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The U.S. Army's counterinsurgency manual points out that such conflicts aren't won by the military so much, but rather by the aid, development, and improved government services end of things.

What does that make an aid worker? That makes him a counterinsurgent. His aid program is a weapon, designed to win the masses away from the hard-core insurgents. Those hard-core insurgents are left for the regular military to deal with. I don't know that even Petraeus thinks of it that way, but that is what contemporary doctrine amounts to.

Getting back to the COIN manual, it emphasizes the need for close coordination with aid agencies and their implementing partners. It also suggests that putting the aid community under the commander's authority allows for the best coordination. This should make perfect sense; wars are fought by means of centralized control, and in the weird form of war that is counterinsurgency, in which an aid program is a weapon that deprives the insurgents of support, it will be a good idea to coordinate that weapon with all the other, conventional weapons.

The idea that aid and development workers are important, active participants in the struggle– that they are counterinsurgents– does not seem to have sunk in yet. But we need to deploy our aid in cunning ways that will advance the counterinsurgency, not in blind ways as though we were working in peacetime. See, for example: http://alamanach.com/2009/06/03/counterinsurgen...

I probably should mention that I am an aid worker, based in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

The U.S. Army's counterinsurgency manual points out that such conflicts aren't won by the military so much, but rather by the aid, development, and improved government services end of things.

What does that make an aid worker? That makes him a counterinsurgent. His aid program is a weapon, designed to win the masses away from the hard-core insurgents. Those hard-core insurgents are left for the regular military to deal with. I don't know that even Petraeus thinks of it that way, but that is what contemporary doctrine amounts to.

Getting back to the COIN manual, it emphasizes the need for close coordination with aid agencies and their implementing partners. It also suggests that putting the aid community under the commander's authority allows for the best coordination. This should make perfect sense; wars are fought by means of centralized control, and in the weird form of war that is counterinsurgency, in which an aid program is a weapon that deprives the insurgents of support, it will be a good idea to coordinate that weapon with all the other, conventional weapons.

The idea that aid and development workers are important, active participants in the struggle– that they are counterinsurgents– does not seem to have sunk in yet. But we need to deploy our aid in cunning ways that will advance the counterinsurgency, not in blind ways as though we were working in peacetime. See, for example: http://alamanach.com/2009/06/03/counterinsurgen...

I probably should mention that I am an aid worker, based in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

General Jones is starting to make some very good moves, but lives and works in a closed circle that blocks out all of the good ideas from the past 20 years starting with General Al Gray's seminal article “Intelligence Challenges in the 1990's” that identified narcotics as a “type” threat and called for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) that would justify “peaceful preventive measures” and Whole of Government operations. We still do not have a national strategy center (General Tony Zinni would be perfect as the director, a national intelligence processing center, access to the 80% of the information needed that is in 183 languages we do not speak, and so on and so on and so on.

Learn more at http://www.oss.net/HILL, where the white paper “Fixing the White House and National Intelligence” can be found, along with “Perhaps We Should Have Shouted: A 20 Year Retrospective,” which Joint Forces Quarterly has refused to publish–looking in a mirror must not be fun over there.

Robert David STEELE Vivas
CEO, OSS.Net, Inc.
Pro bono CEO Earth Intelligence Network