Afghan Ambassador Speaks on Future War Strategy

At 6 p.m., Said Jawad, the Afghan ambassador to the United States, is scheduled to give a speech at Harvard University outlining what the Afghan government wants a new U.S. approach to the seven-and-a-half-year war to look like. Much of what he is expected to say was outlined by the Afghan cabinet-officers’ delegation to Washington two weeks ago: there can be no counterterrorism success in Afghanistan without a thoroughgoing increase in security, prosperity and governmental capacity. The new troops are welcome, but Jawad wants additional resources devoted to training Afghan security forces. Most of the Obama administration probably agrees with most of this, at least in broad outline.

More interesting is Jawad’s perspective on negotiating with the Taliban-led insurgency. Speaking to a point Josh Foust has taken me to task for overlooking, Jawad reminds that talks with “individual Taliban commanders has been going on for the past six years” and says about 600 insurgents have agreed to stop fighting, with some “even occupy[ing] public offices in government and parliament.” Mirroring the reconciliation framework that I reported the Afghan government is adopting, Jawad uses Gen. David McKiernan’s “capital-T Taliban” phraseology to describe those whom the Afghan government considers irreconcilable:

This faction is affiliated with Al Qaeda and the regional and international terrorist networks. Contrary to Iraq, the history of Al Qaeda and the Haqqani and Hekmatyar networks are deeply rooted in the three decades of fighting together against the Soviet Union and cemented by inter-marriages.  This group of Taliban is irreconcilable and will not rest until their main objectives of eliminating the West and its allies are met. They must be defeated or eliminated by force. We mustn’t forget that in 2001, there were talks with the Taliban for it to deliver Osama bin Laden, but that yielded no success. Furthermore, since 2004, talks with similar groups in Waziristan, Pakistan and FATA have led to regroupings, extended control and brutalities against the Pakistani people.

The other mid-level commanders are potentially reconcilable and the foot soldiers need a jobs program to cleave them from the insurgency. Jawad thinks there’s really no hope in talking with them unless fighting continues:

Negotiation and reconciliation with the Taliban will succeed only if we talk to them from the position of strength and with a clear and strong stand on human rights, women’s rights and the Afghan Constitution.  These are principles on which there cannot be concession or compromise. Unfortunately, some of the current “defeatist” and “reductionist” media statements and policy recommendations in the U.S. and European capitals feed the Taliban propaganda, which is mainly based on questioning the U.S. and NATO’s staying power. NATO and U.S. forces are saying that we are not winning in Afghanistan, implying that the Taliban are not losing. If they are not losing, why should they talk to us?

But they’re not losing. Saying that does something more important than “feed[ing] the Taliban propaganda” — it reflects the truth about the current strategic situation. If the insurgency wasn’t registering big successes, there would be no need to negotiate. Jawad risks marginalizing himself if he’s telling the Obama administration to stop speaking clearly about the severity of the situation in Afghanistan.