rssDo I Talk About the Karzai-Taliban Negotiations in Platitudes?
Friday, October 31, 2008 at 2:00 pm
- 4 Comments
Joshua Foust says I’ve been writing too many platitudes about the Karzai-Taliban negotiations. I think he means I’m guilty of wishful thinking, and I can see how he has a point there, at least in the breezy block quote he picks out. So let me take up this question:
My question is: How? Has the Taliban — any faction since 2004 or so — demonstrated itself to be a good-faith negotiator? If so (and even if not), how do you “methodically apply peaceful inducement” (whatever the hell that means) to convince Taliban members they won’t be thrown into Bagram’s torture cells the moment they stand down?
On the question of the Taliban’s good faith, I can’t speak to motives, and I’m just going off the reporting that I’ve linked to. To be clearer, the reports by Carlotta Gall, David Ignatius and the Voice of America on the Afgh-Pak mini-jirga all say that either a) the Afgh-Pak officials have some reason to think there’s a real shot at this, or b) some former Taliban officials are seeing a basis for an opening. In the final analysis, I guess all I’m saying is that it’s worth testing their seriousness, because a) the alternative is open-ended warfare and b) the potential upshot is tremendous and in our interest. I will admit that this is comes close to substituting hope for a plan. But attempting to negotiate is cost-free.
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4 Comments
Comment posted October 31, 2008 @ 2:16 pm
Spencer, I think I should clarify: I only singled you out because I read your site and you were right there in my RSS reader. But you're not alone — I think this is a problem that is entrenched in the entire foreign policy establishment. Literally everyone does it — from Kaplan saying we just need to solve India-Pakistan to win, to Rubin and Rashid saying we just need to solve the Durand Line and apply “governance” (both are simplifications, but you get my point).
I think the general bits of what needs to happen has been known for a good six years at this point — it's why Karzai has been trying to integrate former and current “moderate” Taliban ever since their government fell. But he's had at best spotty success.
Looking at the why behind that, and not just that yet another bi-annual round of “integrating the Taliban” talks is under way, I think, would yield deeper answers. But we're not there yet — any of us, including me. I know there is a deeper issue at play, whether historical cycles of power-sharing, ethnic conflict patterns, even recent dynamics in community dispute. But I'm not there, so I can't say for sure.
We need to split off reconciliable Taliban. That's settled. I'm just curious as to how. I've not figure it out yet. And we need to be willing to accept that there might not be a way we can. But that kind of theorization hasn't happened yet, at least not publicly. That's what I was getting at.
Comment posted November 2, 2008 @ 11:59 am
“But attempting to negotiate is cost-free.”
Well, what if the attempt succeeds? Would you say that negotiating is cost-free?
Do you have any idea of what good would come from negotiation at present?
Are you being careful about what you wish for?
Comment posted November 2, 2008 @ 7:59 pm
“But attempting to negotiate is cost-free.”
Well, what if the attempt succeeds? Would you say that negotiating is cost-free?
Do you have any idea of what good would come from negotiation at present?
Are you being careful about what you wish for?
Comment posted September 6, 2011 @ 10:20 am
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