleshed out in the coming weeks” at international conferences in London and Kabul.

Nicholson, the Joint Staff’s top man focusing on Afghanistan and a veteran of the war himself, elaborated on which ministries that effort will target: the security ministries of Defense and Interior, as well as the Agriculture ministry and the ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. And it means supporting the National Solidarity Program, an Afghan-led development effort that funds and support projects designed at the local level. The goal, Nicholson said, was to broaden and deepen the ministerial presence out in the provinces and districts, as right now that presence can be as thin as “one individual, who may or may not be able to connect effectively with the people.” One metric Nicholson suggested the administration will be looking at to measure success will be the expansion of wheat production in areas that right now are growing poppy, which helps fund the insurgency.

Much as this might seem like American beneficence, Jones emphasized that it was necessary to “reverse the momentum” of the insurgency in a sustainable way. As the administration has described since March, one of its assumptions is that non-ideological Taliban fighters motivated by local grievances or lack of economic opportunity can be essentially taken off the battlefield by these sorts of development efforts. That’s one of the reasons why Flournoy said she thinks that al-Qaeda’s allies in Afghanistan could “lose foot soldiers in droves” as the result of the revised administration strategy.

Flournoy gave some additional details about both the strategy and its implementation, as did her co-panelists, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Paul Jones and Brig. Gen. John Nicholson, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell. The July 2011 date for beginning the security transition was “not arbitrary,” she said, but the result of “district by district analysis” during the strategy review about what a realistic timeline for that transition was. Asked by TWI to clarify how large the Afghan Army and police ought to grow to take over security responsibilities — a point somewhat obscured in last week’s congressional testimony — Flournoy declined to cite a specific figure, saying instead the Obama administration will measure the Army and police annually to determine progress in “recruitment, retention, reduc[ing] attrition, [and] performance to “set the next year’s targets based on performance, in part, of the last year.” She said that the administration is in ongoing dialogue with Canada and the Netherlands, two allied countries scheduled to remove their troops from Afghanistan in 2010, about possible continued contributions to the war effort. “All options are still on the table in discussion,” Flournoy said. And she said that as happy as the administration was to receive a new NATO troop commitment of 7,000 after last week’s NATO foreign ministerial summit, the administration expects “additional allied troops” to be promised “in the weeks ahead.” (Hey, where’d you read that last week?)

Flournoy stepped back from those details at the conclusion of the event to envision a sort of virtuous circle taking place in terms of the degradation of al-Qaeda and its affiliated insurgent and terrorist groups on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. “I think they’ve got to be worried,” she said. Between the “increased forces, increased show of resolve, increased commitment [and] increased investment” by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and greater pressure “from the Pakistani military than ever before,” the insurgent coalition could start to “lose foot soldiers in droves.” She cited the lack of ideological commitment of the Afghan Taliban’s forces in particular, and said that if the U.S. could start “changing the dynamic on the ground” both militarily and economically for Afghan civilians, the insurgent coalition would “have to be very worried.”

Frederick Kagan, an adviser to Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s summer strategic review and AEI’s moderator, endorsed at least that sentiment. However odd it might be to see a Democratic administration send representatives to AEI, Kagan said, he hoped that the country could put domestic political disputes aside to support the Obama administration’s strategy for the region.

A Pentagon official tells me that Flournoy is working to lock down addresses to a wide variety of think tanks and their wonks around town, including centrist and progressive ones. She hosted some security policy analysts today already. It so happened that AEI nailed down the specifics of her talk with impressive efficiency. So, yes, Flournoy wants to reach out to the right to explain the Obama administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. But not to the exclusion of the left or the center. Look for an announcement later this week about other think-tank roundtables or speeches.

One related observation: The Obama administration rolled out its first Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy in March — Flournoy co-chaired the review that produced it — and then it sort of … disappeared for a while. Into that vacuum crept a great deal of public antipathy for the war as post-Helmand offensive casualties mounted. Flournoy’s tour around the think tanks is at least one indication that the administration doesn’t want to repeat its earlier misstep.

While it may sound logical to have an economist examining the economic impact of regulatory changes, Steinzor points out that Lutter has made some rather bizarre and disturbing arguments, including that the economic value of each of a child’s IQ points isn’t really all that much, so regulation to prevent lead poisoning ought not be so strict.

Lutter argues in this fascinating policy paper:

Benefits to parents of lower lead levels in their children are much less than federal regulatory agencies’ estimates of benefits, which they compute as the expected discounted gains to children’s lifetime earnings. … I show benefits to parents are between $1,100 and $1,900 per IQ point gained, or roughly one-sixth of the benefits to children estimated by federal agencies. … This analysis suggests lead standards will redistribute resources from parents to their children, because the benefits to parents are less than the costs of the standards.

In other words, the economic benefit to parents of an extra IQ point in their child is not as much as the cost of implementing new regulations that reduce lead in the environment. As a result, concludes Lutter, “The Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Housing and Urban Development should reconsider their lead standards.”

Although it’s not exactly surprising to see the government weighing the costs and benefits of new regulations, the economic valuation to parents of their children’s IQ points would surely, if made public, be quite controversial.

Steinzor notes that less than 24 hours after she asked Sunstein at a meeting whether he would be hiring Lutter, “perhaps by coincidence, AEI had pulled many documents referring to Lutter off its web site, including his biography.”

AEI is an odd venue for Flournoy for two reasons. First, she co-founded the most influential think tank of the Obama era, the Center for a New American Security. And second, AEI is the locus of neoconservatism, the ideology that, more than any other, encouraged the United States to ignore and under-resource the Afghanistan war during the Bush administration. The left is, I think it’s fair to say, decidedly unhappy with Obama today, and is comparing him to former President George W. Bush. Flournoy’s speech will seem to them something like the last scene in ‘Animal Farm.’

Chances are, Flournoy is speaking to AEI in order to solidify support for the war on the right, which has reacted generally positively to Obama’s speech, notwithstanding its deep antipathy to the president himself. Flournoy’s task will be to see how deeply she can entrench that sentiment and tamp down the rancor that the president identified as deleterious to the war. That puts the right in a box: how to support a war without bolstering Obama?

“Think tanks develop into a more mature institution when they are willing to say unpleasant things about their friends. But CNAS hasn’t done that yet, and they haven’t really had the opportunity to,” said American Enterprise Institute defense studies head Tom Donnelly. “That’s a benchmark of whether they can withstand the test of time.”

Yeah, like the time Donnelly said the surge didn’t achieve its objectives with regard to Iraqi politics; or denounced Dick Cheney’s conceptions of national security; or called out John McCain’s presidential campaign for, I don’t know, saying McCain wouldn’t meet with the Spanish prime minister. There’s a good point to be made about the Center for a New American Security having yet to critique, for instance, the counterinsurgents in the Obama administration, many of whom matriculated from the think tank. But there’s an unfortunate tendency in Washington to measure intellectual honesty by the willingness to attack your friends, rather than, say, the merits of a particular critique.

US Attorney General Michael Mukasey (WDCPix)

It’s been exactly one year since then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey proposed in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute that Congress pass legislation declaring a new, expanded war with al-Qaeda and the Taliban — thereby granting the president the authority to detain indefinitely members of those groups anywhere in the world where they’re found.

That proposal from a lame-duck Attorney General never got very far with the Democratic-controlled Congress. But a year later, the country is still debating that exact same detention authority. And news reports suggest that President Obama may seek precisely the same sort of authority that Mukasey was talking about.

Illustration by: Matt Mahurin

Although the Detainee Policy Task Force yesterday announced it was taking a six-month extension on its deadline to formulate the policy, reports from National Public Radio, The Washington Post and Politico have all quoted anonymous Obama administration officials saying the president intends to create or continue some sort of indefinite detention system for suspected terrorists associated with al-Qaeda or the Taliban, whether through new legislation or mere “consultation” with Congress.

“There is no intent in the administration to rely on anything other than congressional authority,” one senior administration official reportedly told The Washington Post.

Whether that authority would take the form of an entirely new system of administrative detention outside the authority of the laws of war, as some have proposed, or whether it would rely either on the existing Authorization for the Use of Military Force, or seek a new authorization, is unclear.  The anonymous officials aren’t explaining (or don’t yet know) how the administration intends to go about solidifying its legal authority to indefinitely detain suspects without charge or trial arrested around the world.

The question arises because the Supreme Court, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, affirmed that the president does have authority to detain combatants arrested on the battlefield in a conventional war, which the United States was engaged in with Afghanistan at the time. Since then, lower federal courts have ruled that the United States can detain combatants who are members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban. But it’s not clear if that authority would reach countries where there is no active combat — or if the authority described in the Hamdi decision  at some point runs out.

In attempting to answer that question a year ago today, Michael Mukasey, in a speech delivered to the American Enterprise Institute, said that Congress should:

acknowledge again and explicitly that this Nation remains engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated organizations, who have already proclaimed themselves at war with us and who are dedicated to the slaughter of Americans—soldiers and civilians alike. In order for us to prevail in that conflict, Congress should reaffirm that for the duration of the conflict the United States may detain as enemy combatants those who have engaged in hostilities or purposefully supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated organizations.

Today, Obama — or at least members of his administration — appear to want something very similar.

“It’s hard to see how they would end up writing anything much different from what Mukasey proposed a year ago,” said Chris Anders, senior legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union in Washington. “And that was dead on arrival.” Although the issue was raised at congressional hearings, proposed legislation never received enough support even to get to the floor for a vote.

Last summer, Anders described the idea on the ACLU’s blog as “a multi-part plan to violate the Constitution” that would “give a president worldwide power to declare anyone a terrorist and hold the person forever – without ever charging anyone with a crime.”

Although it’s possible that Obama would have more sway with Congress than Bush did, the leaders of the judiciary committees in both the House and Senate have publicly opposed a preventive detention plan that would detain suspected terrorists that the president deems “dangerous” without charge or trial; the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have likewise expressed reluctance.

So could Obama really get new authorization for preventive detention? Or will he try to rely on the old one, and issue an executive order or presidential memorandum clarifying (or extending) its scope? One reason he might want to seek new authorization is that, as David Kris, assistant attorney general for the Justice Department’s National Security Division,  recently testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the authority the Supreme Court acknowledged in Hamdi could eventually “run out.” After all, the laws of war only authorize detention for the duration of active hostilities.

Anders said that in his conversations with lawmakers on the Hill, he hasn’t heard of any proposed legislation being circulated. “No one I’ve come across so far has seen or heard anything from the administration about an indefinite detention proposal,” he said.

In an e-mail, Ken Gude, associate director of the International Rights and Responsibility Program at the Center for American Progress, cautioned that new legislation could lead to far broader authority for indefinite detention than even Obama envisions.

“For me, the answer to this question decides the whole ball game — if they go to Congress, what will inevitably emerge is a broad preventive detention system regardless of what the Obama administration wants. If they rely on AUMF authority, then it can be much more narrow.”

I am certain that no one wishes the current administration more success in defending the country than we do.

Full text below the fold.

Thank you all very much, and Arthur, thank you for that introduction. It’s good to be back at AEI, where we have many friends. Lynne is one of your longtime scholars, and I’m looking forward to spending more time here myself as a returning trustee. What happened was, they were looking for a new member of the board of trustees, and they asked me to head up the search committee.

I first came to AEI after serving at the Pentagon, and departed only after a very interesting job offer came along. I had no expectation of returning to public life, but my career worked out a little differently. Those eight years as vice president were quite a journey, and during a time of big events and great decisions, I don’t think I missed much.

Being the first vice president who had also served as secretary of defense, naturally my duties tended toward national security. I focused on those challenges day to day, mostly free from the usual political distractions. I had the advantage of being a vice president content with the responsibilities I had, and going about my work with no higher ambition. Today, I’m an even freer man. Your kind invitation brings me here as a private citizen – a career in politics behind me, no elections to win or lose, and no favor to seek.

The responsibilities we carried belong to others now. And though I’m not here to speak for George W. Bush, I am certain that no one wishes the current administration more success in defending the country than we do. We understand the complexities of national security decisions. We understand the pressures that confront a president and his advisers. Above all, we know what is at stake. And though administrations and policies have changed, the stakes for America have not changed.

Right now there is considerable debate in this city about the measures our administration took to defend the American people. Today I want to set forth the strategic thinking behind our policies. I do so as one who was there every day of the Bush Administration –who supported the policies when they were made, and without hesitation would do so again in the same circumstances.

When President Obama makes wise decisions, as I believe he has done in some respects on Afghanistan, and in reversing his plan to release incendiary photos, he deserves our support. And when he faults or mischaracterizes the national security decisions we made in the Bush years, he deserves an answer. The point is not to look backward. Now and for years to come, a lot rides on our President’s understanding of the security policies that preceded him. And whatever choices he makes concerning the defense of this country, those choices should not be based on slogans and campaign rhetoric, but on a truthful telling of history.

Our administration always faced its share of criticism, and from some quarters it was always intense. That was especially so in the later years of our term, when the dangers were as serious as ever, but the sense of general alarm after September 11th, 2001 was a fading memory. Part of our responsibility, as we saw it, was not to forget the terrible harm that had been done to America … and not to let 9/11 become the prelude to something much bigger and far worse.

That attack itself was, of course, the most devastating strike in a series of terrorist plots carried out against Americans at home and abroad. In 1993, they bombed the World Trade Center, hoping to bring down the towers with a blast from below. The attacks continued in 1995, with the bombing of U.S. facilities in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; the killing of servicemen at Khobar Towers in 1996; the attack on our embassies in East Africa in 1998; the murder of American sailors on the USS Cole in 2000; and then the hijackings of 9/11, and all the grief and loss we suffered on that day.

Nine-eleven caused everyone to take a serious second look at threats that had been gathering for a while, and enemies whose plans were getting bolder and more sophisticated. Throughout the 90s, America had responded to these attacks, if at all, on an ad hoc basis. The first attack on the World Trade Center was treated as a law enforcement problem, with everything handled after the fact – crime scene, arrests, indictments, convictions, prison sentences, case closed.

That’s how it seemed from a law enforcement perspective, at least – but for the terrorists the case was not closed. For them, it was another offensive strike in their ongoing war against the United States. And it turned their minds to even harder strikes with higher casualties. Nine-eleven made necessary a shift of policy, aimed at a clear strategic threat – what the Congress called “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” From that moment forward, instead of merely preparing to round up the suspects and count up the victims after the next attack, we were determined to prevent attacks in the first place.

We could count on almost universal support back then, because everyone understood the environment we were in. We’d just been hit by a foreign enemy – leaving 3,000 Americans dead, more than we lost at Pearl Harbor. In Manhattan, we were staring at 16 acres of ashes. The Pentagon took a direct hit, and the Capitol or the White House were spared only by the Americans on Flight 93, who died bravely and defiantly.

Everyone expected a follow-on attack, and our job was to stop it. We didn’t know what was coming next, but everything we did know in that autumn of 2001 looked bad. This was the world in which al-Qaeda was seeking nuclear technology, and A. Q. Khan was selling nuclear technology on the black market. We had the anthrax attack from an unknown source. We had the training camps of Afghanistan, and dictators like Saddam Hussein with known ties to Mideast terrorists.

These are just a few of the problems we had on our hands. And foremost on our minds was the prospect of the very worst coming to pass – a 9/11 with nuclear weapons.

For me, one of the defining experiences was the morning of 9/11 itself. As you might recall, I was in my office in that first hour, when radar caught sight of an airliner heading toward the White House at 500 miles an hour. That was Flight 77, the one that ended up hitting the Pentagon. With the plane still inbound, Secret Service agents came into my office and said we had to leave, now. A few moments later I found myself in a fortified White House command post somewhere down below.

There in the bunker came the reports and images that so many Americans remember from that day – word of the crash in Pennsylvania, the final phone calls from hijacked planes, the final horror for those who jumped to their death to escape burning alive. In the years since, I’ve heard occasional speculation that I’m a different man after 9/11. I wouldn’t say that. But I’ll freely admit that watching a coordinated, devastating attack on our country from an underground bunker at the White House can affect how you view your responsibilities.

To make certain our nation country never again faced such a day of horror, we developed a comprehensive strategy, beginning with far greater homeland security to make the United States a harder target. But since wars cannot be won on the defensive, we moved decisively against the terrorists in their hideouts and sanctuaries, and committed to using every asset to take down their networks. We decided, as well, to confront the regimes that sponsored terrorists, and to go after those who provide sanctuary, funding, and weapons to enemies of the United States. We turned special attention to regimes that had the capacity to build weapons of mass destruction, and might transfer such weapons to terrorists.

We did all of these things, and with bipartisan support put all these policies in place. It has resulted in serious blows against enemy operations … the take-down of the A.Q. Khan network … and the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear program. It’s required the commitment of many thousands of troops in two theaters of war, with high points and some low points in both Iraq and Afghanistan – and at every turn, the people of our military carried the heaviest burden. Well over seven years into the effort, one thing we know is that the enemy has spent most of this time on the defensive – and every attempt to strike inside the United States has failed.

So we’re left to draw one of two conclusions – and here is the great dividing line in our current debate over national security. You can look at the facts and conclude that the comprehensive strategy has worked, and therefore needs to be continued as vigilantly as ever. Or you can look at the same set of facts and conclude that 9/11 was a one-off event – coordinated, devastating, but also unique and not sufficient to justify a sustained wartime effort. Whichever conclusion you arrive at, it will shape your entire view of the last seven years, and of the policies necessary to protect America for years to come.

The key to any strategy is accurate intelligence, and skilled professionals to get that information in time to use it. In seeking to guard this nation against the threat of catastrophic violence, our Administration gave intelligence officers the tools and lawful authority they needed to gain vital information. We didn’t invent that authority. It is drawn from Article Two of the Constitution. And it was given specificity by the Congress after 9/11, in a Joint Resolution authorizing “all necessary and appropriate force” to protect the American people.

Our government prevented attacks and saved lives through the Terrorist Surveillance Program, which let us intercept calls and track contacts between al-Qaeda operatives and persons inside the United States. The program was top secret, and for good reason, until the editors of the New York Times got it and put it on the front page. After 9/11, the Times had spent months publishing the pictures and the stories of everyone killed by al-Qaeda on 9/11. Now here was that same newspaper publishing secrets in a way that could only help al-Qaeda. It impressed the Pulitzer committee, but it damn sure didn’t serve the interests of our country, or the safety of our people.

In the years after 9/11, our government also understood that the safety of the country required collecting information known only to the worst of the terrorists. And in a few cases, that information could be gained only through tough interrogations.

In top secret meetings about enhanced interrogations, I made my own beliefs clear. I was and remain a strong proponent of our enhanced interrogation program. The interrogations were used on hardened terrorists after other efforts failed. They were legal, essential, justified, successful, and the right thing to do. The intelligence officers who questioned the terrorists can be proud of their work and proud of the results, because they prevented the violent death of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of innocent people.

Our successors in office have their own views on all of these matters.

By presidential decision, last month we saw the selective release of documents relating to enhanced interrogations. This is held up as a bold exercise in open government, honoring the public’s right to know. We’re informed, as well, that there was much agonizing over this decision.

Yet somehow, when the soul-searching was done and the veil was lifted on the policies of the Bush administration, the public was given less than half the truth. The released memos were carefully redacted to leave out references to what our government learned through the methods in question. Other memos, laying out specific terrorist plots that were averted, apparently were not even considered for release. For reasons the administration has yet to explain, they believe the public has a right to know the method of the questions, but not the content of the answers.

Over on the left wing of the president’s party, there appears to be little curiosity in finding out what was learned from the terrorists. The kind of answers they’re after would be heard before a so-called “Truth Commission.” Some are even demanding that those who recommended and approved the interrogations be prosecuted, in effect treating political disagreements as a punishable offense, and political opponents as criminals. It’s hard to imagine a worse precedent, filled with more possibilities for trouble and abuse, than to have an incoming administration criminalize the policy decisions of its predecessors.

Apart from doing a serious injustice to intelligence operators and lawyers who deserve far better for their devoted service, the danger here is a loss of focus on national security, and what it requires. I would advise the administration to think very carefully about the course ahead. All the zeal that has been directed at interrogations is utterly misplaced. And staying on that path will only lead our government further away from its duty to protect the American people.

One person who by all accounts objected to the release of the interrogation memos was the Director of Central Intelligence, Leon Panetta. He was joined in that view by at least four of his predecessors. I assume they felt this way because they understand the importance of protecting intelligence sources, methods, and personnel. But now that this once top-secret information is out for all to see – including the enemy – let me draw your attention to some points that are routinely overlooked.

It is a fact that only detainees of the highest intelligence value were ever subjected to enhanced interrogation. You’ve heard endlessly about waterboarding. It happened to three terrorists. One of them was Khalid Sheikh Muhammed – the mastermind of 9/11, who has also boasted about beheading Daniel Pearl.

We had a lot of blind spots after the attacks on our country. We didn’t know about al-Qaeda’s plans, but Khalid Sheikh Muhammed and a few others did know. And with many thousands of innocent lives potentially in the balance, we didn’t think it made sense to let the terrorists answer questions in their own good time, if they answered them at all.

Maybe you’ve heard that when we captured KSM, he said he would talk as soon as he got to New York City and saw his lawyer. But like many critics of interrogations, he clearly misunderstood the business at hand. American personnel were not there to commence an elaborate legal proceeding, but to extract information from him before al-Qaeda could strike again and kill more of our people.

In public discussion of these matters, there has been a strange and sometimes willful attempt to conflate what happened at Abu Ghraib prison with the top secret program of enhanced interrogations. At Abu Ghraib, a few sadistic prison guards abused inmates in violation of American law, military regulations, and simple decency. For the harm they did, to Iraqi prisoners and to America’s cause, they deserved and received Army justice. And it takes a deeply unfair cast of mind to equate the disgraces of Abu Ghraib with the lawful, skillful, and entirely honorable work of CIA personnel trained to deal with a few malevolent men.

Those personnel were carefully chosen from within the CIA, and were specially prepared to apply techniques within the boundaries of their training and the limits of the law. Torture was never permitted, and the methods were given careful legal review before they were approved. Interrogators had authoritative guidance on the line between toughness and torture, and they knew to stay on the right side of it.

Even before the interrogation program began, and throughout its operation, it was closely reviewed to ensure that every method used was in full compliance with the Constitution, statutes, and treaty obligations. On numerous occasions, leading members of Congress, including the current speaker of the House, were briefed on the program and on the methods.

Yet for all these exacting efforts to do a hard and necessary job and to do it right, we hear from some quarters nothing but feigned outrage based on a false narrative. In my long experience in Washington, few matters have inspired so much contrived indignation and phony moralizing as the interrogation methods applied to a few captured terrorists.

I might add that people who consistently distort the truth in this way are in no position to lecture anyone about “values.” Intelligence officers of the United States were not trying to rough up some terrorists simply to avenge the dead of 9/11. We know the difference in this country between justice and vengeance. Intelligence officers were not trying to get terrorists to confess to past killings; they were trying to prevent future killings. From the beginning of the program, there was only one focused and all-important purpose. We sought, and we in fact obtained, specific information on terrorist plans.

Those are the basic facts on enhanced interrogations. And to call this a program of torture is to libel the dedicated professionals who have saved American lives, and to cast terrorists and murderers as innocent victims. What’s more, to completely rule out enhanced interrogation methods in the future is unwise in the extreme. It is recklessness cloaked in righteousness, and would make the American people less safe.

The administration seems to pride itself on searching for some kind of middle ground in policies addressing terrorism. They may take comfort in hearing disagreement from opposite ends of the spectrum. If liberals are unhappy about some decisions, and conservatives are unhappy about other decisions, then it may seem to them that the President is on the path of sensible compromise. But in the fight against terrorism, there is no middle ground, and half-measures keep you half exposed. You cannot keep just some nuclear-armed terrorists out of the United States, you must keep every nuclear-armed terrorist out of the United States. Triangulation is a political strategy, not a national security strategy. When just a single clue that goes unlearned … one lead that goes unpursued … can bring on catastrophe – it’s no time for splitting differences. There is never a good time to compromise when the lives and safety of the American people are in the balance.

Behind the overwrought reaction to enhanced interrogations is a broader misconception about the threats that still face our country. You can sense the problem in the emergence of euphemisms that strive to put an imaginary distance between the American people and the terrorist enemy. Apparently using the term “war” where terrorists are concerned is starting to feel a bit dated. So henceforth we’re advised by the administration to think of the fight against terrorists as, quote, “Overseas contingency operations.” In the event of another terrorist attack on America, the Homeland Security Department assures us it will be ready for this, quote, “man-made disaster” – never mind that the whole Department was created for the purpose of protecting Americans from terrorist attack.

And when you hear that there are no more, quote, “enemy combatants,” as there were back in the days of that scary war on terror, at first that sounds like progress. The only problem is that the phrase is gone, but the same assortment of killers and would-be mass murderers are still there. And finding some less judgmental or more pleasant-sounding name for terrorists doesn’t change what they are – or what they would do if we let them loose.

On his second day in office, President Obama announced that he was closing the detention facility at Guantanamo. This step came with little deliberation and no plan. Their idea now, as stated by Attorney General Holder and others, is apparently to bring some of these hardened terrorists into the United States. On this one, I find myself in complete agreement with many in the President’s own party. Unsure how to explain to their constituents why terrorists might soon be relocating into their states, these Democrats chose instead to strip funding for such a move out of the most recent war supplemental.

The administration has found that it’s easy to receive applause in Europe for closing Guantanamo. But it’s tricky to come up with an alternative that will serve the interests of justice and America’s national security. Keep in mind that these are hardened terrorists picked up overseas since 9/11. The ones that were considered low-risk were released a long time ago. And among these, it turns out that many were treated too leniently, because they cut a straight path back to their prior line of work and have conducted murderous attacks in the Middle East. I think the President will find, upon reflection, that to bring the worst of the worst terrorists inside the United States would be cause for great danger and regret in the years to come.

In the category of euphemism, the prizewinning entry would be a recent editorial in a familiar newspaper that referred to terrorists we’ve captured as, quote, “abducted.” Here we have ruthless enemies of this country, stopped in their tracks by brave operatives in the service of America, and a major editorial page makes them sound like they were kidnap victims, picked up at random on their way to the movies.

It’s one thing to adopt the euphemisms that suggest we’re no longer engaged in a war. These are just words, and in the end it’s the policies that matter most. You don’t want to call them enemy combatants? Fine. Call them what you want – just don’t bring them into the United States. Tired of calling it a war? Use any term you prefer. Just remember it is a serious step to begin unraveling some of the very policies that have kept our people safe since 9/11.

Another term out there that slipped into the discussion is the notion that American interrogation practices were a “recruitment tool” for the enemy. On this theory, by the tough questioning of killers, we have supposedly fallen short of our own values. This recruitment-tool theory has become something of a mantra lately, including from the President himself. And after a familiar fashion, it excuses the violent and blames America for the evil that others do. It’s another version of that same old refrain from the Left, “We brought it on ourselves.”

It is much closer to the truth that terrorists hate this country precisely because of the values we profess and seek to live by, not by some alleged failure to do so. Nor are terrorists or those who see them as victims exactly the best judges of America’s moral standards, one way or the other.

Critics of our policies are given to lecturing on the theme of being consistent with American values. But no moral value held dear by the American people obliges public servants ever to sacrifice innocent lives to spare a captured terrorist from unpleasant things. And when an entire population is targeted by a terror network, nothing is more consistent with American values than to stop them.

As a practical matter, too, terrorists may lack much, but they have never lacked for grievances against the United States. Our belief in freedom of speech and religion … our belief in equal rights for women … our support for Israel … our cultural and political influence in the world – these are the true sources of resentment, all mixed in with the lies and conspiracy theories of the radical clerics. These recruitment tools were in vigorous use throughout the 1990s, and they were sufficient to motivate the 19 recruits who boarded those planes on September 11th, 2001.

The United States of America was a good country before 9/11, just as we are today. List all the things that make us a force for good in the world – for liberty, for human rights, for the rational, peaceful resolution of differences – and what you end up with is a list of the reasons why the terrorists hate America. If fine speech-making, appeals to reason, or pleas for compassion had the power to move them, the terrorists would long ago have abandoned the field. And when they see the American government caught up in arguments about interrogations, or whether foreign terrorists have constitutional rights, they don’t stand back in awe of our legal system and wonder whether they had misjudged us all along. Instead the terrorists see just what they were hoping for – our unity gone, our resolve shaken, our leaders distracted. In short, they see weakness and opportunity.

What is equally certain is this: The broad-based strategy set in motion by President Bush obviously had nothing to do with causing the events of 9/11. But the serious way we dealt with terrorists from then on, and all the intelligence we gathered in that time, had everything to do with preventing another 9/11 on our watch. The enhanced interrogations of high-value detainees and the terrorist surveillance program have without question made our country safer. Every senior official who has been briefed on these classified matters knows of specific attacks that were in the planning stages and were stopped by the programs we put in place.

This might explain why President Obama has reserved unto himself the right to order the use of enhanced interrogation should he deem it appropriate. What value remains to that authority is debatable, given that the enemy now knows exactly what interrogation methods to train against, and which ones not to worry about. Yet having reserved for himself the authority to order enhanced interrogation after an emergency, you would think that President Obama would be less disdainful of what his predecessor authorized after 9/11. It’s almost gone unnoticed that the president has retained the power to order the same methods in the same circumstances. When they talk about interrogations, he and his administration speak as if they have resolved some great moral dilemma in how to extract critical information from terrorists. Instead they have put the decision off, while assigning a presumption of moral superiority to any decision they make in the future.

Releasing the interrogation memos was flatly contrary to the national security interest of the United States. The harm done only begins with top secret information now in the hands of the terrorists, who have just received a lengthy insert for their training manual. Across the world, governments that have helped us capture terrorists will fear that sensitive joint operations will be compromised. And at the CIA, operatives are left to wonder if they can depend on the White House or Congress to back them up when the going gets tough. Why should any agency employee take on a difficult assignment when, even though they act lawfully and in good faith, years down the road the press and Congress will treat everything they do with suspicion, outright hostility, and second-guessing? Some members of Congress are notorious for demanding they be briefed into the most sensitive intelligence programs. They support them in private, and then head for the hills at the first sign of controversy.

As far as the interrogations are concerned, all that remains an official secret is the information we gained as a result. Some of his defenders say the unseen memos are inconclusive, which only raises the question why they won’t let the American people decide that for themselves. I saw that information as vice president, and I reviewed some of it again at the National Archives last month. I’ve formally asked that it be declassified so the American people can see the intelligence we obtained, the things we learned, and the consequences for national security. And as you may have heard, last week that request was formally rejected. It’s worth recalling that ultimate power of declassification belongs to the President himself. President Obama has used his declassification power to reveal what happened in the interrogation of terrorists. Now let him use that same power to show Americans what did not happen, thanks to the good work of our intelligence officials.

I believe this information will confirm the value of interrogations – and I am not alone. President Obama’s own Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Blair, has put it this way: “High value information came from interrogations in which those methods were used and provided a deeper understanding of the al-Qaeda organization that was attacking this country.” End quote. Admiral Blair put that conclusion in writing, only to see it mysteriously deleted in a later version released by the administration – the missing 26 words that tell an inconvenient truth. But they couldn’t change the words of George Tenet, the CIA Director under Presidents Clinton and Bush, who bluntly said: “I know that this program has saved lives. I know we’ve disrupted plots. I know this program alone is worth more than the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency put together have been able to tell us.” End of quote.

If Americans do get the chance to learn what our country was spared, it’ll do more than clarify the urgency and the rightness of enhanced interrogations in the years after 9/11. It may help us to stay focused on dangers that have not gone away. Instead of idly debating which political opponents to prosecute and punish, our attention will return to where it belongs – on the continuing threat of terrorist violence, and on stopping the men who are planning it.

For all the partisan anger that still lingers, our administration will stand up well in history – not despite our actions after 9/11, but because of them. And when I think about all that was to come during our administration and afterward – the recriminations, the second-guessing, the charges of “hubris” – my mind always goes back to that moment.

To put things in perspective, suppose that on the evening of 9/11, President Bush and I had promised that for as long as we held office – which was to be another 2,689 days – there would never be another terrorist attack inside this country. Talk about hubris – it would have seemed a rash and irresponsible thing to say. People would have doubted that we even understood the enormity of what had just happened. Everyone had a very bad feeling about all of this, and felt certain that the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and Shanksville were only the beginning of the violence.

Of course, we made no such promise. Instead, we promised an all-out effort to protect this country. We said we would marshal all elements of our nation’s power to fight this war and to win it. We said we would never forget what had happened on 9/11, even if the day came when many others did forget. We spoke of a war that would “include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success.” We followed through on all of this, and we stayed true to our word.

To the very end of our administration, we kept al-Qaeda terrorists busy with other problems. We focused on getting their secrets, instead of sharing ours with them. And on our watch, they never hit this country again. After the most lethal and devastating terrorist attack ever, seven and a half years without a repeat is not a record to be rebuked and scorned, much less criminalized. It is a record to be continued until the danger has passed.

Along the way there were some hard calls. No decision of national security was ever made lightly, and certainly never made in haste. As in all warfare, there have been costs – none higher than the sacrifices of those killed and wounded in our country’s service. And even the most decisive victories can never take away the sorrow of losing so many of our own – all those innocent victims of 9/11, and the heroic souls who died trying to save them.

For all that we’ve lost in this conflict, the United States has never lost its moral bearings. And when the moral reckoning turns to the men known as high-value terrorists, I can assure you they were neither innocent nor victims. As for those who asked them questions and got answers: they did the right thing, they made our country safer, and a lot of Americans are alive today because of them.

Like so many others who serve America, they are not the kind to insist on a thank-you. But I will always be grateful to each one of them, and proud to have served with them for a time in the same cause. They, and so many others, have given honorable service to our country through all the difficulties and all the dangers. I will always admire them and wish them well. And I am confident that this nation will never take their work, their dedication, or their achievements, for granted.

Thank you very much.

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