However, while they made this claim it is simply not supported by the public record Abu Zubaydah, and his colleagues Ibn Al Shaykh Al Libi and Noor Uthman Muhammaed were (minor) rivals to Osama bin Laden, not his assistants or associates.

Al Qaeda had several military training camps in Afghanistan. The two most well-known al Qaeda camps were Al Farouq and Tarnak Farms. Al Qaida may have half a dozen or a dozen other camps. But, according to Indian Intelligence, the Taliban had allowed various militant groups it had given santuary to, to found and run over one hundred independent military training camps.

Of these camps the Khaldan training camp that Abu Zubaydah, Al Libi and Noor Uthman Mohammaed ran was the most famous. It was famous for training many of the foreigners the CIA had helped infiltrate into Afghanistan to fight the Soviet occupation during the 1980s. And it was famous for continuing to train muslims to prepare for armed conflict by acquiring new sponsors after the CIA dropped its sponsorship when to Soviets abandoned Afghanistan.

Both Abu Zubaydah and Noor Uthman Muhammaed independently testified at their Tribunals that the Taliban forced them to close the Khaldan camp in 2000 — a year before the attacks of 9-11.

I believe the public record strongly supports that Osama bin Laden regarded those who ran the Khaldan camp as his rivals. Abu Zubaydah testified he only met Osama bin Laden once — in 2000. He had sought him out to ask to use his influence to convice the Taliban not to shut down Khalden, the camp he had helped run. He testified that bin Laden told him (1) he would not help keep Khalden open; (2) the Taliban shut down at been at his request.

Why would bin Laden request the shutdown of the non-al Qaeda camps? I think the public record suggests two reasons. First, Khalden had one extremely important ideological policy difference with bin Laden and al Qaeda. While it helped train individuals to prepare for combat to defend Islam, unlike al Qaeda, it was not ideologically committed to attack the USA. Second, like al Qaeda it was supported by shadowy sponsors — probably from the same pool of shadowy sponsors. If bin Laden could get those other camps shut down he wouldn't have to share those sponsors.

Strategically, it was a big mistake for the USA to allow extremists to perform the interrogations, and the analysis thereof, of the men from Khalden. If true professional intelligence analysts had been in charge, sober, dispassionate men and women, not driven by a thirst for vengeance, they would have considered the possibility that the jealousies and ideological differences between al Qaeda and the men who ran Khalden could have been exploited.

If his testimony is to be believed Abu Zubaydah did not regard himself as a terrorist. He testified that the trainees at Khalden were taught only to attack military targets. It could be argued that his belief that he was not a terrorist didn't matter. Abu Zubaydah managed the safe houses in Pakistan where candidates for training were received and he vetted them. He said he had not actually visited the training site in Afghanistan himself for years. He may not have really known to what extent trainees were instructed not to target civilians. Additionally, at least one graduate, Ahmed Ressam, had chosen to target civilians.

But perhaps it was worthwhile to have used the humane, rapport-building approach to interrogation function — and to have allowed humane interrogators to have played up that they too believed he was not a terrorist like bin Laden, and to have used Abu Zubaydah's stated denunciation of terrorism.

This shared apparent rejection of terrorism could have been used to induce him to coperate more fully with counter-terrorism analysts.

Abu Zubaydah had been, for a decade, the most visible face of the most famous training camp in Afghanistan. Would there not have been value to agree to give him some kind of release to house arrest — provided every time al Qaeda released a new video he pumped out a video in response that criticized al Qaeda for its un-Islamic attacks on civilians?

However, while they made this claim it is simply not supported by the public record Abu Zubaydah, and his colleagues Ibn Al Shaykh Al Libi and Noor Uthman Muhammaed were (minor) rivals to Osama bin Laden, not his assistants of associates.

Al Qaeda had several military training camps in Afghanistan. The two most well-known al Qaeda camps were Al Farouq and Tarnak Farms. Al Qaida may have half a dozen or a dozen other camps. But, according to Indian Intelligence, the Taliban had allowed various militant groups it had given santuary to, to found and run over one hundred independent military training camps.

Of these camps the Khaldan training camp that Abu Zubaydah, Al Libi and Noor Uthman Mohammaed ran was the most famous. It was famous for training many of the foreigners the CIA had helped infiltrate into Afghanistan to fight the Soviet occupation during the 1980s. And it was famous for continuing to train muslims to prepare for armed conflict by acquiring new sponsors after the CIA dropped its sponsorship when to Soviets abandoned Afghanistan.

Both Abu Zubaydah and Noor Uthman Muhammaed independently testified at their Tribunals that the Taliban forced them to close the Khaldan camp in 2000 — a year before the attacks of 9-11.

I believe the public record strongly supports that Osama bin Laden regarded those who ran the Khaldan camp as his rivals. Abu Zubaydah testified he only met Osama bin Laden once — in 2000. He had sought him out to ask to use his influence to convice the Taliban not to shut down Khalden, the camp he had helped run. He testified that bin Laden told him (1) he would not help keep Khalden open; (2) the Taliban shut down at been at his request.

Why would bin Laden request the shutdown of the non-al Qaeda camps? I think the public record suggests two reasons. First, Khalden had one extremely important ideological policy difference with bin Laden and al Qaeda. While it helped train individuals to prepare for combat to defend Islam, unlike al Qaeda, it was not ideologically committed to attack the USA. Second, like al Qaeda it was supported by shadowy sponsors — probably from the same pool of shadowy sponsors. If bin Laden could get those other camps shut down he wouldn't have to share those sponsors.

Strategically, it was a big mistake for the USA to allow extremists to perform the interrogations, and the analysis thereof, of the men from Khalden. If true professional intelligence analysts had been in charge, sober, dispassionate men and women, not driven by a thirst for vengeance, they would have considered the possibility that the jealousies and ideological differences between al Qaeda and the men who ran Khalden could have been exploited.

If his testimony is to be believed Abu Zubaydah did not regard himself as a terrorist. He testified that the trainees at Khalden were taught only to attack military targets. It could be argued that his belief that he was not a terrorist didn't matter. Abu Zubaydah managed the safe houses in Pakistan where candidates for training were received and he vetted them. He said he had not actually visited the training site in Afghanistan himself for years. He may not have really known to what extent trainees were instructed not to target civilians. Additionally, at least one graduate, Ahmed Ressam, had chosen to target civilians.

But perhaps it was worthwhile to have used the humane, rapport-building approach to interrogation function — and to have allowed humane interrogators to have played up that they too believed he was not a terrorist like bin Laden, and to have used Abu Zubaydah's stated denunciation of terrorism.

This shared apparent rejection of terrorism could have been used to induce him to coperate more fully with counter-terrorism analysts.

Abu Zubaydah had been, for a decade, the most visible face of the most famous training camp in Afghanistan. Would there not have been value to agree to give him some kind of release to house arrest — provided every time al Qaeda released a new video he pumped out a video in response that criticized al Qaeda for its un-Islamic attacks on civilians?