Big T, Little T: McKiernan on the Karzai-Taliban Peace Talks
Wednesday, November 19, 2008 at 11:47 am
When last I heard from Gen. David McKiernan, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, it was early October and he was only grudgingly in favor of supporting Hamid Karzai’s then-fledging outreach to the Taliban. (It was literally the last question McKiernan took as he was leaving his Newseum press conference.) But Nathan Hodge at Danger Room has more on McKiernan, who spoke last night at an Atlantic Council forum.
Judging from Hodge’s piece, McKiernan sounded many of the same themes he did at the Newseum –
Ultimately this will be a political solution, ultimately people will decide to stop fighting and come together for a better future. So I think the idea of reconciliation — or whatever term we want to use, that’s a very Western term, not an Afghan term — the idea of reconciliation, the idea of fighters putting down their weapons and agreeing to support a legitimate constitution of Afghanistan I think is a very powerful weapon and something that ought to be pursued.
– but he added something else that sounds like a useful concept for disaggregating the Afghan insurgency:
I like to refer to the Taliban as Taliban with a small ‘t’ — those who pick up weapons and fight for the Taliban because they are either unemployed, they are fighting for intra-tribal reasons, they are fighting because their family is intimidated, they are fighting for reasons of power, a variety of reasons — and to the Taliban with a capital ‘t,’ those who perhaps fight for ideological reasons.
Prudently, McKiernan didn’t guarantee that this difference could be exploited, at least judging from Hodge’s reporting. But it does offer, at the least, an intellectual framework for strategizing how to exploit the fissure.
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3 Comments
Comment posted December 16, 2008 @ 4:19 am
disclaimer: i live and work in kabul.
i think it's very important to avoiding using the word “taliban” and instead talk about the particular commanders, tribal militias, or organized forces in play. for example, we have the quetta shura with mullah omar, the peshawar shura, hekmatyar/hezb-i-islami, and beitullah mesud – all of which frequently get labeled as “taliban”, in spite of the fact that they sometimes fight and are decidedly not a coherent entity with centralized command-and-control, finance, or ideological operations.
attemps to disarm various factions and tribes have had various degrees of success – there was DDR and DIAG and a few other ones. however, these were never wholeheartedly backed by the US, and in fact were undermined by all the talk of creating rearmed-but-unaccountable tribal militias (lashkars) based on the anbar awakening model. ugh… talk about a footshoot.
duh, of course fighters putting down their weapons sounds great, but who is going to provide security for them if they do? who will protect them from the various warlords, goons, fanatics, and government employees that operate with near-impunity in their home valleys?
till the US embassy/army/etc stops worrying as much about poppy farmers and starts worrying about physical, economic, and environmental security of the afghan people, we won't win. we may “win”, but we won't win.
the ball's in our court, yall…
Comment posted February 3, 2009 @ 10:58 pm
Excellent, entertaining, useful reading, Thanks !!
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