Q: General, from a military perspective, how do the plans to privatize Iraqi oil and carry out a "soft partition" of Iraq appear to affect the willingness of Iraqis to support the insurgency? If we start supporting a plan to nationalize Iraqi oil, and we also give up the partition plans, do you believe that we would start to win Iraqi hearts and minds?

Q: General, you have often pointed to Iran as a major backer of some elements of the Iraq insurgency – yet the closest ally the U.S. has in Iraq is Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who heads the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and has historically close ties to Iran. Iran has also apparently played a major role in brokering a cease-fire between Maliki and Sadr. What is now your current view of Iran?

Q: General, we've heard a lot about Al Qaeda in Iraq from military press releases, but there's been little independent confirmation that Al Qaeda really is active in Iraq, and many Al Qaeda fighters are reported to have joined the "Sunni Awakening". On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that Al Qaeda has regrouped on the Afghan-Pakistan border. Given this situation, how do you justify the focus on Iraq?

Q: General, to what extent is the U.S. using Operation Phoenix-style counterinsurgency programs in Iraq? Can you state whether or not the "El Salvador Option" is being applied in Iraq today, as Seymour Hersh reported:

"The new rules will enable the Special Forces community to set up what it calls