It’s Not The Candidates, It’s The System

I was all ready to give the gasface to Michael Rubin and Scott Carpenter’s op-ed about the Iraqi provincial elections, but I actually think it deserves a serious response. In essence, they’re arguing that the provincial elections present a chance to hit the reset button on Iraqi politics. And, you know, I suppose, but it’s not likely. They fall victim to a classic imperial mistake: presuming that the devil you don’t know is preferable to the devil you do.

At the local level, however, there is real opportunity. Before the 2005 elections, one poll showed that only 3 percent of Iraqis viewed political parties favorably. As ordinary people have been victimized by corruption, abuses of power and party militias, Iraqis say the popularity of political parties and party bosses has fallen even further. Many Shiites, for example, say that they will no longer vote for a unified sectarian list. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani recognizes the trend and will probably not demand sectarian solidarity in local elections. In Anbar, local elections enable the Iraqis there to solidify the past year’s gains. For the emergent leadership of the Awakening Council, who earned their credentials on the battlefield against al-Qaeda affiliates, provincial elections mean real representation, whether or not Iraq’s Shiite leadership likes it.

Note the million hidden premises here. Most notably, where’s the evidence that the new crop of potential province-bred leaders will be any less corrupt or intransigent or parochial than the current one? Abdul Sattar al-Rashawi was a highway bandit. Counterinsurgents openly refer to the Sons of Iraq and tribal leaders as “warlords.” I’m not making an argument for not having the elections — Nouri al-Maliki seems to need little help there — just for a realistic assessment of what they’ll yield.

Also, would it kill them to consider that the problems with Iraq’s politics are systemic, and don’t reduce to Good Guys and Bad Guys?